C172 pilot reported loss of aircraft control during landing resulted in aircraft damage.

Date: 2025-05 · Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172 · Phase: landing

Anomalies: ground-event-encounter-ground-strike-aircraft|inflight-event-encounter-loss-of-aircraft-control|inflight-event-encounter-unstabilized-approach|inflight-event-encounter-weather-turbulence

Synopsis

C172 pilot reported loss of aircraft control during landing resulted in aircraft damage.

Narrative

Direct AWOS radio broadcast from departure point ZZZ prior to taxi were winds at 10G16 knots from 300 degrees; 30 degrees off runway heading 33. Crosswind component was well within personal limitations.At runup area; quick check of the AWOS was that wind was now 310 degrees at 11; even more of a headwind (if my memory is correct; I did not erase and rewrite my original AWOS notes since I was focused on looking/listening for inbound traffic). Began my usual routine post-runup of a left traffic lap of the pattern; which I always do as a private; personal use pilot flying just for the enjoyment. Gives me a chance to check out myself; the rental aircraft otherwise used for flight instruction; as well as actual conditions at altitude.Takeoff roll was normal; as single occupant of the aircraft with a light fuel load the aircraft climbed very well; to the point that pitching all the way back to Vy of 74 knots while full throttle would've been an uncomfortable angle to pitch to so I climbed out around 78-80 knots. Left crosswind turn; uneventful. Left downwind turn; uneventful. Traffic pattern altitude is 1;800 MSL and I leveled off approaching 1;900 MSL due to the difficulty bleeding airspeed without aggressive movement with a light load. Pulled power to lower back to 1;800 MSL; left downwind went quickly due to strong tailwind.Traffic pattern was empty; only aircraft talking on CTAF was taxiing back to the ramp and no aircraft were seen out the windscreen or on ADSB-in on my tablet. Pulled back to descent RPM; flaps 10; began descending. Left base turn; uneventful except for being faster than I wanted to be. Pitched up slightly to bleed speed; slight power reduction to not slow the descent too much.As I lined up for final; flaps full; I was still a bit fast but came over the runway numbers at ~70 knots based on my memory. It was at this point that I felt the slight left crosswind component begin to come near the ground; but maintained centerline with right rudder with left aileron input. Initial pull to flare was a bit too much and I relaxed backpressure as airspeed came down to 60. It was at this point I felt what seemed to be a gust from directly aircraft left and the seat dropped down from under me.I had previously experienced low-level wind shear while a student pilot with my instructor on-board; where my reflex had been to push full power and apply right rudder input on a late go-around. My instructor agreed with simply landing long further down the runway once we recovered airspeed; and acknowledged afterward that reaction had kept us from a very hard landing. I recall this same reflex kicking in on my incident flight; but the combination of the left-angle headwind and full right rudder not coming fully in time with the application of full throttle; the left wing was now facing more directly into the left head/crosswind gust. I had heavy left aileron applied; but the combination of left-turning tendency and the left crosswind that had surprised me had the full left wing pointed straight into the flow of air with full flaps; and the left wing picked up.This uneven lift combined with the sideloaded right main gear meant that the right wingtip struck the asphalt runway as I pulled power immediately to idle. Feeling the sensation of the aircraft begin to slide to the right toward the grass; and knowing that the wingtip catching grass could cartwheel me/the aircraft; I pushed hard right brake to throw the weight of the plane back to the left in the hopes that this would get the left wing/gear back to the ground. Whether this brake input mattered or not; or if airspeed had simply diminished enough; I don't know; but the left wing did come back down and the left gear touched down surprisingly soft. The whole range of motions left and right was gradual enough that the loose checklist and bag in my right seat did not fall from the seat. I can only liken the sensation to going downhill in a car with your seatbelt on: the downward angle of the body resting against the belt is felt; but no feeling of impact or deceleration.Rudder pedal inputs brought the aircraft back to centerline; and with no feelings of vibration or tire or steering damage; I let my remaining groundspeed roll me to the first available taxiway and cleared the runway. Stop; landing/strobe lights off; flaps up; lean mixture; clear call on CTAF. While still belted in; I opened both doors to check tires and saw no visible damage to either of the main gear. I decided I had no indications that taxiing back to the ramp was unsafe; and taxied back without incident and under power. Parked the aircraft; shut down electronics; and shut down the engine by the checklist; being specifically deliberate about not skipping a step in my shaken state. It was only after the propeller had stopped rotating that I realized the propeller tips had struck the runway and curled.I chocked the aircraft and walked inside to inform the FBO staff that I 'owed them a propeller' and that I had suffered a wingstrike. The FBO staff member walked out to the aircraft with me and we walked any damages together. Both tips of the propeller were curled a few inches; and the right wing plastic nav light cover was broken as well as the plastic cap of the wingtip being worn down by asphalt. The right main gear tire sidewall showed signs of light spiraling surface wear; consistent with my feeling of the right tire dragging as the plane skid on the right wing. After confirming with their staff that there was nothing more for me to do and that they would be in touch; I left the airport uninjured.The FBO's chief instructor called me the next morning to discuss next steps. My expectations of maintenance teardown were confirmed and we discussed insurance involvement.It's clear to me that attempting a go-around in these specific circumstances may have been incorrect at the point that I applied full throttle as compared to a hard touchdown; and perhaps I was defaulting into the reflexive action I had previously experienced with my instructor. The alternative of aggressive braking while not settled onto the ground with both gear felt unsafe for fear of locking up a wheel or losing directional control and hitting the soft grass at the runway edge. I recall having heavy left aileron applied; but I am not certain whether I had reached the control limit of full left roll. The whole experience lasted just a few seconds; and I primarily reacted on instinct to keep myself on the runway and upright.While I never heard an AWOS report of anything other than primarily headwind at any of the times I checked it; and the midfield windsock showing a headwind as well; the recorded METAR readings available online after my flight do show wind direction changes closer to a direct left crosswind. This matches the observation by the FBO staffer and myself post-incident that the midfield windsock was waffling between downline of runway 33 and a crosswind from the left.As a private pilot only flying for a hobby and to share the experience of flying with family and friends; there is no condition where I 'have' to make a flight happen. My already restrictive personal limitation of 8knots of crosswind component will be lowered further. Retraining with a CFI on crosswind pattern work and ground discussion on recognizing warning signs within available weather data for possible changes in wind direction or LLWS will be a requirement I put upon myself before any solo flying.Added personal limitation will be no touch-and-gos for the foreseeable future; there's no reason for me to rush through takeoffs/landings. Safe; full-stop landings and taxi back to the runway to analyze and assess are my expectation of myself; I can learn from every landing. Reminders to myself that a late go-around; even if it results in slight runway contact; will be important. Fixation on 'get down and stay down' even in unstable situations would be an over-correction.Weather/aircraft availability/personal health will continue to dictate go/no-go decisions; but the idea of loss of proficiency will also be a consideration. Deciding not to fly when fit and able because 'I don't want to' can lead to extended periods of not flying when compounded by other conditions; and this can be unsafe. Simulator time will help keep processes and flows fresh; but the feel for an aircraft requires continued experience.

Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.