EMB-175 Captain reported a Cabin Pressure High EICAS message during climb; the Captain stopped the climb and found the pressurization control valve switch in the incorrect manual position. The Captain placed the switch in the correct auto position and resumed the flight to destination.

Narrative

We arrived at the aircraft that was powered on by maintenance. There were numerous switches and systems with improper configuration. I conducted the safety and power up checklist. I then conducted my originating flow. I placed several switches back into their proper position. However; I failed to notice the pressurization control valve was placed in the 'manual' position; rather than 'auto'. I personally have never seen that switch out of place; and believe I had a preconceived expectancy that it was in the proper mode of 'auto'. Upon completion of the originating flow; we completed the originating checklist. We completed the rest of our assigned preflight duties. Due to this being an irregular operation as a reposition flight; I utilized the irregular operations checklist in the company manuals to verify the entire cabin and plane was configured properly with all doors armed. With the knowledge that a satellite Wi-Fi had system was installed; I also inspected the roof of the location of installation. The plane was good to go.After completing all before start; engine start; and after start tasks; flows; and checklists; we proceeded to taxi out for takeoff; and subsequently departed. Upon departure; I noticed the cabin pressurization rate was amber. The autopilot was off and we were on the flight director climbing at approximately 5;000 feet per minute. I stated the aircraft condition and advised the pilot flying to reduce the climb rate stating there seems to be an issue with the outflow valve. I changed the vertical flight mode to vertical speed; and reduced the climb rate; as well as turned the autopilot on. The cabin pressurization rate proceeded to turn green; meaning it's in normal condition. I'm not sure if I vocalized or just though 'we need to keep monitoring this; but it is good for now'. As we passed through 10;000' we received a 'cabin pressure hi' EICAS message. The cabin pressure matched our current altitude. I instructed the pilot flying to immediately level off; and stated to ATC that we needed to stop our climb. We were approximately 10;800' MSL. ATC instructed us to maintain 11;000'. I subsequently requested to descend and maintain 10;000' to which ATC responded to descend and maintain 10;000'. The pilot flying placed 10;000' into the altitude and flight level changed in green mode to 10;000'. I advised ATC that we were dealing with an issue with our outflow valve and that I will advise further. At that point I moved into the TEAM (Transfer; Eliminate; Accept; Mitigate) model. The aircraft was stable; on course; and the cabin pressure was stable at 10;000'. I asked the pilot flying to take the radios while I completed the QRC and QRH for the corresponding issue. Due to being at 10;000' already; with the cabin pressure at 10;000' no emergency decent was conducted. Upon completion of the QRH procedure; I stated that we had plenty of time; that we had caught the issue well before it became a problem and were at a safe altitude; however; the ECS (Environmental Control System) synoptic page did show the outflow valve open. I stated to ATC that we were going to need to divert. They placed us on heading and had us maintain our current altitude. I stated I will keep them up to date with further. I then proceeded to discuss and move forward with my plan; and I turned the cabin light on. I looked up towards the pressurization control panel and noticed the pressurization control valve was pointing left towards manual. I immediately recognized this as the source of the issue; and proceeded to place it to 'auto'. The cabin pressure immediately turned green and was corrected. I checked our fuel; which showed we were landing at our destination with 200 lbs more than the release had us landing with; and knew we were good on fuel; as we were only vectored for a few minutes at that point. I advised ATC that we corrected the system malfunction; and no longer needed to divert and requested to be placed back on course to our original destination. I received a new clearance; which matched our previous one; verified the route was valid in the MCDU (Multipurpose Control Display Unit); then advised ATC that we were ready. ATC proceeded to climb us to our filed altitude on our filed route. There were no issues from that point forward. I messaged dispatch and explained the situation; as I had made the decision to divert prematurely; and told them we were proceeding to our destination. I advised dispatch of our fuel at destination and continued as planned. We debriefed the event at cruise to finish the TEAM model.Cause: The cause of the event was failure to observe the pressurization control valve in the manual position during the originating flow. I accept full responsibility for the missed configuration; and believe it was caused by expectation bias. I had even explained the importance of checking every switch; due to maintenance often times leaving switches in weird modes or positions. I do not know how I missed the pressurization control valve pointing to the left. The only thing that I can see causing an issue; is the hydraulic pump 3A switch right in front of it from my perspective needing to be in the left most 'off' position; and somehow I did not catch the switch behind it from my point of view pointing left. This was a deviation that should have been caught.An additional factor that contributed was the irregular operations and odd messages we were receiving from the MCDU that we had to diagnose; which deviated my attention. During the climb; I immediately noticed and stated the state of the pressurization rate; and proceed to start to diagnose the issue. We maintained a safe altitude and stuck to the plan that we prebriefed during the arrival brief for a time threat. Suggestions: To prevent a recurrence of this event; absolute attention must be utilized during the origination flow to ensure that all system switches are in the correct position. Just like we restart checklists if distracted; restarting a flow if distracted should be also adhered to. Simply turning on a bright light and inspecting the systems panel slower and more methodically could have prevented this. Additionally; recognizing that expectancy bias can deceive you and being extra diligent could prevent occurrences such as this.If we had received a message about a systems failure such as a hydraulic pump fail; along with the synoptic page; I would typically immediately check the system modes. I should have responded in the same manner of behavior when I saw the amber cabin pressurization rate. This could have been a debrief item and a self check. This event; though it was controlled before it became an issue by slowing the climb rate then leveling off; creating time is an event that will ensure that I am meticulous going forward during the originating flow and all tasks; as it is my sole responsibility to maintain proper configuration of all systems.