B737-800 flight crew reported on departure roll experiencing a yawing motion followed by a master caution light resulting in the flight crew rejecting the takeoff and returning to the gate.
Synopsis
B737-800 flight crew reported on departure roll experiencing a yawing motion followed by a master caution light resulting in the flight crew rejecting the takeoff and returning to the gate.
Narrative
ZZZ-ZZZ1 Flight ABCDSequence initially began with Captain and I deadheading in from ZZZ2 on Flight ABCE to operate Flight ABCD. Once we got to the aircraft; I began the walk around; and the Captain did the pre flight checks; Flight Management work for our flight to ZZZ1. Once the walk around was completed; in accordance with company standard operating procedures; no adverse ambiguities were noticed outside; nor inside for our checks. We discussed our threats for ZZZ and departure off of Runway XX as well as our mitigation strategy to trap any potential errors that could arise due to the multiple runway crossings and engine out procedures for Runway XX. Due to the gusty crosswinds departing Runway XX; we requested a new performance which resulted in a 26k MAX; flaps 5 takeoff. We concluded I would be the pilot flying; and the Captain would be pilot monitoring. Once the before start checklist was complete we pushed back from Gate XX. Both engines were started normally with nothing out of the ordinary being observed. After start checklist was completed according to SOPs. To save time and to avoid rushing; the Captain asked for a load closeout brief while stopped for added safety and time mitigation. I then called for taxi and had a normal taxi route to Runway XX with multiple runway crossings. The engines had over 5 minutes of warm up time as this was the airplanes first flight of the day. The flight attendants were then notified and the before take off checklist completed as per SOP. We got our line up and wait clearance; the Captain and I had a positive transfer of controls with the aircraft stopped and aligned for Runway XX. We were then cleared for take off; I advanced the thrust levers above 40%; and waited for stabilization. The TOGA buttons were then pressed and we had acceleration of both N1s; but in the movement I felt a yawing motion to the left as the aircraft started to accelerate. I pushed right rudder in as we yawed and noticed we got a master caution ENG indication at about 20 kts. or so. After noticing the abnormality I called for a reject; and the Captain took over the controls and stated REJECT; MY AIRCRAFT" and I then responded "YOUR AIRCRAFT" and we transferred controls. The throttles were placed at idle; with auto throttles disengaged. The plane was halted to a stop on Runway XX short of runway XYL and the Captain stated over the pa; "This is the Captain; Remain Seated; Remain Seated; Remain Seated." I then notified ATC that we are rejecting on Runway XX for an abnormal engine indication. As we stopped on the runway and both assessed the issue; the Captain stated we had Engine Control Light on the aft overhead panel. As we were going to taxi off the runway to complete the checklist; we were instructed to pull up and hold short of Runway XYL. We complied with and held short of Runway XYL on Runway XX. As we were waiting to cross Runway XYL; I then noticed the number 1 engine started to increase to about 60% N1 with the throttles at idle; and auto throttles off. After relaying that to the Captain; the number 1 shut it self down about 3-5 seconds later with no fail message or indications on the engine systems page. I asked if we should cut the fuel shutoff to the cutoff position to prevent any other issues or damage. We agreed and I switched the fuel lever to cutoff; and secured the engine. At that moment; ATC and two other aircraft reported that they saw the engine blow a flame out the tail pipe and a puff of white smoke exit the aircraft. There was no indications of any fire in the flight deck; nor from anyone observing after the initial report. Both the Captain and myself talked briefly if we should send CFR (Crash Fire Rescue); we agreed. I then asked ATC to send ARFF (Airport Rescue and Firefighting) to inspect our aircraft for any fire or damage out of abundance of caution. The FAs (flight attendants) then called up front and reported a passenger saw white smoke and fire out the tailpipe; but no evidenceof any burning nor fire after the initial burst. We then were instructed to cross Runway XYL and off Runway XX to Taxiway 1 to hold short of XZR while waiting for CFR to approach our aircraft. I then pulled out QRC and asked if we should do the fire smoke fumes checklist as I went through the list. We agreed but as we went through; there was ambiguity of what actually was the issue. To the best of our ability and information we had is we continued through but would come to the conclusion that this wasn't the appropriate checklist since there was no active "Smoke; Fire" Fumes". We then looked to the QRH of our engine control light as per our QRH procedure. The only written information was told to not take off; end of checklist. The Captain and I