AN ACR LGT CREW WITH A 'GLASS COCKPIT' ATTEMPTED TO BUILD A VOR APCH IN THEIR FMC. THEY DSNDED BELOW THE PUBLISHED PROFILE.

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WE WERE TOLD TO EXPECT A VOR APCH TO 22L AT JFK IN EXCELLENT VFR CONDITIONS. AS THE APCH IS NOT IN OUR DATA BASE; WE 'CONSTRUCTED' IT USING VOR/DME FIXES. WE INSERTED ALL FIXES FROM CAPIT (JFK 052/10.0) THROUGH THE MISSED APCH POINT AND ON TO THE MISSED APCH FIX (CHANT). WHEN FIXES ARE INSERTED IN THIS MANNER; OUR DATA DISPLAY IDENTS THEM BY THE VOR AND A NUMERAL (E.G.; JFK13; JFK14; JFK15; ETC; WITH JFK 13 BEING CAPIT; JFK 14 WUGAL; ETC). THE APCH WAS BRIEFED AND FLOWN AS PER COMPANY POLICY WITH 1 PLT DISPLAYING RAW DATA. WE WERE RADAR VECTORED ONTO FINAL AND CLRED FOR THE APCH TO CROSS RUSHY AT OR ABOVE 1400 FT MSL. APCHING THE FINAL FIX IS A VERY BUSY PART OF THE APCH. IN THIS HIGH WORKLOAD ENVIRONMENT; I MISIDENTED JFK14 (WUGAL) AS JFK15 (RUSHY) AND BEGAN MY DSCNT FROM 1400 FT TO 600 FT AT WUGAL. I WAS ATTEMPTING TO XCHK MY POS WITH RAW DATA; BUT WAS HAVING DIFFICULTY FOCUSING ON THE TINY NUMBERS ON THE COMMERCIAL APCH CHART. THE PNF ALSO MISIDENTED THE FIX. WE NOTICED THAT THE APCH LOOKED VERY FLAT AND LEVELED ABOUT 900 FT MSL. VERY SHORTLY AFTER LEVELING; THE TWR ISSUED A LOW ALT ALERT. AFTER LNDG; WE DISCUSSED THE APCH TO TRY TO FIGURE OUT WHY THE LOW ALT ALERT HAD BEEN ISSUED. WE THEN REALIZED WE HAD BEGUN OUR DSCNT FROM 1400 FT AT WUGAL AND CROSSED RUSHY ABOUT 900 FT. WE MAINTAINED 900 FT UNTIL INTERCEPTING A VISUAL GS AND WE CROSSED THE 3 DME FIX ABOVE 600 FT. LESSONS: THE WORKLOAD IN A 2-MAN; HI-TECHNOLOGY AIRPLANE CAN GET VERY; VERY HIGH AT TIMES -- ESPECIALLY ON APCH. WE MUST ALWAYS KEEP THIS IN MIND WHEN PLANNING AND TAKE ALL POSSIBLE STEPS TO MINIMIZE CONFUSION. IN THE FUTURE I WILL CAREFULLY ANNOTATE COMMERCIAL APCH CHARTS WITH NICE; BIG; EASY-TO-SEE-IN-DIM-COCKPITS NUMBERS. I WOULD LIKE TO SEE OUR DATA SYS CHANGED SO WE CAN GET BETTER FIX NAMES. JFK14 IS NOT VERY USEFUL. FORTUNATELY; WE WERE VISUAL AT ALL TIMES AND NO HARM WAS DONE; BUT PLTS; ATC CTLRS; ENGINEERS; MGRS; ETC; MUST REALIZE HOW BUSY A 2- MAN COCKPIT CAN GET AND DO EVERYTHING THEY CAN TO REDUCE THE WORKLOAD AT CRITICAL TIMES.