B737-800 flight crew reported an uncommanded shutdown of the right engine during climb. Flight crew returned to departure airport and landed uneventfully.
Synopsis
B737-800 flight crew reported an uncommanded shutdown of the right engine during climb. Flight crew returned to departure airport and landed uneventfully.
Narrative
Captain - pilot flying (PF)First Officer (FO) - pilot monitoring (PM)Climbing through FL250; experienced a sudden; un-commanded shutdown of the right engine. Vibration was present but it did begin to dissipate as the engine spooled down. Autopilot disengaged so PF assumed manual control. Due to startle factor; it took us several seconds to understand what had happened. PM [advised] ATC asked for a lower altitude to begin drift-down. PF focused on control; trim; airspeed management and rebuilding automation and eventually reselecting the Autopilot ON. Task saturation quickly became a threat. ATC was communicating local diversion airports including ZZZ1 and ZZZ2 and further descent altitudes. At some point the cabin called forward to inquire. The PM handled the ATC calls and briefly received the cabin call promising more information later as the PF continued focus on flying and managing descent airspeed and drift-down considerations (terrain).As PF and PM reconnected; we discussed the appropriate checklist response. Due to the sudden nature of the shutdown and the initial vibration; we initially agreed on the ENGINE FIRE or Engine Severe Damage checklist on the Quick Reference Card. However; when we got a few steps into the checklist where pulling the fire handle and looking for signs of fire and overheat were directed; we observed no fire indications along with what seemed like adequate N1 and N2 rotation present and the vibration had at that point subsided. For these reasons and because the ENG FAIL depiction was present; we elected to redirect to the QRH Engine Failure or Shutdown checklist which we then completed. It took longer than I would have liked to complete the checklist response due to numerous concurrent interruptions; task saturation; and our decision to re-evaluate the proper checklist but ultimately we got through it without rushing.With the engine secure; we now directed our focus on navigating towards a suitable alternate. pilot in command (PIC) dismissed ZZZ1 and ZZZ2 out of hand due to high terrain and complex approach and single engine procedures. Consideration was given to ZZZ3 which was ahead and VFR or a return to an ILS at ZZZ. Initially PIC resisted return over terrain to overcast conditions at ZZZ in favor of ZZZ3; but after investigating the mileage difference and through good council from PM; agreement was reached that a return to ZZZ was the nearest suitable airport.With momentary transfer of control; Captain completed One Engine Inoperative and other checklists including communication with cabin. ATC provided vectors direct to ZZZ and Captain resuming PF role conducted ILS XXL approach resulting in a landing and a negative heat inspection by Airport Rescue and Firefighting (ARFF) before proceeding to the gate.I don't know the cause; but I can comment that training was an excellent mitigation tool. I believe we both did the best we could in the moment to follow our training SOPs. The startle factor is very real and it takes time to regroup. I'm sure it wasn't perfect; but we definitely both understood each other's intent throughout thanks to good communication and a solid training model to follow.
Second reporter narrative
Climbing through FL250; we experienced a sudden and abrupt shutdown of the right engine. A bang noise followed by vibration was present but it did begin to dissipate as the engine fan spooled down. Autopilot disengaged so pilot flying (PF) (Captain) assumed manual control. Due to startle factor; it took us several seconds to understand what had happened. Pilot monitoring (PM) (First Officer (FO)) made a call to ATC and asked for a lower altitude to begin drift-down. PF focused on control; trim; rebuilding automation and eventually re-selecting the Autopilot ON. Task saturation quickly became a threat. ATC was communicating local diversion airports including ZZZ1 and ZZZ2 and further descent altitudes. At some point the cabin called forward to inquire. The PM handled the ATC calls and briefly received the cabin call promising more information later as the PF continued focus on flying and managing descent airspeed and drift-down considerations (terrain).As PF and PM reconnected; we discussed the appropriate checklist response. Due to the sudden nature of the shutdown and the initial vibration; we initially agreed on the Immediate Action Checklist (IAC) 'ENGINE FIRE or Engine Severe Damage' checklist. However; when we got a few steps into the checklist where pulling the fire handle and looking for signs of fire and overheat were directed; we observed no fire indications along with what seemed like adequate N1 and N2 rotation present and the vibration had at that point subsided. For these reasons and because the ENG FAIL depiction was present; we elected to redirect to the QRH Engine Failure or Shutdown checklist which we then completed. It took longer than I would have liked to complete the checklist due to numerous concurrent interruptions; task saturation; and our decision to re-evaluate the proper checklist but ultimately we got through it without rushing.With the engine secure; we now directed our focus on navigating towards a suitable alternate. PF (still Captain) dismissed ZZZ1 and ZZZ2 out of hand due to high terrain and complex approach and single engine procedures. Consideration was given to ZZZ3 which was ahead and VFR or a return to an ILS at ZZZ. Initially PF resisted return over terrain to overcast conditions at ZZZ in favor of ZZZ3; but after investigating the mileage difference and through good council from PM; agreement was reached that a return to ZZZ was the nearest suitable airport.Transfer of controls to FO was accomplished; then Captain completed QRH One Engine Inoperative and Non-Routine Landing Considerations checklists including communication with cabin. ATC provided vectors and Captain asked to transfer control back to him which was accomplished; flew direct to ZZZ and ILS XXL approach; resulting in a normal landing followed by a negative heat/fire inspection by Airport Rescue and Firefighting (ARFF) before proceeding to the gate.Cause: Task saturation due to concurrent calls from ATC and cabin crew members.
More incidents for this aircraft family →
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.