EMB-145 flight crew reported a pressurization failure.
Synopsis
EMB-145 flight crew reported a pressurization failure.
Narrative
On Day 0 while operating from ZZZ to ZZZ1 we experienced abnormal pressurization indications that led to us depressurizing the aircraft. Throughout the incident the aircraft stayed below 10;000 feet; and we were able to continue to our destination without any delays.Shortly after taking off from ZZZ the Captain who was pilot flying at the time noticed that the cabin altitude was climbing much faster than normal. I also noted that there was no differential pressure being indicated. This was at approximately 3;000 feet. We notified ZZZ approach that we had an issue with our pressurization system; and I requested our climb be stopped at 10;000 feet. No emergency was declared. My immediate response to the abnormal indications was to check that the cabin pressurization panel was set correctly. It appeared to be normal. While the Captain was flying I began working the Pressurization Normal System Failure QRH. We were unable to get the manual system to work; so as directed by the QRH; we dumped the cabin. Upon completion of the QRH procedure; the flight attendant called us stating that the cabin had filled with fog; and that passenger's ears were popping. At this point the Captain handed me control of the aircraft; and briefed the passengers of the situation. Around this time I began to message dispatch to determine if we had enough fuel to continue to ZZZ1 at 10;000 feet with the pressurization system inoperative. Dispatch determined that we had plenty of fuel to continue to ZZZ1; and that a diversion wasn't necessary. The Captain and I then returned to normal operations; and the rest of the flight was uneventful.I have no suggestions at this time and I believe that our response to the malfunction was appropriate.
Second reporter narrative
Climbing out of ZZZ I noticed the cabin climb rate was matching the aircraft. There was no EICAS caution that the automatic pressurization had failed; so we monitored as we climbed. It became evident that the aircraft was not pressurizing; so we requested to stop our climb at 10;000 ft. Once level; I requested the FO to run the QRH for the pressurization automatic system failure. The checklist had us attempt to manually control pressurization and maintain cabin pressure differential. We started to descend the cabin and got to a differential of 5.5 whereby we requested a climb to higher altitude. While climbing the cabin kept descending and the cabin altitude indication eventually went to all dashes (it did return; however I cannot definitively say if it did before or after completing the checklist where we had to depressurize the cabin). It was evident we could not effectively control the pressurization manually. At 10;500 ft we requested to return to 10;000 ft. We performed the remainder of the QRH procedure which had us depressurize the cabin. At this time the FA called us and said that there was moisture briefly visible in the cabin. I asked if she and the passengers were ok (she responded that they were); we were finishing a checklist; and I would make an announcement after we finished with it. When finished with the checklist I informed the passengers of the situation and that we may need to land at ZZZ2 as a precaution. We informed ATC we may need to proceed to our filed takeoff alternate of ZZZ2; but would talk to company and get back to them. We sent a message via ACARS appraising dispatch of the situation; our location and fuel onboard. Our dispatcher sent back fuel numbers showing that we could make ZZZ1 with just over 3000 lbs onboard at landing. My FO and I discussed this and we were both confident in the numbers returned as they matched what we were seeing in the cockpit and agreed to proceed to ZZZ1. We informed ATC that we would not need to proceed to ZZZ2 and would continue on the route at 10;000 ft. I then informed the passengers that we had conferred with company and concluded that we would proceed to ZZZ1. The flight proceeded and concluded uneventfully from there on. Finally; I would note that there was never any warning; caution; or aural alerts; and the highest cabin altitude I recall seeing on the EICAS was 9400 ft.Something in the pressurization system wasn't working. With no warning; caution; or aural alert it is impossible for me to say what the malfunction was. Nothing specific to this event; as it happened at low altitude and was caught. The FO and I kept each other informed of our thoughts and worked our actions and planned together so there was no ambiguity about the situation and our intentions. The FA was composed and helpful with regards to the passengers physical and emotional state.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.