A319 flight crew reported a loss of hydraulic system with associated components on climb. Crew followed ECAM/QRH and returned to departure airport.
Synopsis
A319 flight crew reported a loss of hydraulic system with associated components on climb. Crew followed ECAM/QRH and returned to departure airport.
Narrative
BACKGROUND. This event occurred between XC:05 and XE:44 on Day 2. This as the last day of a 4-day sequence. We completed a leg from ZZZ1 to ZZZ earlier with an departure time of XA:00. We departed late gate XX as the aircraft arrived late via Maintenance tow/taxi due to it arriving to ZZZ on Day 0 at XS:06. We were additionally delayed due to Maintenance addressing damage found by the FO (First Officer) during the preflight walk-around inspection. While Maintenance referenced this damage as already included within the logbook and didn't have stickers next to the dents due to it being within the RVSM area; the FO discovered these dents outside of the RVSM area. Maintenance arrived and corrected the lack of stickers and adjusted the logbook accordingly. These activities resulted in approximately 1hr delay in pushback from the gate. WEATHER. ZZZ Weather at approximate time of takeoff: 130/06kts; 9SM; BKN013 BKN018 OVC035 20/19 A3002 LTG DSNT N and W. Thunderstorms in the vicinity of the airport; primarily to the West were forecasted to approach and become a factor impacting the airfield within the hour. EVENT NARRATIVE. At XD:42; Aircraft X was cleared for takeoff; assigned Fly HDG 190; climb and maintain 10;000'MSL". Captain (PF) and FO (PM) performed a normal intersection takeoff from XXL at 1. The takeoff roll; rotation; lift off; and positive rate climb with associated "GEAR UP" call were all unremarkable. Approaching 400' AFL; FO (FM) selected HDG 190 as requested by Captain (PF) while hand-flying as tower instructed Aircraft X to switch to departure. There was a noticeably greater airflow noise and vibrations felt as the aircraft climbed through thrust reduction altitude (1000'AFL). Prior to checking in with departure; Captain (PF) selected CLB with comm "CLIMB" and FO (PM) called "CLIMB SET" as the thrust levers were brought from FLX to CLB and the aircraft passed through approximately 1200'AFL; immediately receiving the following ECAMs on the upper E/WD:HYD G RSVR LO LVLL/G DOORS NOT CLOSEDL/G GEAR NOT UPLOCKED The SD (System Display) eventually displaying the HYD page showing a depleting RSVR quantity and GREEN HYD pressure. Captain (PF) called "MY AIRCRAFT" as FO (PM) echoed "YOUR AIRCRAFT". Almost simultaneously; the flightdeck received a call alert from the cabin crew which Captain answered and told them to please standby and the Captain would "get back with them". Captain (PF) selected 180kts Speed; continued to hand-fly through 2000'MSL; leveled off at 3;000'MSL on HDG 190 and selected Autopilot 1 while FO (PM) attempted to check in with Departure. The frequency initially incorrectly selected was corrected within 20 seconds. FO (PM) checked in with departure as "Aircraft X; HDG 190 and leveling at 3;000'MSL; requesting priority handling." Departure was told of Aircraft X intentions to return back to ZZZ requesting XXR (Departure offered XYR which Aircraft X declined). Note: Captain and FO; during the departure brief; discussed intention to return back to XXR in case of engine failure with XXR in 'standby' in the SEC-FLP in case of needing to quickly return back to ZZZ. Captain (PF) and FO (PM) continued Non-Normal Methodology as departure requested with time permitting for standard information. FO (PM) replied indicating hydraulic pump failure and landing gear unable to UPLOCK and 15;000lbs of FOB initially and then updated to 2hrs of fuel on board with TSOB to follow when time allowed. After FO (PM) initial identification of presented ECAMs as not "Quick Action Items" and "Not ECAM exceptions"; Captain (PF) announced "YOUR AIRCRAFT; YOUR RADIOS" and after positive passing of aircraft and radios; FO (PM) stated "ECAM ACTIONS". Captain (PM) completed HYD G RSVR LO LVL ECAM actions (PTU - OFF; GREEN ENG 1 PUMP - OFF); Cleared ECAM; and continued with the L/G ECAMS. Captain (PM) selected "GEAR HANDLE DOWN" as the L/G would not be able to "RECYCLE" due to the lack of GREEN HYD Fluid and Pressure. Captain (PM)Cleared L/G ECAMs with FO (PF) concurrence and walked through the SD selection of HYD; F/CTRL and WHEEL pages; noting lack of ALL HYD Green fluid and pressure and the positive indications of "THREE DOWN AND LOCKED" as well as "THREE GREEN" present indications on the 'Three Green Gear Down Lights' indicator noting that the gear doors on the WHEELS SD expectedly displayed amber; indicating they were hanging down as there was no GREEN HYD pressure to raise/lock them. FO (PF) continued flying and coordinating with ATC in order to remain with the CLASS B airspace receiving vectors (to the West and North in an extended Right-Hand Pattern for XXR) away from developing thunderstorm cells approaching the terminal area from the West and North.The STATUS Page was reviewed by both Captain (PM) and FO (PF) with note of the following associated left lower ECAM items:FMS PRED UNRELIABLEFUEL CONSUMPT INCRSDLDG DIST PROC - APPLY MAX SPEED - 250/.60 (associated with L/G DOORS NOT CLOSED)MAX SPEED - 280/67 (associated with L/G GEAR NOT UPLOCKED)And the following affected systems on the right lower ECAM:GREEN HYDSPLR 1 + 5CAT 3 DUALN/W STRGAUTO BRKNORM BRKL/G RETRACTREVERSER 1YAW DAMPER 1L/G DOORAfter Captain (PM) called "CLEAR STATUS?" and FO (PF) instructed "CLEAR STATUS"; Captain continued with QRH Follow-Up of L/G DOORS NOT CLOSED; incorrectly applying the note of WHEEL N.W STEER FAULT being 'displayed' and need to delay nose wheel touchdown for as long as possible. Captain performed non-normal landing assessment through the A320 app utilizing the "G SYS LO PR" for applied failure with a planned Flaps FULL landing with approach speed of 129kts. Flightdeck crew discussed continued plan for Aircraft X to return to ZZZ; FO to retain PF and radio duties as Captain continued the Non-Routine Landing Considerations at the end of L/G DOORS NOT CLOSED. Captain communicated with dispatch through ACARS; and spoke with the cabin crew for intentions of a "precautionary landing" back at ZZZ and remaining on the runway as there would be an issue with nosewheel steering and normal braking. Captain requested (F/A) Flight Attendant to perform necessary duties for return to ZZZ in approximately 20min. Captain should have; but did not; gain information from the F/A's about what they could hear or experience from the cabin and what prompted their initial call as the flightdeck received the ECAM alerts. Captain (PM) made PA to passengers indicating an issue related to landing gear not retracting but now showing positive "Down and Locked" indication which would provide for a safe landing back at ZZZ and subsequent inspection from "Safety Equipment" followed by a towing from company equipment to a gate for their follow-on travel. FO (PF) continued to coordinate as flight deck communication allowed to climb to 4;000'MSL and vectoring away from traffic and developing thunderstorms quickly nearing the ZZZ airfield. Captain (PM) and FO (PF) conducted arrival briefing; discussing threats of weather; everything presented in the ECAMs (with special consideration of NO NORMAL BRAKES; NO NWS; NO REVERSER 1; INABILITY TO RAISE GEAR IN CASE OF GO-AROUND) and affected systems and consideration of fuel available for go-around or delay if required. Flight Deck Crew reviewed Go-Around procedures and callouts. Captain (PM) fully briefed the ILS Runway XXR approach and confirmed entries into the MCDU (Multipurpose Control Display Unit). Captain assumed external radio communication duties. Captain (PM) announced "F/As; prepare for landing" PA at approximately 8-10min to landing. Captain (PM) and FO (PF) again reviewed ECAMS and associated systems and discussion of holding the nosewheel off during the landing; and lack of normal NWS and need to differential brake along with a single reverser. The descent checklist was mistakenly not completed as Tower gave final vectors to intercept the LOC for XXR and avoid storm cells. Aircraft X was cleared for the ILS RWY XXRapproach and switched to a discrete frequency. Before Landing Procedures and Checklist was completed as Aircraft X continued the approach and was cleared to land. At XC:15 the FO (PF) performed a SUPERB landing on XXR; stopping on the runway; and passing the aircraft to the Captain (PF) at which time the PARK BRAKE was set. FO (PM) communicated for ARFF (Airport Rescue and Firefighting) to conduct inspection as Captain made PA to passengers and coordinated with F/As for the delay of company tow tractor arrival. A dispatched super tug arrived approximately 15-20minutes; towing Aircraft X to gate XY. Thunderstorms fully developed with 10min of super tug connection; surrounding the airfield with lightning strikes occurring within 5nm from the airfield and subsequently shutting down the ramp just as the aircraft was towed into position for a full stop and normal deplaning of all passengers and crew. Lessons Learned and Recommendations. 