Air carrier flight crew reported while on final and cleared to land; ATC issued a turn and climb without canceling the approach and landing clearance resulting in a confusing and unsafe operation.
Synopsis
Air carrier flight crew reported while on final and cleared to land; ATC issued a turn and climb without canceling the approach and landing clearance resulting in a confusing and unsafe operation.
Narrative
We were cleared for the RIVER Visual 19 approach into DCA. I was the pilot monitoring; and the Captain was the pilot flying. While on the RIVER Visual 19 approach into DCA at or around SUNEY; I checked in with Washington Tower. Tower stated; No departures prior to your arrival; wind 240@10; Runway 19 cleared to land." At or around JUBOL and at altitude of 800-900'; ATC stated "Aircraft X turn left heading 120; maintain 4000." A left turn to a 120 heading from our position at that point would've resulted in overflying the Washington Monument and flying across the National Mall; thereby penetrating P-56. I thought surely that was a mistake; so I questioned the clearance. "Was that for Aircraft X?" Tower paused and then responded; "Aircraft X; you can continue inbound; and cancel the landing clearance; and traffic is departing the southwest corner of the field on a mission here; so expect a 120 heading up to 4000." Still confused about the clearance as it was changing each time I queried; and we hadn't heard Tower say approach clearance cancelled; I asked if he wanted us to overfly the runway; trying to clarify exactly when he wanted us to execute a missed approach since our landing clearance had been rescinded; but not our approach clearance. Tower respond this time; "Cancel the approach clearance; maintain 4000." I responded; "What heading?" Tower said; "120." So; I clarified once more; "120 heading up to 4000?" Tower replied; "You got it." By this point; our position was south of P-56; so we could fly heading 120 as instructed without entering prohibited airspace. We executed a go-around turning to a heading of 120 and climbing to 4000. After receiving an approach and landing clearance; our landing clearance was canceled and we were given a heading that would've penetrated prohibited airspace while our approach clearance hadn't been cancelled. Then we were instructed to continue the approach and expect the same heading and altitude we had been given just seconds prior. Finally; our approach clearance was cancelled and a go-around was instructed and initiated. ATC's rapidly changing and ambiguous instructions lowered the safety margin during our approach. It made for a confusing and chaotic period during an already high workload approach. Furthermore; it seems to me the safer course of action would've been to hold the traffic (presumably a helicopter) at the southwest corner until we landed; rather than send a less maneuverable airplane around at low altitude and nearly into prohibited airspace. Does Tower receive no warning for these helicopter missions? Does Tower not have discretion to choose how best to separate commercial airline traffic from helicopter traffic without compromising the safety margin? Is Tower always limited to simply adjusting the flight path of commercial air traffic to deconflict with whatever the path of the helicopter traffic happens to be? If helicopter traffic is allowed to continue operating in such a way that the Tower must react with little or no warning and therefore little or no planning; the safety margin will continue to be under pressure."
Second reporter narrative
I was pilot flying on the River Visual 19 and using the RNAV (RNP) Z 19 as a backup into DCA with a clearance to land; at approximately 900 feet and in the vicinity of JUBOL intersection I heard ATC give us a 120 degree heading but I never heard an instruction to discontinue the approach or go around. I immediately thought this was a mistake and the controller may have used the wrong call sign as that heading would have required a 30 degree left turn that I was sure would put us into P56A. The FO who was PM immediately queried the controller at which time the instruction was revised and we were told to continue inbound and expect a 120 degree heading and 4000 feet due to a 'mission' departing the southeast side of the field. There seemed to be what I believed to be confusion on the part of the controller and it took several transmissions to clarify what we were doing. Without a clear instruction on what to do I initially continued the approach path as I am well aware of the complexities of DCA airspace and finally initiated a go around at approximately 300 to 400 feet when we had a clear instruction and understanding on what we were doing. After the go around we landed in DCA without further incident. I believe that this is an important event that should be documented because whatever new procedures being used at DCA can create a stressful and hazardous condition for both the flight crews and the controllers. I believe that the controller was put into a position that would have been acceptable for us to continue before but due to the recent tragic events at DCA; the controller was put into a position to make a quick decision which had we followed without question would have put our flight in danger as I believe we would have flown directly through the south side of P56A. Air Traffic Control in DCA has to have a better plan and be made aware of whatever missions are going to be conducted on the airfield so that decisions can be made in a timely and safe manner or there will be another incident.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.