B737 flight crew reported receiving a low altitude warning from ATC during go around. Flight crew returned to safe altitude and continued.
Synopsis
B737 flight crew reported receiving a low altitude warning from ATC during go around. Flight crew returned to safe altitude and continued.
Narrative
This was day one (leg two) of the captain and I flying together as a flight crew. I was made aware by the captain during our introduction that he would be flying all three of our legs together; so he was PF throughout the shared portion of the trip.The captain and I were operating a flight from ZZZ1 to ZZZ. The ZZZ had ceilings of 2000-2500' throughout much of the afternoon. ATC was advertising RNAV approaches to XX and XYL.We requested the RNAVXX approach into ZZZ; as that is what we had loaded in the FMC. The captain (PF) chimed in on frequency to request vectors outside of ZZZZZ. ATC then vectored us outside of ZZZZZ and cleared us to intercept the final approach course at 3000'; with which we complied. The captain attempted to set the minimums in the MCP (Mode Control Panel) and I reminded him we had not yet been cleared for the approach. The captain then reset 3000' in the altitude window.The captain then selected at least one of; if not both; flaps 25 and 30 himself (this was not the first time he selected flaps as the PF). When he later requested flaps 40; we were 4-5 knots above the flap limitation speed. I said this and waited for the aircraft to slow before selecting flaps 40.Once cleared for the approach; the captain set minimums in the altitude window and began a shallow descent in V/S; questioning whether VNAV would capture the path. I am unsure if VNAV was eventually selected.Out of 2500' around ZZZZZ1; ATC stated there was a traffic conflict with a PC12 going to XYL and asked if we could take a vector to be resequenced. I responded in agreement and ATC assigned us heading 090 and maintain 2500'. I read back these instructions.To my surprise; the captain then hit TOGA. As far as I can recall; there was no standard 'go-around; TOGA; flaps 15' callout. The thrust levers came up and we quickly gained airspeed while initiating a slight climb. After a few seconds; the captain called for flaps 15. I complied and stated 'positive rate' and the captain called for me to raise the gear.We were still tracking approximately runway heading; so I selected heading mode and stated our need to turn. The captain then began the left turn. The aircraft was now overspeeding the flaps at flaps 15 and I noted our airspeed; to which the captain responded to raise the flaps 'on schedule.'After selecting flaps 5; I was alerted to the PFD (Primary Flight Display) by an aural 'bank angle' alert. I noticed we were in what I would estimate to be a 40-degree bank and I called 'bank angle.' The captain responded with a further leftward input of the control column. I then grabbed the yoke and help direct the aircraft in a rightward roll back to wings level.At wings level; the aircraft was still in a nose-low attitude and a high descent rate. ATC issued a low-altitude warning. The descent was arrested at approximately 2000' (1200-1300' AGL). We then climbed back to 2500-2700'. I noticed the airspeed was once again approaching an overspeed and the autothrottles were off; so I reduced the thrust slightly and offered to turn the autothrottles back on. The captain accepted. I also offered to turn the autopilot back on. The captain accepted this as well but was still making large control inputs so the autopilot wouldn't engage. Eventually; the captain reduced control inputs enough for me to re-engage the autopilot.ATC then queried us as to whether we would like XYL and we accepted. I requested the localizer approach; as per the captain's wishes. We loaded and briefed this approach and conducted a normal approach to landing.Cause: The traffic conflict was a contributing factor that led to this event. It is possible this scenario would not have occurred if we had selected the same runway that the other aircraft was using.The normalization of deviance from SOP's made it difficult to maintain effective communication and CRM. The selection of flaps and the introduction of radio calls as PF blurred the lines of our split/shared duties and eroded the foundation from which pilots operate (SOP's). I share part of the blame for not speaking up earlier in the day regarding these issues. The insistence of the captain to fly all three legs; particularly in the way it was communicated; also did not help foster good rapport.Finally; I believe the low frequency of executing soft go-arounds; and the absence of forward briefing of this maneuver; played the largest role in this situation. Had ALT HOLD and HDG been selected as opposed to TOGA; we would have had plenty of time to methodically raise the flaps and gear and our situational awareness would have been much higher. I believe encouraging forward briefing of soft go-arounds and practicing this maneuver during training would be incredibly helpful for mitigating this threat in the future.
Second reporter narrative
We were fully configured and on speed/ Flaps 40 for landing on the Rnav Rwy XX at ZZZ and coming up on the faf ZZZZZ. We executed a go-around at the towers request due to a single engine aircraft ahead of us landing on the same runway at a very slow speed. As we did the go-around; a heading and altitude were given by the tower. We ended up landing afterwards on XY L with no issues. Upon arriving at the gate; my FO and I discussed the event and he believes we may have oversped the flap 5 setting during cleanup. He wasn't sure by how much so; based on our pooled recollection I filled out the logbook entry as follows... Flaps 5 selection on go-around exceeded by 10kts. Request flap assembly inspection. I called dispatch and Maintenance Control. Contract maintenace was contacted to perform the inspection. The go-around was somewhat busy with heading and altitude instructions. I pressed the TOGA buttons and yes; things happen very quickly. Retrospect afterwards; the better way would have been to press " Alt Hold"...set the heading and altitude...then press Level Change and set speed to the up bug. It would have made things easier. Causal factors of the go-around in itself was a spacing issue. I'm not blaming ATC here...these things just plain happen."
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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.