MD11 flight crew reported encountering stick shaker during cleanup after a heavy weight takeoff. Crew reported lack of recency in takeoffs at those weights; reconfigured for conditions; and resumed flight normally.
Synopsis
MD11 flight crew reported encountering stick shaker during cleanup after a heavy weight takeoff. Crew reported lack of recency in takeoffs at those weights; reconfigured for conditions; and resumed flight normally.
Narrative
I (Captain) was the PF for an afternoon trip to ZZZ. We had a TOGW of 528.0; and a Vcl of 261kts. We flew the ZZZZZ departure off of Runway XXR. Following a normal takeoff and raising the flaps; I called for slats retract at 240 kts; prior to the turn at ZZZZZ1. The PM retracted the slats; about the same time as we entered the right turn at ZZZZZ1. Shortly thereafter we got a momentary stick shaker. The PM asked if I wanted the slats back out and I said I guess so. The slats were extended and the rest of the departure was flown properly. There were multiple errors on my part. During my departure briefing; I failed to brief the 230 kt speed restriction at ZZZZZ1; and the necessity of a plan to leave the slats extended until after the turn. We then would be wings level; accelerating to our Vcl speed of 261. Second; during the departure; I misjudged the effect that the turn would have on the foot; and how rapidly it would climb once the slats were retracted. I was looking right at the airspeed when I called for slats retract; and we had a good 30kts buffer above the foot; while accelerating. I was also watching the airspeed as the slats retracted; and shallowed my angle of bank as a result of the foot climbing; but it wasn't fast enough to avoid the momentary stick shaker. Obviously I should have left them extended; as previously mentioned. Also; the correct response to the premature slats retract call would have been an immediate slats extend call by me as well.There really is no excuse for these errors. I have XX years of experience on the MD-11; including more heavyweight takeoffs than I can remember. In retrospect; I think several years of flying light-loaded; domestic flights was a contributing factor without a doubt. The company's new policy of maintaining overwater currency by spending 15 minutes in the sim reviewing ORCA (Oceanic Route Clearance Authorization) procedures on a NAT (North Atlantic Track) route might seem like a good idea to them; but there's a lot more to an overwater flight than just those procedures. Namely; the corresponding heavyweight takeoffs and heavier than normal landing weights that a pilot like me almost never sees. Again; not an excuse; but it is a factor. I feel like its a combination of complacency and expectation bias that comes from doing a trip like this so infrequently.In summary; a more thorough brief and more attention to detail would have alleviated this issue. This is self-correcting for me and those I fly with in the future.
Second reporter narrative
I was originally scheduled as FO2 for an afternoon flight to ZZZ but was reassigned to FO due to scheduling needs. I ended up as the PM for the flight. We had a TOGW of 528.0; and a Vcl of 261 kts; much heavier than normal domestic flying that I've become accustomed to; and the CA hadn't flown a crossing in several years. Consequently; We focused a lot on ORCA (Oceanic Route Clearance Authorization) procedures during pre-flight. We flew the ZZZZZ departure off of Runway XXR. Following a normal takeoff and raising the flaps; the CA called for slats retract at approximately 240 kts; prior to the turn at ZZZZZ1. I looked at the foot and noticed we had about 15-20 kts above the foot and it dawned on me in that moment we had failed to ID the threat of being heavy weight and the 230 kt restriction right on departure. I paused as I assessed the situation and felt the CA look at me; so I retracted the slats thinking we had good enough margin although clearly not the normal amount of margin. As the slats were retracting; I kept my hand on the handle and the CA immediately entered the right turn at ZZZZZ1. The foot instantly jumped up to right at our airspeed; momentarily activating the stick shaker. I immediately extended the slats again while asking the PF if he wanted the slats back out. He responded I guess so. The slats remained extended until Vcl and the rest of the departure was flown properly. ??Clearly there were multiple errors on my part. First; I failed to ID the threat of being so heavy with the 230 kt restriction on departure due to expectation bias from flying so many lightweight domestic legs. Had I done that then We would've had a shared mental model that we wouldn't retract flaps until after that turn was complete and closer to Vcl. Second; As the PM it's my responsibility to ensure safe parameters are achieved and maintained before actuating any controls called for by the PF. Third; I failed to accurately judge just how far and fast the foot would jump up in this scenario. Had I properly done just 1 of these 3 things then the error would have been properly trapped and the undesired aircraft state avoided.As an experienced FO and pilot on many different high performance aircraft; and plenty of experience on the MD; there's no excuse for me to have let this happen. While there certainly were contributing factors for why this error surfaced; I could have easily used all of my CRM tools to prevent it. This has made an impact on my approach to preparing for flights so that I won't succumb to any expectation bias or complacency in the future.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.