A corporate jet flight crew reported ATC turned them on to final approach above glide path and too close in to the airport resulting in an unstable approach to the wrong runway.

Narrative

Summary of Event. The flight in question was a short; early morning repositioning flight conducted in VFR conditions. Due to the nature and expected brevity of the flight; we completed a thorough briefing of the anticipated approach at the destination and programmed it into the FMS prior to departure.After takeoff; we were vectored to a left downwind at 4;000 feet for the arrival airport. During this segment; the FMS generated an advisory message indicating that the LPV approach was unavailable. While I began troubleshooting the message; ATC issued an immediate vector to a close-in base leg and instructed a descent to 3;000 feet. As we turned base; ATC queried whether we had the airport in sight. From my position in the right seat; I did not yet have visual contact with the airport; but the pilot flying (PF) confirmed that he did. I relayed to ATC that we had the field in sight; and we were subsequently cleared for the Visual Approach to Runway 8L.At this point; we were high and fast on the approach profile; and the PF was struggling to reduce airspeed sufficiently to begin configuring the aircraft for landing. I focused on monitoring the airspeed to deploy slats and flaps as soon as permissible. During this time; I noted that the auto throttles had disconnected. I directed my attention to re-engaging the auto throttles to assist the PF in energy management. Consequently; I did not return to addressing the LPV advisory.Given the confirmation from the PF that we were on a Visual Approach with the airport in sight; I prioritized configuration and checklist completion. Once airspeed allowed; I extended the landing gear and initiated the landing checklist using the electronic checklist displayed on Display Unit 4 (DU4); which required head-down time for completion. Upon finishing; I looked outside and encountered significant glare from the rising sun. My initial visual reference was the PAPI; which indicated four red lights. I immediately advised the PF that we were below the glide path and continued to monitor the PAPI while cross-checking with the altimeter. The PAPI indications improved to two red; two white; at which point I directed my attention fully to the runway environment directly ahead.We landed without incident on Runway 8R. There was no communication between our crew and ATC from the landing clearance to touchdown. Following rollout; Tower instructed us to exit left and contact Ground; and ground control subsequently cleared us to taxi to the ramp.Contributing Factors. Task Saturation and Prioritization Error: The unexpected FMS advisory; coupled with the increased workload managing aircraft energy state (airspeed; configuration; auto throttle anomaly); diverted crew attention away from continuous external monitoring. This introduced a breakdown in flight path cross-checks during a critical phase of flight.Instrument Cross check-Verification Deficiency. The flight crew did not utilize available heading references or lateral navigation overlays to corroborate visual alignment with the assigned runway. Additionally; the advisory message regarding LPV approach unavailability was not fully resolved or integrated into the landing verification process.Expectation Bias. Confirmation bias influenced runway identification; as both pilots anticipated acquisition of the assigned Runway 8L and subsequently misidentified Runway 8R as the correct landing runway.Environmental Conditions. The combination of low sun angle and intense glare from the rising sun significantly degraded external visual cues; complicating positive runway identification.- ATC Non-Intervention: No external correction or advisory was issued by ATC from the point of landing clearance to touchdown regarding the incorrect runway alignment.Conclusion / Corrective Actions:Moving forward; I will place significantly greater emphasis on positive runway identification by incorporating systematic cross-checks between external visual cues and available instrument references; including heading indications; lateral navigation overlays; and localizer or GPS guidance when available.Additionally; I will reinforce strict adherence to stabilized approach criteria; ensuring that if the approach is not stabilized by the appropriate point; a go-around will be executed without hesitation. During periods of increased workload or automation anomalies; deliberate task prioritization will be verbalized to ensure shared situational awareness between crew members.Finally; I will apply lessons learned from this event to improve workload management; maintain better CRM practices; and actively participate in future training scenarios that address visual approach procedures; task saturation; and operational decision-making.