1. The departure brief works: Both Captain and FO had a clear plan before leaving the gate of gameplan if an immediate return to the airfield was required along with delineation of workload and plan for transfer of control from Captain (PF) to FO (PM) after initial non-normal methodology procedures. The SEC-FLPN having selected XXR prior to departure was more useful than if the crew would have selected 'COPY PRIMARY' flight plan. This allowed for immediate selection of ZZZ as a 'NEW DESTINATION' and a meaningful approach already selected for execution (similar to a coded engine out procedure). Recommend consideration of offering this as a valued technique instead of just copying the primary flight plan at the end of the sequence of loading the FMS for departure.2. Training was effective and must be continually reinforced in line-flying: Airbus training was able to get the crew back into meaningful tasks after initial startle-factor and provided ingrained skill in dealing with non-normal situations. It is difficult to recreate the time-compressed nature of an actual priority situation and the bombardment of communication from all channels inside and outside of the aircraft; however; the instructors and check pilots provide valuable training in the simulator and discussion during the brief of how much 'noise' there can be during such a situation. We forgot to perform the descent checklist after completing the arrival briefing. We were under time pressure to make vectors for final given the impending thunderstorm approaching the airfield. All tasks were completed; but we did not do this checklist in order to provide a barrier to the procedure flows of descent phase which was 'out-of-sync' from normal process since we leveled off at 3;000'MSL with intention to immediately return. Recommend continued reinforcement of conducting BOTH the descent checklist just as the before landing is conducted and so ingrained in the pilot population. This may be useful within some portion of the departure briefing at the gate stating; "we will complete ECAM Actions; Follow-ups; non-routine landing considerations; conduct an arrival briefing and back ourselves up all along the way with 'After Takeoff'; 'Descent'; and 'Landing' Checklists." Cause: GREEN HYD LINE or PUMP or OVERALL SYTEM Failure. Record occurrence. Analyze for possible engineering change or change in planned replacement of components. Continue training to emphasize actions during event."
Second reporter narrative
At approximately XD:42 on Day 2; Aircraft X took off from ZZZ on XXL with Captain as PF and FO (First Officer) as PM. Takeoff roll; rotation; liftoff; and positive rate;" "gear up" procedures and calls were unremarkable. Aircraft X turned to assigned heading (HDG 190) at approximately 400' AGL and continued climbing to assigned altitude (10;000' MSL). Aircraft X climbed through thrust reduction altitude (1;000' AGL) as there was a noticeably increased amount of airflow noise as; switching to departure frequency. Within a few seconds; the ECAM displayed HYD G RVSR LO LVL; L/G DOORS NOT CLOSED; and L/G NOT UPLOCKED. The SD (System Display) displayed the HYD page depicting the GREEN HYD system with rapidly depleting pressure and reservoir fluid. Aircraft X leveled at 3;000'MSL on assigned heading (HDG 190) and requested priority handling with departure. After initial non-normal methodology of verbal identification of ECAM and not being a 'Quick Action Item' or 'ECAM Exception'; Captain passed control of aircraft and radio communications to FO (PF). FO (PF) coordinated with ATC for vectoring around approaching thunderstorms and gave intentions of Aircraft X to return for landing to Runway XXR ZZZ after procedures and checklists were completed. Captain (PM) completed HYD G RVSR LO LVL ECAM actions and cleared the HYD ECAM. The 'L/G DOORS NOT CLOSED' ECAM called for 'L/G LEVER…RECYCLE'. As the GREEN HYD system was completely depleted; the Captain (PM) selected the L/G Handle Down ONLY and noted the presence of '3 Green Gear Down Lights' on the center instrument panel and '3 down and locked gear' on the WHEEL page (amber gear doors due to lack of green HYD to close/lock). Captain (PM) and FO (PF) completed non-normal methodology of all ECAMs and stepped through all applicable SD pages. Captain (PM) notified dispatch through ACARS. Captain (PM) completed non-routine landing considerations; speaking to Cabin Crew and making a PA informing of landing back at ZZZ. Captain (PM) performed a landing distance procedure with HYD G LO PR failure applied and verified by FO (PF). CA (PM) conducted the arrival briefing and adjusted the PERF approach page for ILS Runway XXR ZZZ. FO (PF) performed uneventful approach and landing to Runway XXR bringing Aircraft X to complete stop on runway at approximately XE:15 for ARFF (Airport Rescue and Firefighting) inspection and subsequent company tow to gate. Passengers and crew deplaned normally at Gate XY at approximately XF:00."
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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.