ERJ175 flight crew reported pilot flying continued unstable approach below glide slope resulting in Captain taking control for a go-around.
Synopsis
ERJ175 flight crew reported pilot flying continued unstable approach below glide slope resulting in Captain taking control for a go-around.
Narrative
I was PM; FO was PF. The weather was CAVOK and calm. Upon initial call-up with Approach; I requested from the Approach Controller vectors to final for the ILS XXR and was told to expect that. PF maintained level 3 automation until approximately 200 feet above minimums while established and stabilized on the approach. After disconnecting the autopilot; the PF announced 'I'm going to go 3 red; 1 white;' which was something not briefed during the approach briefing. The runway has a long displaced threshold; I looked at the approach plate notes to see if there was any guidance about the height above the threshold in reference to the visual glideslope and did not find any. I thought that I would have to debrief with the FO about this decision after we landed and parked. Very soon afterwards; I realized that we were were 4 red on the visual glideslope; we were approximately 200 feet above the field and our screen height was close to the end of the runway. I called 'Glideslope; glideslope' whilst simulataneously the EGWPS sounded an audible alarm 'GLIDESLOPE; GLIDESLOPE' as the vertical track depicted flashing yellow. The FO replied 'clear my flight director.' I immediately replied; 'My controls.' I advanced the thrust levers to TO/GA; and flew the airplane at approximately an 8 degree pitch up attitude. I told the FO to advise ATC of our go-around; and called 'Flaps 2; gear up.' I called for heading; but the FO did not give me heading on the guidance panel. Tower asked for the reason for the go-around; I said 'Unstable.' The FO replied on radio; 'Unstable.' Reaching 2000 feet I called out 'Climb sequence; After Take off Checklist' and '1000 to go.' We returned to 3;000. I commanded the FO to rebuild the approach; get new landing numbers based on our new fuel amount; briefed the approach a second time; called for After Takeoff Checklist; Descent Checklist; and then flew the aircraft on localizer; on glideslope; all the way to the touchdown markers; landing approximately 1;200 feet past the threshold and vacated the runway at taxiway F. Upon the debrief; I allowed the FO to debrief the flight as to what he saw it and he said that 'I took the controls before he could do the go-around himself.' I replied that both I and the airplane were calling for you to correct the deviation and you did not say 'correcting;' or 'going around;' but instead said 'clear my flight director.' I reminded the FO that night EGPWS aural warnings cannot be disregarded and that since he did not take immediate action to correct the unstabilized approach; but rather indicated that he chose to continue by stating 'Clear my flight director.' I reminded the FO we cannot cross the threshold at less than 50 feet screen height and that dipping below the visual glideslope to shorten the runway landing distance reduces our margins of safety and is unacceptable; that the displaced threshold on the runway is there for a reason.Cause: The FO's poor judgment to not correct the deviation before it got worse. The FO decided to deviate from the standard operating procedures and violated the stabilized approach criteria; did not recognize the risk of flight and failed to execute a go-around on his own.Suggestions: We need to continue stressing to the pilots the importance of maintaining vertical approach guidance all the way to the touchdown markers. As this event proves; the normalization of deviance when it comes to flying lower than the glideslope is a serious risk of safety amongst the fleet and it needs to be stopped immediately.
Second reporter narrative
Flight occurred during night VMC conditions. While flying the ILS XXR approach into ZZZ. FO was pilot flying; approach was stabilized and we continued the approach descending below 1000 AFE. Runway XXR was in sight. Around 500-600 AFE; FO verbalized that I was following the PAPI lights and touchdown point was in sight. The flight director was still on during this time but the autopilot was turned off to prepare for landing. While focused on the touchdown point; the plane descended below the glideslope indicator and heard a glideslope" annunciation - Captain called for missed approach and transferred controls. We executed the missed and followed ATC's instructions to recommence the same approach and landed without further incident. Cause: The plane descended below glideslope while FO was fixated on the touchdown point; and due to the runway layout with the extended threshold for XXR and the altitude at the time this caused the " glideslope" annunciation warning. Suggestions: To avoid this or similar issues like this in the future; I will place special emphasis on maintaining the aircraft on the indicated glideslope until closer to the runway and ensure a safer approach."
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.