Fractional jet Captain reported an unstabilized approach resulted in an altitude below the glidepath on final approach. The Captain directed the new hire First Officer to go-around and the flight landed on a different runway.

Narrative

The flight had begun with a significant set of delaying circumstances; largely related to poor FBO service and departure changes that resulted in us departing roughly 30min late. We were on our way to do a new owner first flight with only a 1hr turn on the ground; so there was definitely added pressure to get back whatever time we could in flight. The original plan was to shoot the RNAV 25 into LEB and this was the approach that had been loaded into the FMS. Since the RNAV 07 would be more efficient and the weather and our performance numbers allowed; we also briefed this approach. Nearing LEB; we were offered the RNAV 07 and I switched the approach and landing numbers in the FMS; but forgot to change the landing runway as well. After we broke out of the clouds and I called the runway in sight; my First Officer (FO) did not level off at MDA or maneuver to align the aircraft on final approach (the approach has a 15 degree offset from centerline); but instead kept flying straight to the threshold and continued descending while following the FMS VNAV Path. After disregarding my instructions to add power and level off; we descended to the point of 4 red lights on the PAPI and I could see that our current path would likely have us impacting terrain short of the runway; so I called for a go-around. During the go-around; the First Officer did not make any callouts and I had to coach him through all of his two engine go around actions and callouts in addition to performing my own. As we were climbing out; the First Officer asked multiple times; 'Why did we go around? I was on glideslope and on speed.' This makes me believe that despite briefing it; he did not understand the approach we were shooting and was not looking outside the cockpit during the visual segment of the approach. Also due to my previous failure to switch landing runways when changing the approach to the RNAV 07; we got a 'Check Runway' aural alert; however this occurred after the go-around had been initiated for the unstable approach and we were already climbing out at that point. Because of this non-standard execution of the maneuver; I missed that we did not perform our After Takeoff Checklist upon FRA. When leveling off at the MAA; I went head's down to program the FMS and input landing numbers for the RNAV 25 since ATC offered to let us try again from the opposite direction. When I was head's down; I heard the aural 'Overspeed' chime and looked up to see that we had exceeded 270 kts at 5;000 ft. The First Officer asked me why we were over speeding and I had to instruct him to reduce power and slow to 250 kts or below. I also had to instruct him that the auto-throttles were not engaged since he had turned them off when hitting TO/GA and did not re-engage them. I believe we ran the 'Approach Checklist' though I can't remember with certainty. We then shot the RNAV 25; performed the 'Before Landing Checklist' and landed uneventfully. This situation was debriefed after landing and prior to the next flight.Due to a busy and time-pressured cockpit and a non-SOP approach and missed approach; my personal mistakes were:- Forgetting to switch runways when I loaded the new approach and landing data.- Accidentally loading the higher CDFA minimums on an approach that was not eligible for CDFA.- Not noticing my FO move the altitude bug from the MDA to the MAA. He may have also asked me to set missed approach upon glide path intercept and I did without thinking about it; but I do not recall ever adjusting the altitude bug other than on the go-around when we were given a higher vectoring altitude.- Not performing the 'After Takeoff Checklist' upon reaching FRA during the go around.- Not adequately monitoring the aircraft's speed after leveling off at our MAA and informing my first officer that the auto throttles were not on and that we were trending to overspeed prior to it actually happening.- Allowing my level of involvement as pilot monitoring to be compromised by other duties; such as programming the FMS instead of watching the Primary Flight Display (PFD) until all flight parameters had stabilized.Primary factor suggestions:-Increase the experience requirements for new hires. The First Officer told me during the tour that he had only been flying for a couple years and his previous experience consisted of over 900 hours in light sport aircraft. According to him; most of that time was logged as a safety pilot and not as pilot flying or giving instruction. The rest of his time consisted of skydiving and did not include much meaningful IFR time from what I gathered.- Increase the amount of training and training standards for new hires.- Emphasize VMC go-arounds inside 500ft during future recurrent events.- Include offset LNAV approaches in future recurrent events.- Emphasize task prioritization for Pilot Monitoring during future recurrent events.Secondary Factor Suggestion- Provide greater turn times for high profile flights; such as new owner first flights; in order to prevent time compression for crews in the event of a delayed departure.