EMB 145 flight crew reported an engine bleed leak and pressurization failure during departure resulted in return to departure airport.
Synopsis
EMB 145 flight crew reported an engine bleed leak and pressurization failure during departure resulted in return to departure airport.
Narrative
Climbing out of ZZZ we received a Master Caution 'Bleed Leak 1' EICAS message around 8;000-10;000 ft. I called for the FO to start running the Bleed Leak QRH. We had the EICAS message but did not have the Red Leak inscription on the associated button. I used the test switch on the OH (Overhead) panel to verify the light was not burned out. At this point we advised ATC we were trouble shooting an issue and needed a level off with a max ALT of 25;000' per QRH. We still had the mindset of continuing at this point. We leveled off at 17;000. We advised dispatch we were troubleshooting a bleed leak issue. I transferred the flight controls over to the FO so I could look at the QRH and communicate with ATC. After the first section of 'Wait 3 minutes' in the QRH and no resolution the FO and I discussed RTF (Return to Field) may be a better option. Looking ahead in the checklist we knew we would likely be restricted to 10;000' no matter the decision to continue or RTF so we ask ATC for a lower altitude. We descended and began monitoring cabin ALT. I called the flight attendant and gave them a special procedures report. I stated we had a Bleed Leak and Pressurization issue; we were still evaluating whether we were going to continue or RTF. If we RTF the timeline would have been about 15 minutes. I told them no special instructions but I wanted him to monitor the cabin temp and if it got hot let me know. I was still concerned about the potential bleed leak getting into cabin. I also told him if we RTF it should be a normal landing with no special procedures. He reported back to me what I had explained to him. In our debrief we talked that the only other thing I should have added was the potential for the oxygen masks to drop with our lack of pressurization.By this point Dispatch replied to us we had burn numbers to ZZZ1 at 10;000' if we wanted them. The FO and I were agreeing now RTF was the best option. We advised ATC we wished to RTF ZZZ. We sent an ACARS to dispatch advising them we were RTF now. ATC began vectoring us around for the ILS XXR. We finished the QRH procedures and with both engine bleeds pushed out and crossbleed closed the message went away. We were aware we no longer had ice protection or pressurization. We chose not to don the O2 masks because at this time we were below 14;000 and descending to 10;000'. I gave a passenger announcement advising everyone we were returning to ZZZ for a small mechanical issue and pressurization issue. I tried my best to word it in a way that would not cause panic.Our biggest conscience now was evaluating landing weight; however after setting up the FMS for the return to field and recalculating fuel burn we determined we would be under max landing weight and did not need to run the overweight landing QRH.We encountered icing conditions on the decent into ZZZ from our previous leg and this was a major contributing factor in our decision to not continue to ZZZ1 at a lower altitude without ice protection and [request priority handling]. We did encounter icing conditions around 6000ft and requested an immediate descent to exit asap. With no engine bleeds we got the associated icing failure EICAS messages; we encountered trace icing from what we could see on the windscreen. With the expedited descent we exited icing conditions fairly rapidly.The rest of the flight was uneventful and the FO executed a normal landing. Emergency vehicles were waiting for us as we landed but we advised ATC we did not need their assistance. We taxied to the gate with no further incident.
Second reporter narrative
My crew and I were operating flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1 on Day 0. We had been slightly behind schedule due to previous delays on our last two flights. We were expecting to leave only a few minutes behind schedule as I feel we had done an effective job at making up time. I was the First Officer serving as the pilot monitoring for this flight.Pushback; taxi; and departure procedures were conducted in compliance with standard operating procedures and were uneventful. We were flying the ZZZZZ departure; when between ZZZZZ1 and ZZZZZ2 at approximately 8500 feet when we received a E1 BLEED LEAK master warning EICAS message. The red LEAK inscription on the Engine 1 bleed button was not illuminated. The Captain called for the BLEED ENGINE LEAK QRH procedure; which I initiated.At this time; the Captain elected to transfer controls to me so he could confirm and execute the QRH procedure. The QRH procedure called for pushing both engine 1 and 2 bleed sources out to close the engine bleed valves and wait three minutes; thus removing pressurization to the cabin. We determined that we would be altitude limited to 25;000 feet as per the QRH procedure but had yet to resolve the bleed leek; but nonetheless still planned to continue to ZZZ1. During the procedurally-mandated three minute waiting period; we had yet to see the BLEED LEAK message extinguish. We determined it necessary to descend below 14;000 to alleviate a rising cabin altitude; and initiated a descent to 10;000 feet. The E1 BLEED LEAK message only extinguished with both engine bleeds closed. At this point; we elected to [request priority handling] and return to ZZZ as we could not assure avoidance of icing conditions. We had encountered icing conditions on our previous arrival and thus this played a role in our decision making process.The Captain provided our Flight Attendant a special procedures briefing and made a PA to inform the passengers. He then informed our dispatcher via ACARS and we began receiving vectors for the ILS XXR into ZZZ. Upon descending into a thin layer of clouds; we encountered icing conditions; accumulated trace rime icing; and received the associated ICE CONDITION ANTI ICE INOP message. I expedited our descent; and to my recollection; we exited the icing conditions within 30 seconds. We returned to ZZZ and made a normal landing under our maximum gross landing weight; which we briefed prior to initiating the approach. We taxied to the gate with emergency personal standing by without difficulty and deplaned the aircraft once it was clear the aircraft was going to be on maintenance overnight.We felt confident in our decision making and were very satisfied with our CRM; actions taken; and debrief. We did feel as if the QRH procedure left much to be desired in the decision-making process. We felt as though there was a lack of clarity in the decision tree that would have aided us in determining whether to continue our normal flight profile and rectify the issue or descend immediately to prevent a high cabin altitude. During a climb; spending a cumulative six minutes waiting to see if the EICAS warning would extinguish was a contributing factor in our decision to descent and return to the departure airport. We felt as if there was guidance suggesting a descent prior to experiencing a cabin altitude event; we would have felt more confident and comfortable troubleshooting the issue more extensively. Additionally; with both bleed sources closed; we contemplated starting the APU; but there was no guidance in doing so. Thus; the temperature in the cabin decreased significantly; and passenger comfort now became a contributing factor in our decision making. I would also love to see guidance in the EMB-145 Aircraft Systems Manual in the specific triggers for the E1 BLEED LEAK EICAS warning versus the red LEAK inscription on the BLEED buttons on the overhead. This would provide more confidence in the potential cause and likelihood that a serious issue is being encountered versus a sensor error.I am happy with our decision making; conduct of our crew; and positive outcome of this event. Given the training; knowledge; and experience I have received; I am satisfied with the assistance I provided the Captain in flying the aircraft; CRM; and decision making.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.