Air carrier Captain reported multiple ENG 1 ECAM messages on the takeoff roll. The Captain rejected the takeoff and taxied to the ramp; then completed the flight after a delay for maintenance.
Synopsis
Air carrier Captain reported multiple ENG 1 ECAM messages on the takeoff roll. The Captain rejected the takeoff and taxied to the ramp; then completed the flight after a delay for maintenance.
Narrative
This flight was the first flight of a pairing and it was the first flight together as a crew. We decided that it would be my leg to start; because the FO had done this trip the week before and flew the first leg. The weather was good (greater than 5000 ft and 5 mi) and there were no overt threats to completing the flight safely. The aircraft pre-flight was completed normally and we had to wait for a short time after our scheduled departure time for the volume to be loaded. When calling over the radio to notify of load complete; they notified us of their intention to pull us out into the ramp due to our heavy weight. An MD11 was being loaded next to us and operations was concerned that the jet blast would be an issue. The engine start; taxi; and takeoff prep occurred in a normal manner with nothing seemed out of the ordinary. The first sign that something was not normal was after taxiing onto runway XXL and applying the initial power to synchronize the engines. The number 1 engine took longer than normal to match number 2; but still equalized and the takeoff was continued. The FO noticed that THR was not annunciated on the FMA (Flight Mode Annunciator) and was about to notify me; but was interrupted by the 3 ECAM messages that popped up. I believe the first one to appear was the ATS (Air Turbine Starter) OFF message; followed closely by two ENG 1 (Engine) messages. I called reject and slowly brought the aircraft down to taxi speed; exiting runway XXL at runway XY. The after takeoff flow was performed and I elected not to follow the ECAM procedures on the ground and simply initiated another procedure. The FO was the first to point out that we were already below minimum fuel for the flight and it made sense to not waste time troubleshooting over the radio and let line maintenance look at the issue. We were assigned ramp spot A and coordinated with ground control to taxi to our assigned ramp. At the ramp; we coordinated with maintenance; dispatch; and personnel to turn the aircraft and complete our flight to ZZZ1. The deferrals were made and the flight was completed on the next attempt.Looking back; the ENG 1 EPR (Engine Pressure Ratio) gauge was behaving abnormally and we may have been able to single out the issue before taking the runway. The problem was that the gauge was working correctly most of the time and led us to believe it was still working normally. I think as a crew; working together for the first time; we did a good job of handling threats and trapping errors. The decisions that were made; the adherence to SOP; and effectively using company resources led to the safe conclusion of the flight on the next attempt. The flight arrived in ZZZ1 approximately 2.5 hours late; and the only real gain that could have been made is on the ground with the procedure. They are notoriously chaotic as flight crew; dispatch; and maintenance scramble to legally and safely re-dispatch the aircraft. We may have been able to clear the ECAM faults however we would still have had to return for fuel. I also failed to mention the procedure and the RTO (Rejected Takeoff) in the maintenance log and will specifically do so in the future.
Second reporter narrative
[Report narrative contained no additional information.]
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.