AN LGT MADE A POOR APCH IN IMC. THE ACTUAL WX WAS MUCH LOWER THAN THE RPTED ATIS WX.

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THE CAPT WAS SHOOTING THE ILS 23L WITH THE VASI AND GS OUT. HE DSNDED TOO EARLY AND AT TOO HIGH OF RATE. I THOUGHT HE WAS LOW; SO I CHKED MY NOTES THAT MADE OFF THE CAPTS APCH PLATE. FE'S DON'T CARRY APCH PLATES AT ACR. MY NOTES SAID THAT HE WAS LOW; SO I CHKED THE CAPT'S APCH PLATE TO MAKE SURE THAT I WAS RIGHT. BY THIS TIME; THE FO HAD INFORMED THE CAPT THAT HE WAS TOO LOW. HE IMMEDIATELY CORRECTED. THE REST OF THE APCH WAS A BIT SLOPPY. I BELIEVE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WERE AS FOLLOWS: THE WX WAS MUCH WORSE THAN THE ATIS HAD CALLED FOR. IT WAS CHANGED AS SOON AS WE LANDED. THE CREW WAS TOO CONCERNED ABOUT THE LOWER WX AND THEREFORE WE WERE LOOKING FOR THE RWY WHEN MORE ATTN SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN TO FLYING THE AIRPLANE. I ALSO BELIEVE THE ILS 28 SHOULD HAVE BEEN IN USE SINCE IT WAS TOTALLY OPERATIONAL. CLEVELAND DID BEGIN USING IT AFTER WE LANDED. I SHOULD HAVE SPOKEN UP SOONER WITHOUT LOOKING AT THE CAPT'S APCH PLATE AND TRUSTED MY HANDWRITTEN NOTES OF THE APCH. I'M NOT SURE; BUT ACR'S ALTIMETER PROC MAY HAVE BEEN CONFUSING. (WE SET THE ALTIMETERS WITH THE CONVERSION ALTIMETER EXCEPT FOR THE STANDBY ALTIMETER WHICH IS MLS). SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 226348. 'PULL UP' WARNING FROM GPWS SOUNDED. GPWS SOUNDED FOR 2300 FPM DSCNT. CAPT DSNDED EXCESSIVELY; RESULTING IN GPWS WARNING AND DRIFTED 1 1/2 TO 2 DOTS L OF LOC CTRLINE. THE APCH BRIEF WAS SHORT AND NOT VERY COMPLETE OWING TO THE FACT THAT WE EXPECTED TO SEE THE ARPT MUCH EARLIER. WX WAS SIGNIFICANTLY LOWER THAN ATIS RPTED AND; IN MY OPINION; THE CAPT MISREAD THE STEP DOWN FIXES BECAUSE THE NDB AND OM ARE NOT CO-LOCATED.