Air carrier crew reported receiving a GPWS warning while maneuvering for a visual approach in a valley when the crew determined the aircraft was in an incorrect position for the visual approach. The crew performed a go around; then returned from another direction; became unstable on that approach; then continued to a landing.
Synopsis
Air carrier crew reported receiving a GPWS warning while maneuvering for a visual approach in a valley when the crew determined the aircraft was in an incorrect position for the visual approach. The crew performed a go around; then returned from another direction; became unstable on that approach; then continued to a landing.
Narrative
We conducted a visual approach to runway 09 at DOM/TDPD. As Pilot Flying; I chose to use visual approach procedures coming from VOLAB; crossing the shoreline on a downwind (as opposed to coming from NEIDR); because this allowed me early identification of the runway and the approach environment. Weather was reported as FEW clouds at 2;200 AGL. Approaching the first waypoint; DOM R-359 D2.2; we observed the cloud deck to be at approximately 2;000 AGL; and I opted to cross the shoreline at 1200agl; fully configured at full flap; on speed 129kias. We crossed the second waypoint; DOM R310 D3.1; at 1;200 AGL. Turning to base leg proceeding to third waypoint; DOM R-271 D2.9; I turned off the autopilot; descended to 1;100 AGL and identified what I thought was the correct ridge line. It was not. Crossing this ridgeline at 1;100 AGL; I banked and started my descent into the valley. I followed the valley track for about 2 seconds when the FO called for a go around. I executed a go-around; climbed to 3;000 AGL and proceeded to VOLAB where we entered holding to decide our next course of action. FO explained that he called for a go-around when he recognized we were in the wrong valley. I turned controls over to FO while I reloaded the FMS for a second attempt.I took control of the aircraft. On this approach; while proceeding from VOLAB to the first waypoint; DOM R-359 D2.2; I identified the runway; the correct ridgeline and the valley that must be flown to arrive at runway 09. Once again; after passing the second waypoint; DOM R-310 D3.1; I turned off the autopilot and descended to 1;100 AGL. I initiated my turn into the valley early which put me into the valley high on the profile. I descended at a rate to land in the landing zone; while navigating the valley. I heard the FO call out 1;100 FPM and 1;200 FPM which I visually confirmed and acknowledged. EGPWS (Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System) gave us a SINK RATE followed by a PULL UP warning. The FO called for a go-around. I verbally told him NO because I now had the runway in sight and was already making corrections to STABLE approach criteria. On short final; we had 900fpm and touched down in the landing zone on speed.Cause: Despite the fact that we briefed the approach very thoroughly and planned contingencies; I had only been to DOM 1 time; on my initial check with an LCA (Line Check Airman). The FO had not been to DOM many times and not for several months. Neither of us were very familiar with this approach. I prepared before the flight by reviewing the SARA (Solutions for Aircraft data Replay and Analysis) data for DOM and re-watching the video of the approach. I also reviewed my notes from my initial check ride. What caused the first missed approach and the second unstable approach was my unfamiliarity with this airport and the long interval of time between my initial check and my first time flying it on the line. This approach is unlike any other in my 35 years of flying. It is extremely challenging under the best of circumstances.Suggestions: I believe this particular approach should require an initial qualification of being flown multiple times with LCA's within a short time period; 1-2 weeks; to firmly cement in the captains experience key visual check points and help him build some muscle memory. At the very least; after flying the initial qualification; a newly qualified captain should be assigned to fly this approach several times over the next few weeks to drill into their experience all of the necessary visual checkpoints and procedures. In my opinion; it is a mistake to give a captain a qualification flight; then NOT fly the approach for months before he sees it again.
Second reporter narrative
Correcting an unstable approach and not going aroundCause: Coming into our first approach for runway 9 into Dominica; we setup the PBDs (Place Bearing/Distance) and altitudes into the FMS. At 1100ft prior to reaching the ridge; the captain made a hard left bank and missed the ridge and lined up onto the incorrect valley. I was unaware because of the hard bank until he leveled off and that's when I told the captain to go around. He executed the go around and we went to hold at Volab to try for another approach. On the second approach we flew to the last PBD to cross at or above 1100ft; but the captain made the turn too short and ended up high after crossing the ridge. I was noting the descent rate and it quickly started to increase past 800ftpm. When the descent rate reached 1400ftpm I called to Go Around and we received a sink rate pull up alert. The captain said no to the go around as he he was correcting. I saw the captain correcting the descent rate but I was ready to call a go around again if there was any other reason. The captain ended up with the correct speed and descent rate for a stable approach and there were no further alerts. The captain landed safe within the first 1000ft. Suggestions: Being more cautious on the turn over the ridge line to not end up high and get into an high descent rate situation. Be more situationally aware of where you are turning.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.