communicated that the engine was secured with no fire indication or abnormal indications; that we would wait for CFR and stay in communication with the flight attendants and passengers. As we waited there was a moment of hesitation as to what other possible checklist we should accomplish next given the fact the engine was now secure and all other indications normal. Looking back at this moment; the engine limit or surge or stall checklist or the engine tailpipe fire checklist or even engine fail checklist would have been better choices. As a result; it was at that moment CFR approached the aircraft. The Captain relayed to the passengers we will have safety vehicles inspect us. I communicated to CFR and confirmed that the number 1 "Captain SIDE" engine is off and secured while the number 2 is on "FO (First Officer) SIDE" and running. CFR approached the aircraft as well as inspected the aircraft from all angles; as well as our number 1 engine. They relayed to us that they saw no damage as well as no evidence of any fire. We then communicated to CFR to follow us to the gate and deplane normally. A detailed write up was entered into the logbook by Captain as well as call to maintenance in ZZZ for a proper explanation of the engine issue. No further issues ensued at the gate; and passengers disembarked normally. During the brief discussion with the maintenance technicians at the gate; we quickly found out that Aircraft X had been in ZZZ for roughly three days for engine work since it last flew. During our review of the aircraft history during our preflight checks; the Captain noticed a repeat write up for a ENG Valve closed blue light being illuminated but both occurrences were signed off in accordance with applicable maintenance procedures and the aircraft was in airworthy condition. Cause: Maintenance; repeat write ups; to mitigate look further back then 4 days in logbook and or ask the maintenance techs for any clarifying questions about what work was done. SOP's; Rejected take off; make sure to put the flaps down to 40 regardless of any malfunction. Make it muscle memory even if the speed wasn't enough to catch the auto brakes system in a low speed reject and review your AOM more throughout the year. Checklist usage; even after a reject for a minor issue and one check list being called for initially. More issues can arise very quickly for a completely different issue. Slow down and look further down either the QRC or QRH for the issue that is of most importance even if multiple issues are calling for different checklists. Task Saturation; In regards to a reject; holding short of an active runway on an active runway; aircraft issues; flight attendants; and ATC. Make sure to go in order of importance; runway is ours and we need to get the problem fixed here first. Then communicate that with ATC and the Flight attendants once our problems are controlled per SOP; and continue on."
Second reporter narrative
Flight ABCD ZZZ - ZZZ1Sequence initially began with the FO (First Officer) and I deadheading in from ZZZ2 on Flight ABCE to operate Flight ABCD. Once we got to the aircraft; I began the preflight checks and loading the FMC while the FO conducted the walk around. Once the walk around was complete; everything was routine and done in accordance with company standard operating procedures. We discussed our threats for Runway XX as well as our mitigation strategy to trap any potential errors that could arise due to the multiple runway crossings and engine out procedures for Runway XX. Due to the gusty crosswinds departing Runway XX; we requested a new performance which resulted in a 26k MAX; flaps 5 takeoff. This culminated with the FO being the pilot flying; and I would be pilot monitoring.Once the before start checklist was complete we pushed back from Gate XX. Both engines were started normally with nothing out of the ordinary being observed. Taxi to Runway XX was normal with sufficient time for the engine warm up. With all pertinent checklist complete and the FA's (flight attendants) prepared for takeoff; We got our line up and wait clearance. I transferred controls to the FO with the aircraft stopped and aligned for Runway XX. As we were issued the takeoff clearance; the FO advanced the thrust levers just above 40%; and waited for stabilization. The TOGA buttons were pressed and we had a normal acceleration of both engine N1's. Shortly after; I felt a yawing motion to the left as the aircraft started to accelerate but attributed this to possibly the strong winds and it would be corrected as we continued to accelerate. A few seconds later; I observed the illumination of the master caution light at about 20 kts. or so. After noticing the abnormality the FO quickly called for a reject; and I followed immediately with the REJECT; MY AIRCRAFT" call and took control of the aircraft to which he responded; "YOUR AIRCRAFT" and we transferred controls. The throttles were placed at idle; with auto throttles disengaged. The aircraft came to a complete stop on Runway XX short of Runway XYL and I followed this up with the "This is the Captain; Remain Seated; Remain Seated; Remain