A330 flight crew reported on initial climb out they experienced noxious fumes entering the cockpit and diverted to a nearby suitable airport.
Synopsis
A330 flight crew reported on initial climb out they experienced noxious fumes entering the cockpit and diverted to a nearby suitable airport.
Narrative
I previously submitted Pilot Report for this event. The purpose of this submission is to provide a detailed more narrative of the flight. I was PF for Aircraft X and the CA was PM. Light snow began to fall as we arrived at the airplane.' The CA and I were well acquainted; and this was the second of two back-to-back pairings with each other.' We had also previously flown as FO/Relief Pilot in Aircraft Y.' This would be the captain's first deice on the cargo Operation and my first deice of the season. Thus; we took our time briefing threats and the Company Deice Process as well as all of our new post- operations deice resources.' Our PDC indicated departure from Runway XX.' We also briefed the threat of runway contamination and pulled performance data for TOGA takeoffs with Wing and Engine Anti Ice usage.' We had a 1-minute push delay; probably related to the inclement weather. After start; I taxied to the deice pad.' During the Pre-deice setup; we determined a switch position conflict between the Deice Configuration and MEL 21-XX-XX which was in the OFF position and placarded INOP.' The PreDeice checklist called for the switch to be in AUTO while the MEL'ed switch was in the OFF position.' Obviously; the MEL would supersede other switch guidance; but we still wondered if there would be any issues stemming from the Deice.' I consulted the Systems Description in the manual.' From the system description it became apparent to me that in the present (frigid) ambient temperature state; AUTO mode would result in the valve being set to OFF anyway.' The CA requested Type I Full Bath and Type IV Wings and Tail. ' Deicing took longer than anticipated.' While we were being deiced; we noted the increased snowfall intensity. Briefly; the reported visibility at ZZZ dropped to 3/4 mile.' This prompted the CA to contact dispatch and request a takeoff alternate (ZZZ1). ' While the CA dealt with Dispatch; I consulted the snowfall intensity tables and found that under our present conditions; snowfall was Heavy.' No sooner did I share this info with the CA; then an updated ATIS arrived with visibility back up to 1 SM.' This equated to a Moderate snow intensity; and we elected to continue.' We monitored the visibility up until takeoff and it remained at 1 SM. Once deice was complete; ZZZ Ramp issued instructions to taxi to runway XYL. ' The CA queried ATC about the change.' The response was that Rwy XX had a 6kt tailwind and was unplowed.' Rwy XYL Plowing was in progress.' I taxied up to holding spot XX while the CA pulled new takeoff data.' With the runway cleaning in progress while snowfall continued; we opted for a TOGA power takeoff in case of runway contamination. ' Ground control held us at spot XX while XYL Runway clearing was underway.' This amounted to an additional 10-15-minute delay. The runway sweepers exited the runway and ground control instructed us to continue taxi while friction checks were underway. ' In hindsight; we never heard what the result of these checks were.' As I taxied down Twy 1; the CA noticed that we had'burned below our Min Takeoff Fuel.' The CA coordinated this issue with dispatch who was able to move our extra fuel below the line and increase our Minimum Takeoff Fuel.' Our actual payload was approximately 30;000 lbs less than originally planned by dispatch; so this allowed additional leeway in recomputing our fuel requirements. ' As we continued taxi; and performed the taxi checklist; the flaps were at the F2 position; but the perf data displayed F1.' Flap 2 was the Rwy XX Flex config; while F1 was the Rwy XYL TOGA config.' I moved the handle to F1 and we continued the checklist.' Additionally; we discovered a 1-2 kt V-speed discrepancy between the XYL printed ACARS performance data and that of the uplinked data on the MCDU (Multipurpose Control Display Unit).' The CA agreed with my desire for a new set of takeoff performance numbers for a XYL TOGA takeoff.' We also selected a condition code of 2.' The new uplinked numbers were all in agreement. We arrived at the runway first in a queue of airplanes. ' We were cleared for takeoff; but hadn't yet received the ACARS confirmation of the new Minimum Takeoff Fuel.' We declined the clearance. At Tower's request I taxied onto the runway and exited at 2 so Aircraft Z and Aircraft A could takeoff ahead of us.' The runway was obviously contaminated; but I experienced no friction or sliding issues. Reaching the number 1 position again; we had everything in order and were cleared for takeoff once again.' I lined up on the runway and performed the ice shedding procedure before advancing thrust to TOGA power.' We departed ZZZ 1 hour and 19 minutes after pushback.' The takeoff roll was uneventful with no directional control issues.' Looking back; I now realize that we did not have the full 45 m prepared surface; as only the center third of the runway had been swept free of contaminants. Upon rotation and initial climb out; I began smelling an increasingly stronger ammonia-like odor blowing out of the cockpit vents.' Muscle memory called for gear up; engaged autopilot and reduced to climb power; but my mind was equally focused on breathing.' Each time I inhaled I could feel this vapor entering my nostrils and burning my nasal passages and airway.' My eyes started to water and then began to burn.' I quickly developed a very bitter taste in my mouth; a dull headache; and my lips began to tingle. ' In the initial climb after flap retraction; the CA remarked that this smell was awful and that he did not want to proceed to ZZZ2.' He turned and asked me what I thought.' My immediate response was to perform the Fumes Memory Item and don my oxygen mask.' The CA did the same. ' As soon as I was on oxygen;' all symptoms except for the headache and tingling lips abated. ' Almost immediately the VHF frequencies were saturated with static.' I assumed this was Precipitation Static as it was also accompanied by very strong St. Elmos' Fire. My weather radar display at this time painted almost the entire display in yellow at 40-mile range (AUTO Gain/On Path settings). There was very little if any turbulence.We were initially