A321 Captain reported an engine bleed malfunction during the climb on an ETOPS flight. The flight diverted to an alternate airport and landed overweight.

Date: 2025-06 · Aircraft: A321 · Phase: climb

Anomalies: aircraft-equipment-problem-critical|deviation-altitude-crossing-restriction-not-met|deviation-altitude-undershoot|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-weight-and-balance|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-published-material-policy

Synopsis

A321 Captain reported an engine bleed malfunction during the climb on an ETOPS flight. The flight diverted to an alternate airport and landed overweight.

Narrative

Climbing thru about 12000 feet on departure from ZZZ; encountered an AIR ENG2 BLEED FAULT ECAM. Due to the 14000 foot altitude restriction at ZZZZZ on departure; we had departed with the APU BLEED on. This was still not enough to meet the constraint; so per the procedure referenced in the 10-7 chart selected Maximum Continuous Thrust (MCT) thrust. APU bleed was selected off around 10000 feet. All engine parameters were normal. The ECAM triggered after the APU bleed was deselected; while still at MCT. As this tail number is affected by Operations Engineering Bulletin (OEB) XX; we ran that procedure prior to the ECAM. The procedure led us back to the ECAM; as the PSI of the affected bleed was low. The ECAM directed ENG 2 BLEED …. OFF. This immediately cleared the ECAM alert. Status showed 'normal'; bleed system display (SD) indications consistent with normal OFF selection. Since conditions for the ECAM were no longer present per the flight manual procedures; stopped procedures. After some time tried to reselect the bleed. This caused a re-triggering of the ECAM. Noticed a slight overheat to about 390 degrees on the right engine precooler as the alert triggered. Ran the ECAM again (OEB conditions still not present). This time the ECAM remained displayed; so we ran the full procedure leading to a shutdown of engine bleed and pack 2; with an opening of the crossbleed valve.As there are no single-pack limitations that applied to us; continued normal climb while assessing the situation. After reviewing procedures; QRC; and weather along the coast; we decided as a crew that the risk of continuing the flight was greater than the risk of returning. This was supported by the fact that we had an ECAM associated with an active OEB; and the risk of depressurizing if the other one failed was potentially heightened. We also were still over land with 5:30 of ocean crossing ahead of us.Contacted Dispatch with a conference to Maintenance Control. Maintenance Control confirmed they had seen a precooler failure on their screen and that ETOPS flight was not advised. This agreed with our decision so we elected to divert. Weather was similar at all stations in both the departure area and destination area; and since we were in no immediate rush let Dispatch and Operations review options for repairs and passenger reaccomodation. They suggested ZZZ1; which we agreed was fine. After clearing the line with Dispatch contacted ATC (still with ZZZ) and [advised ATC] and set up diversion to ZZZ1. Due to the overweight condition of the aircraft did request Airport Rescue and Firefighting (ARFF) to standby; though we did not anticipate any issues.Recleared to ZZZ1. Got a nice long final and ran an overweight landing QRH procedure (putting the APU bleed back on). Landing was smooth per the QRH procedure; allowing the airplane to roll to the end of the runway with minimal braking. Cancelled the [priority handling] with ARFF and taxied to the gate ZZZ1 with no issues. After some discussion with the station agents decided to deplane the passengers. Initially this was met with resistance by Operations; who wanted to leave everyone on board based on a 1-hour advise time from Maintenance Control. Due to the fact that engine runs are required after this repair and personal experience with these taking longer than expected; told Operations that I would require the passengers to be deplaned. As I sit and write this still waiting on the aircraft at ZZZ1; the engine cowling is still open and three hours has passed since we parked here at the gate.

More incidents for this aircraft family →

Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.