Air carrier crew reported a traffic conflict with a delayed departing aircraft while on final approach resulting in an ATC-directed go around to provide separation. The crew performed the go around then returned for a landing.
Synopsis
Air carrier crew reported a traffic conflict with a delayed departing aircraft while on final approach resulting in an ATC-directed go around to provide separation. The crew performed the go around then returned for a landing.
Narrative
I was pilot monitoring (PM) and the Captain was pilot flying (PF). Kennedy Tower instructed us to go around while on short final to 31L due to insufficient spacing between us and the traffic that was taking off and still occupying the runway. We swiftly conducted the go around maneuver and the Captain added go around thrust and I placed the flap lever to 20. Kennedy Tower then immediately instructed us with a heading and altitude to which I replied to. In the process; I was distracted from my primary duties as PM to call positive rate. We only managed to raise the gear up after we have leveled off at 2000 feet when the 3rd seat First Officer (FO) mentioned that the gear was still down. We then retracted the flaps to 10 and eventually 5. The Captain fully reautomated and called for the after takeoff checklist. We then continued as per normal and set up for another 31L approach. In the end; we did all the procedures we needed to do; but the workload was pretty high initially and we missed a couple of steps for the standard go around procedure; only to catch it later and do it at a later time.
Second reporter narrative
While arriving to JFK our crew performed a go around at approximately 700-800ft AGL. Following the IGN1 arrival; we were given vectors for the visual approach to Runway 31L. Conditions were Captain as pilot flying (PF); day; VMC; dry runway and winds 320 variable to 350 at 13 gust 23 and 20 gust 27 (multiple variations given) & high gross weight which facilitated a crew request for a 31L arrival (ATC accommodated without issue) vs 31R arrival (gusty winds required autobrake (AB) MAX and 4.2 Brake Temperature Monitoring (BTM)). The arrival and approach were normal until approaching 2.5 miles from the displaced threshold when Tower finally cleared Aircraft Y; holding position in the underrun; for takeoff after already having issued our landing clearance. The departing aircraft was slow to start its takeoff run; separation appeared to be too close and I (Captain) queried Tower if this was going to work. Tower did not immediately answer but shortly thereafter directed a go around as we approached 700-800ft AGL. The go around; while not violating a clearance in any way; was procedurally sloppy. The PF commanded go around-Flaps 20" while presseing the TO/GA switches; the PM positioned the flaps to 20. Before the PM could call "thrust set" and "positive rate"; ATC called directing a turn to heading 220 and climb to 2;000ft. The PM answered the radio call immediately; while I; as the PF; aware of the small climb/high power setting/low altitude level off from a higher altitude go-around; called thrust set; positive rate; gear up (first 2 visually verified) so I could disengage the auto throttles and reduce power to avoid an altitude overshoot. The PM did not hear the gear up call because he was transmitting his response to Tower; never made a positive rate call and I did not immediately realize I'd stepped on his radio call/he didn't hear me. I next commanded and the PM selected HDG sel 220 and we verified 2000ft set. Approaching approximately 1500 ft; as I was about to call for VNAV (a little late); I realized the power required to maintain a desired 1000 fpm climb was higher than I expected and noticed the gear was not up; as the relief pilot voiced that the gear was still down. Complicating crew communication on the flight deck during this high workload period was multiple radio calls from ATC (go around heading & altitude instructions from Tower given twice/read back twice; a frequency change with a mis-heard frequency by the PM resulted in 2 more radio calls and a heading change during the execution of the procedure). We retracted the landing gear selected VNAV; retracted flaps to 5; leveled off at 2;000ft; reautomated; ran the after takeoff checklist; configured for the next approach; briefed and ran both the descent & approach checklists. The next approach happened quick with tight vectors and simultaneous interception of both the final approach course/desired glide path right on top of the final fix for the ILS (used as a back up for the visual). The second gusty wind approach and landing; after getting established on final; was uneventful.The primary cause of the event was ATC vectoring our aircraft too tight with departing traffic and not accounting for our higher approach speed due to a heavier aircraft with gusts on final (incidentally we provided a heads up on final speed to approach control). The cause of the poorly executed go around procedures was a break down in SOP due to distractions from multiple ATC comms and prioritizing "communicate" over "aviate".The biggest takeaway for me here is prioritization of Aviate; Navigate; Communicate and Manage. We allowed communication with/from ATC to disrupt our habit patterns for execution of the go around SOP while also impeding our flight deck communications. I take responsibility for poorly managing this event even though I was mentally prepared for a go around. While there was not a clearance violation or compromise of safety; I realize a successful outcome (clearanceadequately/safely complied with) doesn't justify rationalizing messing up an important SOP. I could have managed the situation better by not rushing myself and overloading the PM. I should have just patiently focused on flying the heading/climb; reducing power as required and waiting for the PM to finish his radio call before communicating; so he could make the required PM call outs (thrust set/positive rate); then called for the gear up; HDG Sel/VNAV and reautomating. A second takeaway is the importance of relief pilots remaining situationally aware; staying mentally engaged in actively monitoring the PF/PM and making constructive/assistive inputs when necessary. Fortunately we had an engaged and helpful relief pilot on this flight. Lastly; ATC needs to not cut arrival/departure separation so close at JFK and when/if they do make it tight they must recognize the error sooner and take proactive action without being prompted by the crew."
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.