handed off to ZZZ Center; but the VHF static prevented contact and forced a return to the now barely usable departure control frequency. ' It seemed ATC could hear us; but we could not hear them. I was much relieved when ATC reached out with a FL380 climb clearance by CPDLC.' The CA requested priority handling and our intention to divert over VHF. Passing through FL200; the CA requested a descent and we were given FL140.' The CA and I quickly assessed return options.' The weather in ZZZ was of concern; as was the only slightly better weather at our takeoff alternate of ZZZ1. ' ATC immediately offered up ZZZ3 as an option; but I quickly realized that we did not have charts for ZZZ3 and that it was also in the path of the storm. At this time; the CA wanted to reach out to dispatch; so I continued to fly but also took the radios.' While flying I reached out to ATC for weather conditions at farther west alternates of ZZZ4 and ZZZ5.' ZZZ4 was about the same as ZZZ; but ZZZ5 was reporting VFR with a ceiling of 5;500 broken 4 miles visibility.' Informed the CA that ZZZ5 was our best bet and that my desire was to proceed there. ' I coordinated this with ATC and received radar vectors to ZZZ5. ' The farther we got from ZZZ the better VHF communications became.' ATC explained that they had been experiencing this phenomenon across the region that evening. The CA was unable to get the SATCOM systems to place a call.' I suggested simply reaching out to Dispatch via ACARS; which he successfully did.' I had seen the increased space weather activity on the release; but at the time I did not make the connection between that and the SATCOM unavailability. Communication with the masks was a mess initially as our exhalation sounds were picked up and amplified by the intercom system. ' It was easier to communicate to ATC by VHF externally than internally via intercom. Throughout the flight we both found that it was best to leave the intercom off and use the intercom (on/off) toggle as a push to talk when we needed to communicate with each other.' While this worked; it required deliberate focus to accomplish and in busier times when we needed both hands for other duties; we still drowned each other out with deafening noise. The CA set our new destination in the FMS.' I explained that I was very familiar with ZZZ5 as it was a frequent destination with my previous carrier.' Based on the reported winds I would plan the RNAV Rwy XZ flown as an FLS approach. The CA asked me how I felt about returning to ZZZ instead of ZZZ5.' I replied that our need to wear the mask added substantial complexity and communication threats to the operation.' It would be much less risky to fly to ZZZ5 with VFR conditions and a cleared runway; than to return to ZZZ to perform a CAT II or III approach to minimums in heavy snow with rapidly worsening weather and surface conditions than what we experienced on departure.' In addition; at ZZZ we would also have to deal with the static saturated VHF frequencies rendering us unable to communicate with approach.' The CA agreed with my rationale; and we continued on to ZZZ5. The CA raised the specter of an overweight landing. I responded that I felt we could land underweight.' Last year I was involved in an ETOPS air turnback and I recalled that at 10;000 ft and fully configured for landing; the fuel burn was 24;000 lbs per hour.' Mentally; I calculated that if we configured early; we would easily be at or below MLW (Maximum Landing Weight) by the time we reached ZZZ5. ATC cleared us direct to ZZZ5 and then subsequently via ZZZZZ (IAF for the RNAV XZ). I transferred control to the CA and performed my approach set up and briefing. During my briefing I communicated that we should run the Removal of Smoke/Fumes Abnormal Checklist.' I resumed control of the airplane.' The captain briefly lifted his mask off his face and confirmed the continued presence of the noxious fumes.' He then ran the fumes elimination checklist up until the first decision point in the checklist.' I commenced descent; called for the approach checklist. ' Descending below 10;000 ft we both agreed that we were caught up; on the same page; and executing to plan. ' While configuring very early and slowing to final approach speed we took several delay vectors and a 360-degree turn to further reduce our fuel below MLW. ' Once this was assured; we requested direct to ZZZZZ1 (penultimate approach fix) to commence the approach.' After approximately 10 minutes of fully configured low altitude cruise at 140 KIAS; we crossed ZZZZZ1 just under MLW.' All of the FLS guidance indications appeared as expected. We commenced the final descent. ' Tower cleared us to land and advised us to roll to the end due to snowplows on the parallel taxiway. I disconnected the autopilot at minimums and performed a normal landing in the touchdown zone.' I used max reverse thrust and let the auto brakes do the work of slowing the airplane. The full width of the runway was bare and wet with patches of slush. All runway markings were easily visible. As we rolled out and slowed to taxi speed; I could see snowplows at the far end of the parallel taxiway 3.' A new and different voice from the Tower directed us to Right turn when able hold short of 3" I was easily slow enough to make the right turn which was 4.' As I made the 90 deg turn; the yellow taxi line disappeared under several inches of snow.' At that moment; the same voice that directed us to make the "next right turn"; pointed out that we had just turned onto a closed taxiway.' We were instructed to continue taxi on to 3 and follow the airport ops vehicle that was waiting for us.' I followed the ops truck onto the passenger ramp; parked and shut down normally. The CA coordinated wit"
Second reporter narrative
Experienced severe noxious fumes (strong ammonia-like vapor burning mucus membranes upon inhalation) upon liftoff from ZZZ. Requested priority handling. Reviewed weather options in vicinity and considered increased threat of flying with mask. ZZZ was moderate snowfall bordering on heavy upon departure. Severe P-static in vicinity of ZZZ rendered VHF comms inop. Opted for divert to ZZZ1 due to its significantly better weather and comms environment. Completed all relevant checklists and landed under MLW (Maximum Landing Weight) at ZZZ1. Transported to hospital upon reaching ZZZ1 for physical exam and toxicology testing.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.