C680 flight crew reported while on final with strong winds and obstacles; they received a GPWS alert and during landing roll the aircraft veered to the left off the centerline resulting in the flight crew proceeding visually near the obstacles and recovering control of the aircraft on the runway.
Synopsis
C680 flight crew reported while on final with strong winds and obstacles; they received a GPWS alert and during landing roll the aircraft veered to the left off the centerline resulting in the flight crew proceeding visually near the obstacles and recovering control of the aircraft on the runway.
Narrative
Aircraft operating under part 135 from ZZZ1 to ZZZ with passengers. The weather was VFR with strong; gusting winds out of the northeast close to the aircraft's crosswind limit for landing north on runway XX. Throughout cruise; the crew evaluated fuel remaining; as avionics continued to display approximately 2100lb remaining upon landing. PF/PIC repetitively brought up concern over fuel remaining with the winds at 330 @ 19 gusting up to 30kt and the high potential for a go around. PM/SIC (Second In Command) led and pushed for a detailed brief of approach considerations; including go around considerations and diversion to ZZZ2; following prior inadequate briefing led by the PF/PIC throughout the trip. PF appeared stressed out by winds and fuel considerations despite identifying and discussing available Plan B" options with PM. Both pilots identified obstacles along the approach path to runway XX as well as the fact that there is no instrument approach due to the obstacles. Pilots discussed possibility of using GPS approach to runway XY; then "side-stepping" to XX. PF questioned if this would be beneficial; and asked PM's thoughts. PM stated belief that this would complicate the approach at a low altitude; and potentially push the aircraft towards the obstacles given the wind direction and strength. Both pilots agreed to use the visual approach in the avionics; acknowledging that it does not provide terrain/obstacle clearance. PM verbally noted that the visual glideslope indicators would display a 3.70° glidepath; resulting in a steeper than normal approach and higher descent rate. Tower queried the aircraft multiple times en route regarding familiarity with the obstacles; to which the pilots responded that they were familiar and had the obstacles in sight visually. The obstacles were identified and verified visually as the aircraft approached from the east; as well as on avionics displays and on the instrument approach chart for runway XX where they are clearly displayed. The aircraft was instructed to fly on a westerly heading and intercept the final approach course. The obstacles remained to the right and slightly below the aircraft at this time; with visual contact continuing to be maintained by both pilots and verbally confirmed as such. When the PF deemed it fit; PF began the turn to join the final approach course as displayed by the visual approach in the avionics. PF did not communicate to PM before beginning turn. PF used the heading bug to accomplish the turn; resulting in a standard rate turn and consequential drift towards the obstacles. PM stated "Shallow out the turn" just before the aircraft announced "Obstacle"; then "Pull up". PF disengaged autopilot to shallow turn away from obstacles; but kept autothrottles engaged. PM did not call a go around due to visual contact; correction; and continued separation from obstacles. From this point; the aircraft continued a steeper than normal approach as previously briefed; but approach was otherwise stable and within normal parameters. Upon touchdown just left of centerline; PF did not apply adequate crosswind correction; causing the plane to immediately veer further to the left on the runway. PM observed the situation and considered that a go around / addition of power may increase velocity towards the edge of the runway. PM does not recall making three standard callouts "speedbrake"; "two deployed"; "65" that would normally be made upon landing due to attempts to control aircraft. PF did not appear to take corrective measures to remain on centerline. PM increased right rudder to prevent worsening of the situation; but was concerned with proximity to the edge of the runway. Aircraft straightened to parallel runway centerline. As the aircraft slowed; the PF removed crosswind aileron input despite having briefed full input as needed prior to the approach; including previously stating that if PF declared "your tops"; PM would take the ailerons while PF exited runway. PMre-introduced the aileron input twice after the PF tried to remove necessary inputs after the first re-introduction of input. PF used the brakes appropriately to slow the aircraft to a full stop. PM heard passenger remark that the landing "was hairy". PF continued to display signs of distress/anxiety including heavy breathing. PM communicated with tower and ground to perform normal operations; while both pilots completed normal flows and checklists after clearing the runway. Taxiing and parking occurred normally.Following the departure of the passengers; no debrief was prompted or discussed. PF stated that it was their "second worst landing"; to which PM replied "I wasn't crazy about that". PM was not comfortable pushing further for debrief of tower or landing events due to (1) PF's infallible; single pilot attitude and (2) PF's retirement in the next couple of months. PM did not feel that the request to debrief would be met with professional or calm communication; but rather would result in defensiveness and breakdown of crew cohesiveness. PM did continue to make clear their displeasure with the events; while observing that PF never admitted wrong or that a go around should have been initiated; seemingly focusing only on the poor landing and not acknowledging the GPWS alert. In hindsight; PM observes that a go around should have been initiated immediately following "Pull up" GPWS call. Additionally; a go around should have been initiated immediately as wheels touched down and aircraft control was momentarily lost. Factors at play include fatigue of PF; low experience of the PM and lack of confidence to speak up; as well as potential unfamiliarity with the airport approach from both pilots.Suggestion: AOM/FOM do not have specific clarity about 'Obstacle' or 'Pull up' GPWS wording; though it is performed in training. PM could not find wording about initiating an immediate go around upon hearing 'Pull up' in company documentation and sought clarity from a mentor familiar with operations."
Second reporter narrative
Revenue passengers had their vehicle at ZZZ. The winds at ZZZ were gusty and near the Latitude crosswind limit (30 knots). The best runway to land for the crosswind was RWY XX. RWY XX has no published approaches due to obstacles close to the end of the runway. Our direction of approach was from the Southeast; so we had to fly around the obstacles to get to a good location for the visual approach. We briefed the obstacles thoroughly.An additional factor was our fuel load. New company policy has severely cut the extra" fuel on board. We started with XXX lbs of extra fuel on our release. We were very close to reserve fuel when we started the visual approach. I briefed that we might have fuel for a second try at ZZZ; but would probably have to go to ZZZ2 (where runway XY would be a better option for the winds) if we executed a missed approach. As we neared the field; we identified the towers and were proceeding to the West of them when we got a "obstacle ahead" alert. We both agreed that we saw the obstacle and were going to pass on the left side of it. When we were abeam the tower we got got a "pull up" alert. I was focused on the visual approach and elected to continue. It was not a pretty approach or landing. Probably one of my worst landings. We got the passengers to the FBO and their vehicle. Suggestion: In hindsight:1. We should have asked for more gas when we saw the winds at ZZZ.2. We probably should have just diverted to ZZZ2 for the winds.3. At a minimum we should have heeded the "pull up" alert and gone around."
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.