Air carrier First Officer reported ATIS broadcast of incorrect information along with ATC last minute change in approach clearance led to low altitude alert and a CFTT event.
Synopsis
Air carrier First Officer reported ATIS broadcast of incorrect information along with ATC last minute change in approach clearance led to low altitude alert and a CFTT event.
Narrative
This was a flight operated from ZZZ to ATL. It was a very early morning flight with us landing in Atlanta while the sun was still down; and it was the last day of the trip for me. While on the way to Atlanta; the ATIS was publishing visual approaches; and while I cannot remember the specific reported ceilings; I do remember that the published weather was good enough for a visual and the clouds should have been above the final approach fix for runway 10. We planned on flying the visual for runway 10 backed up by the ILS. We both forgot that the ILS for runway 10 was out of service. As we are nearing the end of the STAR into Atlanta; we are noticing that the ceiling is a bit more thick than what we were expecting; but we trusted that the bottom was where the ATIS said it was going to be. We both knew in the back of our minds though that if it is lower than what we were expecting; we can just transition to the ILS. At this point we have been vectored off of the STAR and are getting close to the FAF. ATC asks us to report the field in sight. We say negative and that we will need lower to be able to see the field; as we were just on the bottom of the layer and would be out of the clouds if we were lower by just a few 100 feet or so. This is the point in time at which we realize we have a glideslope flag and I remember that the glideslope is published OTS (Out of Service) for runway 10. As we are getting closer and closer to the FAF; ATC just clears us for the RNAV approach; which we were very much not expecting. My captain quickly pulls up the approach plate and he sets a lower altitude and starts to do a slow descend via VS. It became very busy very quickly; as I offer to load the RNAV in the box and sequence it for the captain so we have the snowflake. I was slightly concerned about him descending because I wasn't sure if the altitude he selected was an altitude on the approach plate or not (as I havent really looked at the plate at all at this point); but by the time im done loading the box and look up I see that the runway is at our 12 o clock. He says that he's visual and we can see the PAPIs so we are going to continue just like it is a visual approach with PAPIs. I do not remember exactly what the PAPIs were indicating but it was rather 3 red 1 white or 2 white 2 red. It was at this point that ATC gives us an altitude advisory. This confused me because I wasnt aware why we were getting that so I said 'Roger'. I quickly reference the approach plate and see that we were technically below the published altitude on the approach plate by about 200' or so. I do not remember the exact amount. This did not worry me though at this point in time because we had the runway clearly in sight and we were now on the PAPIs. We both acknowledged why we received the altitude report but agreed that it was safe to still continue the approach at that point. We continued to a landing. Cause: I would say the cause of this event was a combination of my captain and I not looking at the NOTAMs into Atlanta before starting the approach; and ATC clearing us for an approach that we were not expecting right before the FAF. If we knew that the glideslope was out of service and had loaded the RNAV; this would have been avoidable. Also if ATC had warned us that the ceiling was lower than advertised and some people were doing the RNAV; that would have cued us to load the RNAV and remember that the GS was inop. Looking back; I dont remember hearing on frequency anyone else getting cleared for the RNAV and I dont remember hearing anyone getting cleared for the RNAVl; because if I did that would have prompted me to load in that approach. Suggestions: I would suggest that if the ceiling is quickly lowering and is even getting close to not allowing a visual approach; that ATC warn inbound aircraft of the possibility that they will need to fly the approach to get in and if so; which approach. I would suggest that ATC not just throw an approach on an inbound aircraft last second when they were leading them to believe that everyone else was getting in visually.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.