A321 Captain reported rejecting the takeoff because the left engine was not producing takeoff power.

Narrative

Briefed rejected takeoff criteria and actions prior to push. Normal pushback and taxi. Maintenance had requested a TOGA takeoff. On the takeoff roll; PF (FO) advanced levers to spool the engines to approximately 1.05 EPR (Engine Pressure Ratio). Once reached; levers were advanced to TOGA. While not hearing 80 knots; I (PF) glanced at instruments; noticed that the needle of #1 EPR was not set and the engine was not producing the power it should have been. The CA was diagnosing this at the 80 knots callout and called and executed a rejected takeoff. The aircraft speed at time of reject was between approximately 80 and 100 knots. I notified ATC of the reject and we stopped and turned off the runway normally. The CA announced remain seated and we reviewed the aircraft systems; brake temperatures and saw that everything was indicating normal. We notified ATC we did not require assistance; coordinated with local tech ops; and operations for a return to the gate and taxied in normally. Observations from the CA.Arriving at the dark aircraft; upon selecting ground power I found the APU master switch on and an APU Emergency Shutdown ECAM present. MX (Maintenance) was called to perform a reset. The logbook had been left with past pages hidden behind the flap and no current clean page established; and as the power up checklist was completed; the parking brake was discovered in the OFF position. The fact that the aircraft was in disarray for no apparent reason resulted in a heightened expectation of additional hidden threats. I completed the walk around and everything appeared normal. As the ground crew prepared for pushback with doors closed and the jetbridge pulled; they advised of a cut and chord showing on the #1 main tire. MX had determined a tire change was required. The chock had blocked the tire damage from being observed. All these minor issues led to an uneasy feeling of the hair standing up on the back of my neck; and may have helped set the tone in the reject. The logbook had a request for a TOGA takeoff and we briefed that as well. Initial power application was normal; acceleration appeared normal; engine indications appeared normal at first run through. Approaching 80 kts as I scanned back through the engine gauges and prepared to announce '80 kts power set' the number 1 EPR was clearly not at the target position. It took a second to verify that it wasn't a fluctuation and was relatively steady state. There was not enough time to assess well; how much power was actually being produced; but I could not honestly make the call 'power set' either. The fact that we still had almost 70 kts of additional acceleration to accomplish and not knowing if the power was adequate or would remain adequate for the rest of the takeoff role; led to the decision to discontinue the takeoff. Because we had crossed into the high speed regime and the internal company focus on that point; I believe; actually led to a delay in initiating the reject as it was another consequential gate in addition to V1 and the malfunction to consider the ramifications of. Ultimately; and as quickly as possible; I announced reject knowing we had more than adequate runway to stop. The deceleration rate was such that I unintentionally did not select idle reverse as my focus shifted from stopping; to not coming to a complete stop with the autobrakes. I should have unlocked the reversers regardless.