C680A Captain reported a hydraulic failure and a decision to divert.

Narrative

This flight was originally scheduled to depart from ZZZ1 and arrive at ZZZ. On approach to ZZZ; the CAS annunciated HYD VOLUME LOW when the landing gear was extended. Hydraulic pressure showed 3100 PSI and the volume was 110 cu in. The landing gear completed its cycle and locked in the down position.We elected to discontinue the approach to give adequate time to complete the QRH and understand the implications of the failure. The QRH directs the unloading of both engine driven pumps and the loss of all hydraulic functions. Due to the significant performance and controllability degradation; we elected to divert to ZZZ2 so that we could use their longer and wider runway. Additionally; the procedure calls for a maximum 10 knot crosswind; and the winds at ZZZ2 were more closely aligned with the runway.After completing the QRH checklist; we [requested priority handling] and landed at ZZZ2 without incident. Since we had used emergency braking to stop (and were still using emergency braking to remain stationary); we elected to remain on the runway and shut down the engines. We stayed in position until Crash Fire Rescue (CFR) determined that there were no immediate external safety concerns. We were then towed to the rampSuggestions: Upon reflection; there are a couple of things should be highlighted as a result of this situation:The first relates to pilot flying/monitoring duties. It has been suggested that it might be wise for the pilot in command (PIC) to run the QRH while the second in command (SIC) acts as pilot flying. I elected not to do this because; when my SIC first pulled up the QRH; he noted that there might be controllability issues. Once we started with the QRH; I did not want to reassign duties. However; if I had to do it over again; I would have slightly delayed beginning the QRH; ensured adequate control was able to be maintained; and then changed pilot flying (PF)/pilot monitoring (PM) duties so that I could run the QRH as PIC. (See my next point on this.) It would be helpful if this were made a more significant point of emphasis in our training.The second relates to the organization of the QRH. The electronic QRH notes temporary revisions to the QRH with a marginal hyperlink that is easy to overlook. The hyperlink is a generally a blue number. It would be much better if the words temporary revision" were specifically noted in the hyperlink. This hyperlink was overlooked in our situation. Fortunately; the only change was to override the flap warning system for landing. However; more significant changes in another situation could be more problematic. I am aware of the way in which temporary changes are made in the QRH; but still managed to overlook it in the heat of the moment. Contributing to this oversight is the fact that this was our final flight after a week of dealing with significant weather on a daily basis and a diversion due to thunderstorms. The third relates to fuel management. Our original fuel over destination (FOD) in our first flight plan had us landing with approximately 2100 lbs of fuel. Due to enroute weather; I requested extra fuel. Our updated fuel load had us arriving at ZZZ with approximately 2900 lbs. We actually landed with around 1600 lbs. If we had not carried the extra fuel; we would have faced a critically low fuel situation in addition to our hydraulic failure. This could cause a crew to rush a QRH procedure due to fuel constraints. We should reconsider our fuel planning in light of this."