A220 flight crew reported a rejected takeoff at rotation speed resulted in a melted tire plug.
Synopsis
A220 flight crew reported a rejected takeoff at rotation speed resulted in a melted tire plug.
Narrative
Prior to the flight; the FO and I discussed the destination and alternate weather as well as planned fuel load. We were aware of deteriorating weather in Location X and the possibility of a wheels up times for departure. The inbound aircraft was late; so there was ample time at the gate for these discussions. Our CPDLC clearance was for the ZZZZZ RNAV with a top altitude of 12;000 feet. During the departure brief; the FO briefed the possibility of a heading 070 departure to 4000 feet; so we decided to set the flight control panel up for that. As we taxied out to runway XXL; we were given a departure time between 13 and 17 after the hour and started the second engine align with that. The previous days' duty period included three takeoffs at No flex or high-power settings due to an inoperative bleed. Also my previous pairing's takeoffs were mostly at high power settings due to inoperative bleeds. Upon taking the runway and cleared for takeoff; I gave throttle control" to the FO and when lined up and rolling; I stated "you have control"; I stated "20 knots" then noticed the auto throttles were not armed as they should be. I reached up to the FCP to arm them but they did not engage. I then placed my hands on the throttles thinking I would advance them to the hard stop but the FO armed the auto throttles. I stated "Thrust Green; airspeed alive" as I noted the airspeed about 45 knots. I made the "80 knots; power set" callout. The FO responded "Checked". Approaching V1; I had a sense that the aircraft was not accelerating as it should and briefly felt that the power was not set correctly. At the V1 callout; I felt the aircraft was not safe to fly and initiated the Rejected Takeoff. I believe I stated to the FO; "We're not accelerating; Reject". The FO stated "We're above V1" but I had already commenced the reject and we both continued with the rejected takeoff maneuver. ATC was notified and as we were slowing; we discussed what just happened and noted no malfunction; just my perception the aircraft was not safe to fly and answered ATC's query that we could clear the runway and did not need immediate assistance. I set the brake and communicated to the cabin "Remain seated; Remain Seated; I aborted the takeoff for a perceived performance issue; we will clear the runway and taxi to the gate for maintenance checks". We then ran the checklist for brake overheat and determined it would be safe to taxi to the gate. We monitored brake temps on the #4 brake turned red for about 2 seconds; then back to white. We also ran the "after landing checklist". At the gate; after running the "parking checklist"; we had another discussion about what had happened. I checked that the passengers and crew were ok; I went out to the cabin and made a PA stating I had aborted the takeoff due to my perception that we did not have performance to fly; thanked them for understanding and that maintenance checks would be performed. I then made logbook entries and called dispatch. After discussions with Maintenance Control; we decided to deplane and I made another PA updating the passengers."
Second reporter narrative
Procedures from gate to just short of the runway hold short line were executed normally and in accordance with SOP. The Captain and I had previously discussed the non standard takeoff instructions ZZZ has been giving lately for XXL due to the TFR which is usually Heading XXX to 4000; expect to resume the ZZZZZ departure at ZZZZZ. We were paying particularly close attention to that setup on the FCP while receiving clearance to ensure the correct flight path upon takeoff. Upon reaching close to the runway; I switched over to Tower and confirmed with the captain that he was ready to go. I then called Tower and told them we were ready. Tower then gave us takeoff clearance for XXL; and as expected gave us the 070 Heading and 4000; expect to rejoin at ZZZZZ; and we confirmed the approach path was clear and we were taking the correct runway; XXL. We also confirmed again on the FCP that the desired heading and altitude were selected and modes were as desired. As we were turning onto the runway; I verbalized to the captain that I would take it on the roll;" and about halfway through the turn to centerline; he told me "your throttles" and I told him I was "bringing them up;" as I brought the throttles up to 55% N1. As we straightened out on center line; the power came up on time and the captain positively transferred the control of the aircraft to me. I confirmed I had control of the aircraft and we began the takeoff roll. Upon reaching 20 knots ground speed; the captain called out 20 knots and I advanced the throttles smoothly. At this time; I could feel that the auto throttle motors did not engage and I looked up and verbalized that the auto throttles weren't armed. The captain quickly reached up and attempted to select the autothrottles button but missed; and then he moved his hand down to take the throttles from me for the takeoff roll. At the same