B737-800 flight crew reported they failed to raise the landing gear after takeoff when they were distracted by a wake turbulence encounter and ATC clearances.
Synopsis
B737-800 flight crew reported they failed to raise the landing gear after takeoff when they were distracted by a wake turbulence encounter and ATC clearances.
Narrative
Normal takeoff with corresponding callouts. 'Positive rate; gear up' was called after rotation; but gear was not brought up. We were taking off behind a 787-9 and were caught in his wake on the climb out after our tower assigned turn on departure. Once we hit the wake; I called for continuous climb power to get above it. Upon reaching the flap retraction speed; I called for 'flaps up'; but was stepped on by Tower telling us to switch to Departure; so I did not call for the entire 'flaps up after takeoff checklist' callout. After the frequency switch we both noticed the excess noise; however; assimilated it to the engines on the continuous setting. I noticed our climb performance was severely lacking with our power setting as well as having a light load; so I started scanning what the issue could've been. The PF pointed out that the gear was still extended and brought the gear up while we were above the gear retraction limitation at ~245 kts. Cause: Failure to continue calling for the 'flaps up after takeoff checklist' callout after the frequency change. Had that callout been readdressed; it would have eliminated the limitation exceedance by trapping the mistake with the after takeoff flow and checklist.
Second reporter narrative
I was the PM on the flight from PHL to ZZZ. Upon becoming airborne; the standard calls confirming a positive rate of climb and 'gear up' were made. At the same time; ATC issued a left turn to heading 230 and instructed us to switch to the departure frequency. After switching to the new frequency; the PF requested additional power to stay above the flight path of a 787 ahead of us in order to avoid further wake turbulence. After setting climb power; the PF called for 'flaps up' and the after-takeoff checklist.As the PM; I verified flap speed and moved the flaps to the up position. Simultaneously; I was acknowledging additional heading and altitude instructions from ATC. Shortly afterward; we both noticed and acknowledged an unusual noise level that had not been present on previous flights operated on this aircraft. Based on the noise level and the aircraft's climb performance; we suspected that a panel was open and creating drag.I continued to acknowledge ATC instructions while remaining focused on monitoring the flight director and engine instruments for any abnormal indications. I then; as the PM; executed the after-takeoff flow and checklist; but immediately realized the landing gear was still extended. I notified the PF and checked the airspeed indication--we were flying at 240 knots and accelerating. To prevent exceeding the extended landing gear speed limit; I immediately raised the gear. However; in doing so; we exceeded the landing gear retraction speed limit of 235 knots by 10 knots. The extended landing gear speed limitation was not exceeded.An AML (Aircraft Maintenance Logbook) entry was made describing the landing gear overspeed; and maintenance personnel were notified after landing. A maintenance debrief was conducted at the gate. A maintenance operational inspection was carried out; and no discrepancies were found. The flight departed as scheduled the following day.Cause: The causal factors can be attributed to task saturation; with excessive emphasis placed on wake turbulence avoidance and compliance with ATC instructions; while being overly focused on performance instruments. Another contributing factor was allowing other tasks to take precedence over the execution of standard operating procedures (SOPs). To mitigate future risk; it is recommended to improve task saturation management and ensure strict adherence to company SOPs.
More incidents for this aircraft family →
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.