DA62 pilot reported landing safely after a low altitude upset occurred on short final to TPA when they encountered wake turbulence from the preceding B737.

Narrative

During vectored visual approach to Runway 19R at Tampa International Airport (TPA) on Day 0; a light twin aircraft (Diamond DA62) encountered wake turbulence from a preceding Boeing 737-700 due to close sequencing on a single active runway. The following aircraft's ADS-B data indicated an unstabilized descent exceeding company criteria; contributing to the proximity. The event occurred at low altitude; resulting in a sudden uncommanded bank requiring immediate corrective action. No separation distance was provided by ATC; and enhanced advisories on the preceding aircraft's position would have aided situational awareness.On Day 0; I was pilot flying a light twin aircraft; Diamond DA62; en route from ZZZ to TPA under visual flight rules with an instrument flight rules (IFR) clearance. Departure from ZZZ was at approximately XA:53. Weather at departure was VFR with scattered clouds and light winds.En route; Tampa Approach advised that Runways 19L and 10/28 were closed for maintenance; requiring all traffic; including general aviation; to utilize Runway 19R shared with commercial jet operations. This deviated from standard practice; where smaller aircraft are typically sequenced to parallel runways to minimize wake turbulence exposure. No NOTAM or ATIS update specified enhanced separation procedures for mixed traffic on the single runway.At approximately XC:30; while approximately 20 NM northwest of TPA at 3;000 feet MSL; we were radar vectored for sequencing behind a Boeing 737-700. The 737 had departed ZZZ1 at XA:49 and was established on a 180-degree heading for the ILS Runway 19R approach. We were cleared to maintain 3;000 feet until established on the localizer; then descend at pilot's discretion. No specific separation distance or altitude relative to the 737 was reported; which limited our ability to assess wake risk in advance.The METAR valid at XC:53 indicated VFR conditions. No significant wind shear or turbulence was reported; though light quartering tailwinds (3-4 knots) from the west were present; potentially affecting vortex drift toward the runway centerline.At XC:45; approximately 10 NM from the threshold at 2;100 feet MSL; we intercepted the final approach course. ADS-B data shows the 737 at this time was approximately 3.2 NM ahead; descending at 1;200 feet per minute (fpm) from 2;800 feet MSL; with groundspeed 140 knots--exceeding a standard 3-degree glideslope rate of ~700 fpm. This descent profile positioned the 737 above the nominal glideslope intercept; compressing our required descent to maintain spacing.ATC then issued a descent clearance to 2;000 feet; placing us below the 737's altitude (which was reported at 2;500 feet MSL). At XC:47; 4 NM from the threshold and 1;500 feet AGL; we began configuring for landing (gear down; full flaps) at 140 knots indicated airspeed. Upon crossing the glideslope; our vertical speed increased to 1;100 fpm to capture the path; but ADS-B data confirms the 737 maintained >1;000 fpm descent through 1;000 feet AGL; violating stabilized approach gates.At XC:48; 2 NM from touchdown and 800 feet AGL; we encountered moderate wake turbulence from the 737's right wingtip vortex. The aircraft experienced a sudden right bank exceeding 30 degrees at 120 knots--critical low speed and altitude for recovery. Contributing factors included the 737's high sink rate generating stronger; lower vortices and our position in the descent phase of the upwind vortex (light crosswind from the left exacerbated drift). The lack of reported separation distance and relative altitude further heightened the risk.Immediate recovery involved full left aileron; right rudder; power to takeoff setting (1;800 RPM); and a shallow climb to 1;200 feet AGL while initiating a right turn into the wind to dissipate the vortex. We advised Tampa Tower: 'Tampa Tower; Aircraft X; wake turbulence; requesting extended vectors for spacing.' Tower acknowledged and provided a 6 NM vector to the right; allowing vortex dissipation. We rejoined the approach at XC:52; landing without further incident at XC:50 (actual wheels down at XC:49:30).Factors Contributing to the Event:Reduced runway availability forcing mixed GA/jet sequencing without adjusted wake turbulence minima (standard 4-6 NM for light behind heavy; actual ~3 NM based on post-event ADS-B review).Preceding aircraft's unstabilized approach (descent >1;000 fpm below 1;000 feet AGL); per FAA AC 120-108 and industry standards.No advisory on vortex behavior in light winds or specific separation/altitude calls; vortices descended ~900 feet below flight path before stabilization.Our descent below the generating aircraft's path per ATC instruction; increasing exposure risk.Recommendations:Enhance ATIS/NOTAMs for single-runway operations to include wake-specific sequencing (e.g.; mandatory 5-6 NM or 2-minute separation for light aircraft behind heavies).Standardize reporting of separation distances and relative altitudes during mixed-traffic vectors.Review radar vectoring tools for automatic wake alerts in mixed traffic.Promote go-around training emphasis for unstabilized approaches in terminal environments.I certify this report is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge. No injuries or damage occurred. Submitting for safety analysis and system improvements.