AN LGT WAS KEPT HIGH AND FAST PASSING SMO FOR LAX. THE ACFT OVERSHOT THE RWY CTRLINE. THERE WAS A TCASII ALERT TO COMPLICATE MATTERS.

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COMMON PROBLEM AT LAX -- TOO MANY AIRPLANES TO TRY TO KEEP TRACK OF. CROSSED OVER SMO VOR AT 7000 FT AND 250 KTS. WE HAD THE ARPT IN SIGHT AS WE TURNED DOWNWIND; BUT HAD BEEN TOLD TO EXPECT ILS 24R AS VISIBILITY WAS CALLED 5 MI IN HAZE OR FOG. APCH THEN ASKED US IF WE HAD AN ACFT AHEAD OF US IN SIGHT. WE DIDN'T SEE IT BUT THE CTLR TURNED US ONTO BASE LEG AND WE KNEW THEN HE WAS GOING TO GIVE US A SHORT VISUAL APCH. WE WERE STILL PRETTY FAST (200 KTS) AND WE WERE ALL STILL LOOKING FOR THE PREVIOUSLY ISSUED TFC. THE FLT ENGINEER POINTED OUT SOMEBODY ON FINAL AND IT LOOKED TO ME LIKE WE WOULD BE TOO CLOSE TO HIM ON FINAL; SO I CALLED FOR GEAR DOWN AND FINAL FLAPS TO SLOW DOWN. WHAT WE DIDN'T REALIZE WAS THE TFC WE WERE LOOKING AT WAS FOR THE S COMPLEX. WE TURNED BACK TOWARDS THE N COMPLEX AFTER ALMOST CREATING A REAL MESS. THINGS THAT MIGHT HELP AVOID THIS : 1) IF AIRPLANES DO NOT HAVE TFC IN SIGHT; VECTOR THEM (HDG AND SPD) ONTO FINAL APCH COURSE. 2) INFORM COCKPIT CREWS OF SEQUENCE OR POSSIBILITY OF SHORT APCH AND/OR A CHANGE OF PLANS (ILS APCH TO VISUAL) ETC. 3) RADIO TFC IS SO HVY WE OFTEN CAN'T CLR THINGS UP IN A TIMELY MANNER -- HAVE TO FIGURE OUT A WAY TO STREAMLINE COM. I'D SAY WE JUST NEEDED BETTER COM FROM THE START OF THE APCH. TO TOP IT ALL OFF; THE TCASII WAS ISSUING TA'S THE WHOLE TIME. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 222426: WE WERE FLYING THE RWY 24/25 PROFILE DSCNT EXPECTING AN ILS 24R APCH (ATIS). I ASKED THE CTLR AT LEAST TWICE ABOUT THE TFC AHEAD OF US. I GOT NO RESPONSE AT LEAST ONCE PERHAPS TWICE. TFC CONFLICTS ARE NOT UNUSUAL AND TCASII SEEMS TO BE MORE HURT THAN HELP IN THE AREA.