B767 Captain reported an electrical malfunction during the climb resulting in a partial loss of flight instruments. The flight diverted to an alternate airport; dumped fuel and landed.

Narrative

We arrived at the aircraft and were bussed to remote stand XX. Except for the extreme heat; everything seemed fine and we appeared to be lining up for an on time departure. We started the APU 10 minutes earlier than the 60 minute restriction on the 10-7 page. It was difficult to keep the aircraft cool. ZZZZ uses XX as the preferred runway for departure; but XX is never possible due to weight and performance issues (see the 10-7 for specific XX runway XY instructions). We notified ATC of our need to use runway XY for departure and we expected the usual delay for departing 'wrong way.' Originally it looked like we would push on time; but the push crew was slightly late. Then there was traffic behind our airplane. Eventually it was one delay after another. ZZZZ is the controller for the enroute airspace and they needed to accept our wrong way runway XY departure. Each time we were unable to push; ZZZZ pushed back our takeoff time. We sat for 2:36 on the ground before we took off. We started to review the chart in the FOM which oddly; doesn't have an 'International to Domestic' column. Eventually; due to ATC pushing our takeoff time back; our tug driver had to leave. He asked me to call him on his cell phone when we needed him to return. I couldn't force him to stay; so this was the best we could do. I discussed with our crew that I would call him 20 minutes in advance of our ETOT (Estimated Take-Off Time) in order to give him time to arrive. I forgot that we were in ZZZZ. We should have called him earlier. He took about 30 minutes to show up again; which caused even more delay with ATC. Finally; after 2 hours and 36 minutes of fighting for an ATC slot; briefing passengers; briefing flight attendants; and struggling to keep the aircraft cool; we finally departed runway XY. Instead of flying the complicated 2 page SID; ATC gave us a surprise direct clearance to ZZZZZ toward the north. That saved considerable time and maneuvering. The FO was the PF. Initially the climb was uneventful. The Relief Pilot left at about FL250 for his break. Climbing through FL270 I was looking left at my iPad trying to mentally prepare for the impending wx deviations that we would need. I heard a small bang sound and the FO suddenly told me to take the controls. I looked over and saw that his ADI and HSI screens had completely failed. There was no autopilot or auto throttles; and there were many EICAS messages. I took control and became the PF. Since the Relief Pilot had just stepped back 60 seconds ago we called him back up. The Relief Pilot was back very quickly and I assigned them to start using the QRC while I hand flew. The failures were as follows:GEN OFF R or AC BUS OFF RENG EEC MODE RCTR FUEL PUMP RAUTOTHROT DISCAUTOPILOT DISCAfter the initial startle; we determined we were flying and the FOs started the QRC; first concentrating on getting the R GEN online. At about that time we entered some clouds with moderate turbulence; so I had the Relief Pilot instruct the FAs to take their Jumpseats. Some wx buildups were up ahead; and the system malfunctions initially distracted me. I was trying hard to hand fly manually; listen and follow along with the QRC; listen to ATC with their accent; and avoid wx. We approached the wx quickly and I asked for deviations; while experiencing brief moderate turbulence which diminished to light turbulence. I was definitely feeling overwhelmed at that moment. We got the R GEN back online but the other failures stayed. Somewhere after this process I was able to engage the L autopilot and fly the throttles manually. That helped. After completing the checklists; we called dispatch and Maintenance Control on the SAT phone. At about the same time we cleared the convective wx and let the FAs up. Maintenance Control had no suggestions for us; and we told dispatch that due to the multiple failures; including the CTR FUEL PUMP R; that an ocean crossing was not possible. Dispatch (and my crew) all agreed on a divert. At this point the FAs wanted to start their service and were calling us. Up until this point we had no useful information for them. We waited to call dispatch and Maintenance Control before verbally communicating a divert scenario to the FAs The FAs were more concerned about getting their service over and starting their rest breaks. After the dispatch call we were finally able to give the FAs more information. We were very task saturated at this point; and our main priority was flying and troubleshooting. In hindsight; I need to develop a script to tell the FAs when we are busy. I need to develop some wording that assures them; yet communicates that we are overly busy and need to put them on hold until we have more information. Unfortunately; the FA community is academically diverse and many do not understand the urgency of our job as pilots. Multiple diversion airports were considered including ZZZZ1; ZZZZ2; ZZZZ; ZZZZ3. It was jointly agreed that ZZZZ3 would be the best option. The next problem was our landing weight. We had 3 options: Land overweight; Fly for hours until below max landing weight; or Dump fuel. Dispatch didn't hesitate and recommended dumping fuel. My crew was in agreement. Side note: My FOs and I discussed that during our training; they did not encourage us to dump fuel. That left an impression on all of us. Nevertheless; we all agreed to dump fuel and get on the ground safely. ATC gave us vectors and told us when we could start dumping. We had about 25K in the CTR tank and we drained it to zero. It took about 15 minutes. After dumping fuel we were still 5K overweight; so we took some delaying vectors near ZZZZ3 to burn down to 320K max landing weight. ATC was very accommodating and did not over saturate us with questions. We needed our time to brief; discuss; and agree on a course of action. ATC offered us the RNAV approach and I declined it. I asked for an ILS and they assigned us ILS XZC. With auto throttles inop; EEC (Electronic Engine Control) in ALT; and the throttles being split and sensitive; I wanted something familiar like the ILS. I was willing to let the FO accomplish the landing; but with the auto throttles inop; EEC in ALT; and the previous workload; he felt more comfortable handing it to me for the landing. I decided to use brakes 1 and let it roll. We had a 13;000 foot runway; so I disconnected the autobrakes quickly after landing. With our max landing weight landing; I wanted to avoid hot brakes. One less thing to worry about. Airport trucks followed us to parking stand. We shut down and the airport staff immediately plugged in to tell us that there would be an inspection. After the inspection; air stairs were brought over but they waited to open the door until they had buses for the passengers. During this process I made a couple of PAs to explain the situation as best I could. Once the door was opened there was a line of official people there to interview me in the cockpit. I knew immediately that any crew debriefing had to be done later that day at dinner. Airport; Police; Station Ops; Mechanics; all wanted information. The police needed me to fill out a 2 page form. I filled it out and took a picture on my phone. Everyone in ZZZZ3 was friendly and accommodating. I was VERY impressed. The company rep hinted that maybe the mechanics could fix the aircraft and get us redispatched. I quickly shot that down. There was no way I would allow my crew to fly again that day.Takeaways -Special emphasis on fly the airplane. We were busy and needed time for the essentials. ATC gave us what we wanted without complications. We felt that by declaring an emergency; ATC would try to bog us down with questions; and for each frequency change; they would ask us to rehash again and again. Of course we always have the power to say 'Standby'. It's amazing how beneficial moments of silence are when running a QRC or trying to determine a course of action. The absence of relentless questioning from ATC was very helpful. Later in the flight when we dumped fuel; we discussed declaring an emergency again. We felt that the psychological effect of declaring would cause us to rush and induce a below the surface element of stress; and we wanted less stress; not more. At that point in the flight; it felt similar to a PC event as we prepared to land at our diversion airport. We decided to keep our situation as 'familiar' as possible. In hindsight; after dumping fuel and lightening our workload; this may have been the time to do a precautionary declaration of emergency.