Corporate pilots reported an NMAC in the traffic pattern with an aircraft that turned in front of them. Corporate flight crew took evasive action.
Synopsis
Corporate pilots reported an NMAC in the traffic pattern with an aircraft that turned in front of them. Corporate flight crew took evasive action.
Narrative
While in the final phase of an Instrument Approach while on an Instrument Flight plan into ZZZ; after having been given landing clearance by Tower; a near miss occurred when Aircraft Y in a visual pattern was told to follow Aircraft X's traffic and turned from downwind to base prematurely creating a hazard. The Aircraft X traffic received an audible traffic warning on final (other aircraft were in the surrounding area and pattern) with Aircraft Y 100ft above and to the north (right) of Aircraft X. The Aircraft X crew searched for the traffic and took evasive action immediately upon seeing the nearby Aircraft Y by offsetting their course to the left (away) from the other traffic as well as initiated a descent to avoid a potential mid-air. This action; fortunately; resulted in a near miss instead of a collision. Tower made a call to Aircraft Y to continue its right turn into a tight right turn to not cut off landing Aircraft X traffic but failed to warn Aircraft X traffic of the impending conflict until well after evasive action was taken and a possible mid-air would have occurred. The Aircraft Y traffic had continued its right turn into a 360 and came within less than 100ft vertically and approximately 200 ft horizontally at its closest proximity (after evasive action was taken by Aircraft X). After maneuvering; the Aircraft X informed Tower of traffic in sight and continued to land. (A near miss with a large bird to the left of the aircraft also occurred prior to landing shortly after the near miss with Aircraft Y.) ZZZ Tower did not initiate any further communication from either Aircraft X nor Aircraft Y regarding the near-miss and the Aircraft X Pilot had to source the Tower number to discuss the situation later that day. The Aircraft X pilot was able to speak to the ZZZ Tower Supervisor regarding the incident. It was clear that no responsibility was being taken by the tower in regards to the near miss for their failure to provide adequate separation for the IFR Aircraft X traffic and barely ensured that the Aircraft Y traffic was able to maneuver and avoid a mid-air collision. The fault clearly lies in the Aircraft Y Pilot not having and maintaining visual contact with the Aircraft X traffic to follow and prematurely turned base right into the Aircraft X traffic. The tower should call the base leg for visual traffic when following IFR landing traffic to provide adequate legal separation instead of asking for only confirmation of visual contact of the VFR Aircraft Y to follow. No warning was given to landing Aircraft X traffic of the potential conflict until too late. Tower never informed nor asked Aircraft X if they had traffic in sight until well after the mid-air would have occurred and evasive maneuvering had occurred. More separation should be made for traffic within the vicinity of the airport and during busy times; the tower should not allow touch and go visual traffic in order to reduce the workload and allow for proper ATC oversight to mitigate future incidents.
Second reporter narrative
Below is my recollection and excerpts of the events of our Near Miss experience at ZZZ with Aircraft Y. We were flying Aircraft X on an IFR flight plan into ZZZ; cleared for the ILS/Localizer XXR approach. We were cleared to land; number 2 behind Aircraft Z; ATC/Tower requested us to reduce to approach speed. As the right seat SIC/Monitor I was running the radios and acknowledged 'clear to land XXR; number 2; reduce speed.' Tower then instructed Aircraft Z to initiate a short approach. Aircraft Y; was instructed by ATC/Tower to extend downwind; Aircraft X 6 mile final. Aircraft Y responded 'Aircraft Y extend downwind'. No Aircraft X traffic call was acknowledged by the Aircraft Y pilot.I called a 5 mile final and at approach speed; ATC/Tower responded ' Traffic is over the runway'.ATC/Tower then called the Aircraft Y Pilot stating 'Aircraft X 3 mile final; XXR cleared touch and go'. Aircraft Y pilot responded 'Cleared touch and go'; no acknowledgement of the Aircraft X traffic. ATC/Tower then gave the following instruction: ' Aircraft Y keep a right turn tight right turn; you are cutting off traffic to follow.' Just seconds before this ATC call was made to Aircraft Y the crew in Aircraft X received a cockpit traffic alert and both pilots acknowledged spotting the Aircraft Y Traffic turning a right base into our flight path on a collision course.Pilot flying made evasive action to avoid a collision. While we were taking evasive action in Aircraft X and the Aircraft Y pilot was continuing his right turn away from Aircraft X; ATC/Tower then made the following Traffic Alert call: 'Traffic Alert Aircraft X traffic off your right; continuing right turn Aircraft Y'.'Aircraft Y was then instructed to follow us; Aircraft X; after completing their 360° turn cleared touch and go. At this point Aircraft Y still never acknowledged having the Aircraft X Traffic in sight.I am an active CFII instructing in a busy training area. Below is my professional assessments of the action that were in error by the ATC/Tower controller and the Aircraft Y pilot. * Aircraft Y pilot negligently failed to comply with ATC instructions to maintain proper sequencing behind Aircraft X aircraft on final approach to Runway XXR. Despite clear direction to follow the Aircraft X; the Aircraft Y pilot initiated an early base turn; cutting in front of the Aircraft X; which was established on the ILS approach for XXR. This action created a Near Miss Incident and disrupted the safe and orderly flow of traffic into the airport. * Despite repeated ATC instructions to follow the Aircraft X traffic; the Aircraft Y pilot never acknowledged having the traffic in sight; nor did he respond with the standard required phraseology ('traffic in sight' or 'negative contact'). * ATC/ Tower controller should not have to cleared the Aircraft Y Pilot for touch and go landings without verbal confirmation that the Aircraft Y pilot had positive visual contact with Aircraft X. Appropriate ATC action would have been to instruct Aircraft Y to extend downwind until visual contact could be confirmed by the Aircraft Y pilot or the Controller should have called the base turn for Aircraft Y with the appropriate traffic pattern separation if no visual contact of the Aircraft X traffic could be confirmed by the Aircraft Y pilot.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.