EMB-145 Flight crew reported failure of landing gear to retract after takeoff. Returned to departure airport and landing uneventfully.
Synopsis
EMB-145 Flight crew reported failure of landing gear to retract after takeoff. Returned to departure airport and landing uneventfully.
Narrative
When calling for gear up; the landing gear handle did not move. The gear was stuck in the down and locked position. The takeoff trim aural warning came on while in flight when the trim was set in between 3 and 4 degrees nose up and with an N1 of 70% or higher. Crew asked for delayed vectors in order to run associated QRH checklists (landing gear will not come up on takeoff non-annunciated). Crew suspected that there may be an air/ground sensor issue which would affect multiple systems. The decision was made to request priority handling in the interest of safety. Crew decided to leave the gear down because the gear showed as down and locked (green indications). Crew coordinated with dispatch; flight attendant; ATC; and passengers. It was necessary to get delayed vectors to burn fuel below the maximum structural landing weight. Runway XX at ZZZ was chosen as the most suitable runway. Although minimum landing distance was not available due to NOTAMs utilizing ACARS and dispatch; crew consulted with the Landing assessment tables using dry runway numbers to confirm adequate distance.Data cards were used for V-speeds. Winds at time of arrival was 310 at 20 gusting to 36 knots. ATC reported gains and losses of 15 knots. Flaps 22 was selected due to heavy gusts. 20 knots was added to Vref. Approach and landing was stable. During the landing rollout; the LG (Landing Gear) Air/GND Fail and IC 1-2 WOW INOP EICAS messages was presented. Crew elected to stop the aircraft on the runway and run the root cause checklist (LG Air/Gnd Fail). Next; the stick shaker actuated and the SPS (Stall Protection System) advanced messages was presented relating to the aircraft WOW falsely sensing it was in the air (aircraft was stopped). Gust lock would not engage; steering would not disengage; and the main door open EICAS warning was presented when the main door opened with the engines shutoff. Because the crew could not disengage the steering; maintenance was consulted prior to aircraft movement. Passengers were deplaned normally using airstairs on the runway; Fire and rescue did not see any aircraft damage. Maintenance discrepancies were logged in the logbook.
Second reporter narrative
Flight was proceeded as normal until a couple seconds after takeoff. I as pilot monitoring said positive rate when the VSI showed positive climb trend. Pilot flying called gear up; I tried to move the gear lever to the up position and the gear lever was stuck in the down position with gear three green lighted on the EICAS. A couple seconds after this the aural warning takeoff trim aural warning sounded when the trim was 3-4 degrees nose up and a TLA (Thrust Lever Angle) angle of over 70 degrees. After this we asked tower to continue straight out and said we were having a landing gear problem; they gave us runway heading and then delayed vectors so we could run checklists and burn fuel so we would not land overweight. After this we then ran the non annunciated QRH checklist for 'Landing Gear Lever Cannot Move Up After Takeoff'; there was no messages on the EICAS indicating any problem.The QRH calls for 'down lock release button press and gear lever up'. We made the decision to leave the gear down as it was indicating three down and locked and in the interest of safety and knowing we were shortly going to be landing back at ZZZ we decided to leave the gear lever alone in the interest of safety and not wanting to add to the problem. We then coordinated with the flight attendant via briefing what the plan is; we also coordinated with dispatch and told them what was going on and that we will be returning to ZZZ. We then worked on a plan to return to ZZZ by getting landing data; setting up the approach for runway XX as the winds were favoring XX. The winds were reported at 310/20G36. We got delayed vectors to burn off some fuel so we would not be overweight on landing. Although landing data via ACARS was not available due to NOTAMed closure of runway XX for landings; we utilized the landing assessment table in the QRH to get landing distance required for the conditions on reported for landing XX. To get the V speeds we utilized the E145 Data Cards XR. After getting the baseline speeds; due to wind conditions and plus and minus 15 knots airspeed loss by other planes landing at ZZZ; we elected to do a flaps 22 landing and adjusted the V speeds for flaps 22 landing accordingly from steady state wind and gust factor. We did the visual backed up by the RNAV Y to runway XX. We ran the descent and approach check prior to landing. The approach was stable and the landing was in the touchdown zone; on centerline and smooth. Captain utilized heavy braking and we then stopped on the runway. I notified ATC of stopping on the runway and briefed the passengers to remain seated until further notice. On the ground roll the EICAS messages LG (Landing Gear) AIR/GND FAIL and IC 1-2 WOW INOP appeared. We stopped on the runway and ran the root cause QRH for LG AIR/GND FAIL (that only appeared on the landing rollout). When we were stopped on the runway the stick shaker then activated and the SPS (Stall Protection System) ADVANCED EICAS message also presented on the EICAS relating to the aircraft Weight On Wheels possibly falsely sensing aircraft in the air and airspeed of Zero; at this time we were then stopped on runway XX. When trying to perform the after landing check the gust lock would not engage. When trying to get towed off the runway due to having no nose wheel steering the STEER INOP message would not present on the EICAS indicating that nose wheel steering was not disconnected. Because we could not disengage steering prior to getting towed off the runway; maintenance was consulted and brought to the plane prior to aircraft movement. We also deplaned on the runway in a normal fashion through the main cabin door using air stairs and being transported to the terminal via a people mover. Fire and rescue were present prior to landing and after landing; they did not see anything abnormal with the aircraft during the event. When opening the main cabin door on runway XX; the emergency EICAS message CABIN DOOR OPEN presented on the EICAS even with both engines shutdown and parking brake engaged. We deplaned coordinated with ATC; OPS; Emergency crews; Maintenance and the plane was then towed to the gate.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.