Seated." Call while the FO notified ATC that we are rejecting on Runway XX for an abnormal engine indication. As we stopped on the runway and both assessed the issue; I stated that we had an Engine Control Light on the aft overhead panel. Just prior to taxiing off the runway to complete the checklist; We were instructed to pull up and hold short of Runway XYL. We complied with this instruction and held short of Runway XYL on Runway XX. As we held short of Runway XYL; I then noticed an uncommanded acceleration of the N1 value from the #1 engine from roughly 20% to almost 60% with both throttles at idle and both autothrottles off. After both realizing this anomaly with the #1 engine; the engine began to slowly spool down. We received no strange indications from the engine page but quickly elected to move the start lever to the cutoff position to prevent any further surges or potential engine damage. At that moment; ATC and two other aircraft reported that they saw the engine blow a flame out the tail pipe accompanied by white smoke coming from the engine. There were no indications of any fire of any sort in the flight deck; nor from anyone observing after the initial report. The FO quickly requested the assistance of ARFF (Airport Rescue and Firefighting) to inspect our aircraft for any fire or damage. The FAs then called up front and reported a passenger saw white smoke and fire out the tailpipe. Again; there was no evidence of any burning nor fire after the initial burst. Shortly after this; we were then instructed to cross Runway XYL; taxi off Runway XX and onto Taxiway 1 to hold short of XZR while waiting for CFR (Crash Fire Rescue) to approach our aircraft. The FO then pulled out QRC and asked if we should do the fire smoke fumes checklist. I agreed butas we went through; this led to a brief moment of ambiguity particularly on the part of myself. Despite accomplishing the engine control checklist which simply said "do not takeoff"; and no indication of fire in the cockpit; there was a moment of hesitation as to what other possible checklist we should accomplish given the fact the engine was now secure and all other indications normal. Looking back at this moment; the engine limit or surge or stall checklist or the engine tailpipe fire checklist would have been better choices. Ultimately; taking everything into account and the limited information we had; we continued with the smoke; fire or fumes checklist but elected to abandon it given the initial steps; phase of flight; the engine being secured and no other reports of fire or smoke coming from the engine or cabin. Once this was done; we both established since the engine was secured with no abnormal indications; and no further surging that we would wait for CFR and stay in communication with the flight attendants and passengers. As a result; it was at that moment ARFF approached the aircraft. The FO communicated to CFR and confirmed that the # 1 (Captain SIDE) engine was secured with the # 2 (FO SIDE) still operating. I spoke to the passengers regarding the safety vehicles that would be present around the aircraft and the brief inspection that would ensue before we could safely taxi back to the gate. ARFF approached and conducted a brief inspection the aircraft. They relayed to us that they saw no damage as well as no evidence of any fire. We then requested for them to follow us to the gate and deplane normally. A detailed write up was entered into the logbook as well as call to Maintenance in ZZZ for a proper explanation of the engine issue. No further issues ensued at the gate; and passengers disembarked normally.During the brief discussion with the maintenance technicians at the gate; myself and the FO quickly found out that Aircraft X had been in ZZZ for roughly three days for engine work since it last flew. During my review of the aircraft history during our preflight checks; I did notice a repeat write up for a ENG Valve closed blue light being illuminated but both occurrences were signed off in accordance with applicable maintenance procedures and the aircraft was in airworthy condition. I noticed nothing out of the ordinary prior to accepting the aircraft and myself and the FO agreed on this during our post flight debrief. LCause: As I mentioned in the report; there was some ambiguity regarding the follow up checklist we should have completed after completing the engine control checklist. Looking back at this situation given the limited information at hand and the reports received; there was at least two follow up checklist that could have been pertinent to our situation. With that said; I think our threat forward briefing; mitigation strategies; communication and delegation of duties made this situation a lot less stressful than it could have been. I really have to commend the FA's and the FO in particular for his outstanding work; clear and concise communication and excellent judgment and decision making. He made excellent recommendations followed up with quick decisive actions."
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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.