Air carrier flight crew reported diverting to due to weather and minimum fuel. The first approach was unstable and during the go-around they received a Ground Proximity Warning.
Synopsis
Air carrier flight crew reported diverting to due to weather and minimum fuel. The first approach was unstable and during the go-around they received a Ground Proximity Warning.
Narrative
Flight was planned ZZZ1 to ZZZ2; the Capt was PF and I was PM. Pre-flight was normal; our alternate was changed from ZZZ3 on the release to ZZZ4 on the second release. We discussed how tight our takeoff weight was to our limit for departure and how that prevented us from adding fuel; but that we had enough fuel for current conditions. When we checked in for pushback at ZZZ1 we were advised there was a 'very very very very very big issue on the field and no one is departing or arriving.' We delayed for about 20-30 minutes and then were given clearance to push and taxi. ZZZ1 was limited to 1 runway for takeoff and landing so we burnt through our taxi fuel but we were still above min t/o fuel. When we departed we were showing 7.4 for REMF (Remaining Fuel) . We climbed to our final cruise altitude prior to the planned step climb to help our fuel as well. The Capt then reached out to dispatch to see if ZZZ5 would be a suitable alternate since it was closer and would use less fuel than ZZZ4. Dispatch agreed that it was a good alternate and we updated the flight computer.Cruise and initial descent were uneventful until we were notified that ZZZ2 was experiencing delays for microburst activity. We were giving holding instructions at ZZZZZ and complied for one turn. We reached back out to dispatch to ask again about ZZZ and they replied that there was a TS cell at the airport but that it looked like it was moving off and that ZZZ was still good. Then the Capt declared min fuel and requested diversion to ZZZ. After some delay by ATC; the Capt [advised ATC] for fuel and requested direct routing to ZZZ. While we were rebuilding the box; we noticed on the weather radar that the cell at ZZZ5 was still hovering over the departure end of the runway. At about that time ZZZ Center asked if we would like to divert to ZZZ instead. We were still at 26000 MSL and ZZZ was pretty close. I looked at FD Pro and saw 'reg' on the info block for ZZZ without realizing I was still set on the 319/320 profile. I hadn't ever been to ZZZ but had heard plenty of other pilots talk about it and so I assumed it was a good enough field for the diversion. The Captain said yes and we were cleared to a point on the final for ZZZ.I was having a hard time keeping up with the box; loading the approach etc. I saw ZZZ and asked the Capt if she would like the Visual Approach. She agreed and we requested it and were given clearance for it as well as a swap to tower. I got so fixated on trying to catch up on the box and do other PM duties that I did not take a step back and try to slow down the situation. I think this was the biggest error of the day. I believe the Capt was still operating off the idea that we had as little fuel as we would have if we continued to ZZZ5. If I used my SA (Situational Awareness) to tell the Capt that we still had over 6000lbs of fuel I think that would have been enough to feel like we could hold a turn or two and get everything stable. Unfortunately that didn't happen; so we were trying to get down on the approach and not able to slow down. The Capt called for flaps 1 and I extended them. We talked about leveling off and extending the gear for drag and that we were over the extension speed 260 knots. The Capt exercised her authority and said to extend it anyway. We got to flaps two after that while the Captain continued to try and descend. Ultimately we were not going to be able to make the landing so the Captain went around. She called out 'Going around flaps 3 check thrust'. Flaps were still at 2 and then tower offered us left downwind to come back around but there was higher terrain that direction and in front of us. I don't remember if we initiated a turn to the left but I asked the Capt if we had enough clearance to the left. We cleaned up the flaps but did not retract the gear or accomplish the after takeoff checklist due to channelization. I tried to convey that we were not climbing sufficiently and that we needed to make a turn to the right for terrain clearance. The Capt initiated the turn to the right but then at some point during this we received a GPWS alert. We did not accomplish the terrain escape maneuver but continued climbing and turning. I think I unconsciously started pulling back on the side stick as we received a single 'dual input'. I released the sidestick but then the Captain stated that she lost SA and transferred the aircraft control to me. I flew the ground track for the LOC XX missed approach while climbing for the terrain. I was flying manual thrust and controls. The Captain then noticed that the gear was still down and we retracted it.I flew the aircraft in a visual pattern back to the LOC XX straight-in course. The Captain was able to regain SA and we slowed and configured early to help stabilize the situation. I talked about getting on the brakes earlier than normal and the Captain recommended medium auto brakes which I agreed to. We complied with the callouts; stabilized approach criteria; accomplished the before landing checklist; and were cleared to land. I landed the aircraft and the Captain took back over control slowing through 80 knots. We cleared the runway and then tried to keep everything as normal as possible into parking. At that time we contacted dispatch and notified them of what happened. Even after more than an hour on the ground ZZZ2 was still ground stopped.