time; I reached up and selected the autothrottles button in an instinctive effort to assist him. Immediately upon selecting the autothrottles button; I looked at the airspeed and Flight Mode Annunciator and verbally confirmed thrust green with the captain; and then I looked at the engine indications and saw that the thrust was in the correct N1 carat setting for takeoff; and we continued the takeoff. As we passed through 80 knots the captain called "80 knots; power set;" and I checked my airspeed which was passing through 80 knots; and replied "Checked." I also visually verified; even though it's not required; that the aircraft was indeed at the correct power setting for takeoff. Again; the N1 readout was matching the commanded N1 power setting for takeoff. As we continued to accelerate down the runway; it did feel as if the aircraft was accelerating a little bit slower than usual; but I just assumed that it was because of the higher temperature and higher gross weight compared to the conditions we have been operating in previously. It seemed to me that we were on profile for a regular takeoff with FLEX thrust settings. I again checked the engine instruments around 110 knots that the aircraft was making proper power and indeed it was. Upon hearing the V1 call out; I heard the captain say "I think I'm gonna reject;" to which I replied; "we are past V1." At the same time I was replying; I once again looked at the air speed and saw 144 knots; which was our rotate speed; and also looked at the engine instruments and saw us making appropriate takeoff power with the N1's reading as desired. I reached down to guard the throttles against the reject; because we were past V1 and his hands were still on the throttles. As I moved toward them; the Captain then said; "Rejecting" and began to pull the throttles back. At this point; the captain had made his decision and committed us to rejecting the takeoff. I made the appropriate callouts for reverse green and 70 knots; and passing through about 50 knots I made a radio call to the tower telling them that we were rejecting on the runway. They asked ifwe needed assistance; and I told them we were going to stop on the runway and asked them to standby. At this point; I could tell the captain was clearly thinking hard; and so I prompted him to make the announcement to the passengers and in-flight to remain seated. He did so; and then we held a brief discussion about the next steps and decided in agreement that it would be best to clear the runway. I requested the clearance from tower and they cleared us to taxi off on Taxiway 1 and contact ground on Taxiway 2. As we were clearing the runway; we got the BRAKE OVERHEAT warning message; and we stopped and ran through the checklist for that message. That checklist is designed for the message while airborne; and really had no applicability to our situation on the ground. It was the outboard right brake that was indicating red and at a value of 15. All the others were at 14. We discussed the message; and the only applicable portion of the checklist; which essentially asked if the brake temperature was decreasing. At that time; and as we taxied back; the brake temperature fluctuated a few times between 14 and 15 triggering the BRAKE OVERHEAT warning message a few more times; but it pretty quickly went away as the brake temperature started to come down. The cyan BRAKE TEMP message remained; as expected. After discussing the message and brakes; the CA decided it was best to continue taxi; return to the gate; and deal with it there. We understood that it takes about 15 to 20 minutes for maximum temperature to reach the outside of the brakes; and decided it would be better to be on the gate than the taxiway in case a plug melted; which it ultimately did later. We contacted ground; and received clearance to the ramp. At this point; the captain asked me to run the after landing checklist to clean up the aircraft; and I did so. We continued our taxi; and contacted ops; told them we were returning to the gate because of an Rejected Takeoff and needed Maintenance Control to meet us and we would need an inspection; and they gave us gate XX. We had to wait a few minutes just short of 12 as the ground crew came out to park us; and in this time I got the APU started and we secured the number two engine. We then taxied into the gate and shut down the aircraft normally; and ran the parking checklist.The reflexive arming of the auto throttles with the Captain was in error; and I should have simply brought the thrust levels to the forward mechanical limit and continued the takeoff as per the manual. The arming of the auto throttles is a somewhat ambiguous procedure in this fleet; as some captains elect to arm them only after getting clearance onto the runways; some arm them approaching the hold short; and some reach up and arm them themselves without saying anything. The CA on this pairing on all previous legs executed the procedure with me as close to manual standard as I can interpret. Our focus on the FCP flight path setup I believe is the root distraction that allowed the autothrottles arming to be missed."
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.