B737-800 flight crew reported a rejected takeoff due to an FMC failure.

Narrative

As a basic overview; I executed a rejected takeoff for a failed FMC with associated failures at a little over 90 knots. The preflight and taxi out were all normal. The FO was the PF and I was the PM. We weren't aware of any problems or issues with the FMC during preflight and taxi out. Just before taking the runway for takeoff a new ATIS became available and the FO checked it. On a rolling TO (Take-off) after the FO selected TOGA; I looked to check the N1 setting and realized that the TO page was not displayed/selected on either FMC. As we continued the takeoff; I tried to select the TO page on my FMC but it was unresponsive to multiple button pushes. Shortly after this; my FMC display went completely blank. Following quickly after that; I heard the Auto-Throttles click off and then the yellow FMC light illuminated as well as the red A/T (Autothrottles) light which was flashing. About the time the auto throttles disengaged I think I noticed we were above 85 knots and by the time I decided to reject the takeoff we were at about 95 knots.The reject was basically uneventful. I will say the auto braking was more aggressive than I was expecting and a little startling. I disengaged the auto brakes due to the aggressive and rough brake application and since we were at a relatively low speed with plenty of runway remaining too. Since we were at a fairly low speed with things under control I also elected to exit the runway at a convenient hi-speed taxiway. Once clear of the runway; we stopped to make a PA; talk to the FAs (Flight Attendant) and run checklists etc. After calculating the brake cooling time; I also coordinated with the Maintenance Control and Dispatch. The Maintenance Control and local Maintenance advised us that the aircraft would need an inspection so we taxied back to the gate at that time. Upon arrival at the gate; maintenance told us the aircraft would be out of service for at least a few hours so we were given another plane to continue to our destination. I also made two logbook writeups for the Reject (including speed and weight) and also the FMC failure.Cause: I would say that the FMC failure was definitely causal but I don't know how we could have mitigated that or any sudden mechanical or system failure. The fact that we didn't have the TO page on either FMC did not help and I plan to check prior to TO that both FMCs are on the proper pages. As far as my decision to reject above 80 knots; with the cascading issues or failures; I wasn't sure what else might fail so I rejected. It was also a little disorienting being distracted from the normal TO procedure and flow and being heads down analyzing as things seemed to go wrong one after the other to having to make a timely decision; go heads up; take control and execute the reject. The FO did a great job and was very helpful throughout though. While on the taxiway initially during the brake cool down period; I was in the process of trying to coordinate for the ARFF (Airport Rescue and Firefighting) when I decided to taxi back to the gate. In hindsight and to mitigate risks in the future I would probably still call for ARFF to at least meet us at the gate or even follow us back on the taxi to the gate.