Second reporter narrative
I want to preface this report with an apology for making possible errors in decision making and poor planning which unfortunately snowballed into many other mistakes made on this flight. As Captain and pilot flying; I take full responsibility for the inadequate aircraft handling and planning made on this ZZZ1-ZZZ2 - diversion ZZZ flight. While in the van in ZZZ1; I signed off release two; which was a change in our alternate from ZZZ3 to ZZZ4 and we were performance limited so adding extra gas was not an option as we were planned to land in ZZZ2 7.8. We experienced an unexpected lengthy delay in ZZZ1 due to a security breach at the airport resulting in a hour taxi out time vs 20 minutes as planned. This in turn burned close to 500 pounds of additional; unplanned fuel. Shortly after leveling off; I noticed ZZZ4 would no longer be suitable due to their fuel state (estimated FOB at approx ZZZ2 7.3) and asked dispatch for a different alternate. ZZZ5 was recommended by dispatch and changed accordingly. As we approached ZZZ2 on the ZZZZZ arrival; we had prepared the cabin early due to severe thunderstorms all around and forecasted turbulence in the descent. I contacted dispatch to confirm ZZZ5 was still a good alternate and received response of just a small cell 20 miles from ZZZ5; but should be moved through. Close to ZZZZZ1; we received instructions to plan to hold at ZZZZZ as published EFC of close to 40 min and that ZZZ2 was shut down due to microburst alert over the field. I inquired about a different arrival such as the ZZZZZ1 to get us into ZZZ2. ATC said; unable at that time. I knew immediately we were not going to make that the proposed EFC.Planning; ZZZ5 as the alternate I did take a look at our fuel burn to ZZZ4 which showed landing with 4.3lbs. We chose ZZZ5 as discussed with dispatch; and did only approximately a half of turn in the hold. At which point I keyed the radio and declared min fuel. ATC responded state intentions; and we asked for routing to ZZZ5. ATC gave us direct ZZZZZ3. I informed the cabin crew that we were diverting to ZZZ5 at which point I said I would make a PA which ultimately I did not have time to do however; the cabin crew made the PA for me. We notified dispatch that we were also diverting to ZZZ5. As we plugged in the new route; our estimated arrival plan fuel was close to land with 4200 pounds. After this discovery; I immediately [advised ATC] for fuel and asked to go direct ZZZZZ4 on the arrival landing north which was assigned. Approximately 60NM out from ZZZ5 we noticed that TS cell that dispatch had warned us about was right over top of the airport. Knowing we had very limited gas for any contingency of a go around at ZZZ5 I desperately looked for another option. ATC advised ZZZ airport 1 o'clock and 25 miles. I will be honest much of my gut knew that this was an unfamiliar airport and I felt very hesitant however it showed ZZZ and in the interest of safety and seemingly the best option at the time; I felt it was our only option. We could see the airport visually. However this is where I began making several mistakes. I was very distracted by our fuel state and did not have a clear mindset as a pucker factor of the severity of the situation was sinking in quickly. We were significantly high for the approach RWYXX. I did not properly brief the approach and I had trouble slowing and descending. Turning final I was very unstable over speeding both the gear and flaps. Both were written up on the ground at ZZZ after talking with [maintenance]. I decided to go around; at which point I lost complete situational awareness. I missed completing my go-around callouts and after takeoff checklists due to distractions from tower and soft go-around mode in the aircraft. We were visual the entire approach and climb out; however did not receive much guidance from tower for vectors back around. Initially ATC was going to give us left traffic back around however unfamiliar it seemed terrain was higher left so made a slight left to rising terrain before making right upwind turn which is what the chart was depicting. During this time; we received a too low terrain warning. Startle factor is real; and was confiding in my FO about his SA (Situational awareness) . He said he was good. While me being very aware of my lack" of presence; I used CRM and relinquish flight controls to him while I became pilot monitoring. Never having flown into ZZZ we should've followed automation more; however we ultimately ended up flying VFR disregarding FMS guidance. The First Officer did an amazing job; staying focused and calm explaining to me what he was doing the entire time back around. This professionalism allowed me to regroup and help him by being a better pilot monitoring. The second approach was stable however we did not get landing distance as I failed to notify dispatch of the diversion change. With familiarity with the landing capabilities of the aircraft and with 9000 feet of runway; medium auto brake set performance should be satisfactory at approx 168000 lbs. It was not until we got to the ramp in which we were advised the limitations of the aircrafts takeoff performance. In hindsight; if I had known; we could not take off out of there I would've definitely considered another option. As a flight crew I debriefed the purser; profusely apologizing to the passengers for not making more PAs about the situation until we got on the ground; in which all seemed very understanding and still appreciative. The First Officer and I extensively debriefed this flight for hours after; including van ride to and from the hotel. Again; as a Captain and someone that has worked in the safety department for X years at company; I take everything about safety seriously. I made a number of mistakes especially when it comes to following SOP and automation management; as I have been taught better throughout my XX years at company. I feel ashamed how this flight was conducted on my behalf; knowing I am a more professional pilot than displayed on this flight; and very angry at myself for some of the decisions I made as Captain. Ultimately we did get the aircraft; passengers and crew on the ground safely. After debriefing this event; both with crew and vigorously with myself; there is a number of things I would have done differently. The biggest being just taking a breath. Taking a minute to pause and regroup before initiating any approaches or final decisions. I don't know if I considered all viable alternate options. Having a new First Officer brand new to company with a military background it helped; but also hurt the decision making process. I know he felt slightly behind the aircraft; knowing this more reason for me as Captain to not have rushed the process. We were both unaware of the restrictions going into ZZZ as a special qual/supervised entry airport. Again; I do not take nothing about this flight lightest and am using this event as a recognition for improvement as a pilot and a company Captain."
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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.