Corporate flight crew expressed concern about the design of the PBI RNAV (GPS) X Runway 28R approach; alleging the offset makes it difficult for departing aircraft flight crews to spot inbound aircraft.
Synopsis
Corporate flight crew expressed concern about the design of the PBI RNAV (GPS) X Runway 28R approach; alleging the offset makes it difficult for departing aircraft flight crews to spot inbound aircraft.
Narrative
Our aircraft; Aircraft X; was holding short of Runway 28R at Intersection L7 at PBI. The Tower Controller (frequency 119.1) cleared us for takeoff on Runway 28R and advised of another approaching aircraft on a five-mile final to Runway 32. My Co-Captain read back the takeoff clearance and finished final checklist items; and I looked to my three o'clock position to ensure the final approach was clear. I did not see any other aircraft; so I released the brakes. As I turned my head back to the left (forward); I then saw landing lights from about the one o'clock position. I immediately stopped the aircraft and called out the traffic; which my Co-Captain noticed simultaneously and called STOP STOP STOP."In the ATC audio obtained; the controller seemed to be attempting to cancel our takeoff clearance in this moment; but the message was garbled. Shortly after; the pilot of the jet on short final exclaimed that he was cleared to land but was going around. The controller did acknowledge the situation was a mistake on his end. We held position just past the hold short line but not yet on the runway; and awaited further instructions.Our takeoff clearance was canceled; and we were told to line up and wait on 28R; which we did. We were cleared for takeoff shortly thereafter; and the rest of the flight was uneventful.After discussion; my Co-Captain and I agreed that the RNAV (GPS) X Runway 28R approach that was in use that day was a major contributing factor. In addition; I posit that the design of the cockpit and possible expectation bias were also contributory.The RNAV (GPS) X Runway 28R approach at PBI is offset 30 degrees from the final approach course to avoid overflight of the TFR over Mar-a-Lago. This places approaching aircraft in an area of the sky that controllers and pilots may not be used to looking at when clearing final approach prior to takeoff; and in our case; the aircraft windscreen structure temporarily obscured the jet from view.Additionally; due to the geometry of the approach; the fix that we are expected to fly by to align with the runway (FREBY) is 0.9 nautical miles from the runway threshold. Maneuvering this close in to the runway and low to the ground (approximately 356 feet above the TDZE if my math is correct; based off the 3.1 degree descent angle prescribed by the approach plate is dangerous; and does not meet the stable approach criteria recommended by the organization; AC 120-108A; AC 91-79B; and the "Stabilized Approach and Landing" fact sheet produced by the FAASTeam of being stabilized by 500 feet AGL when in VMC.As far as human factors; I think expectation bias played a part here. As a pilot; I am used to not having another airplane on short final when cleared for takeoff at a towered airport; and; while helpful and prudent; being alerted to the airplane approaching Runway 32 may have also influenced my bias when scanning the sky before crossing the hold short line because; surely; the controller would have also mentioned the airplane on short final to our runway; right? As a controller; one may get into a rhythm and temporarily let their guard down; especially if SOPs have changed recently. Having a "trust but verify" mentality and making a conscious effort to recognize when one is feeling too comfortable may have prevented any of us having been put in this situation."
Second reporter narrative
While holding short of 28R on Taxiway L7; we advised Palm Beach Tower that we were ready for departure. Within 30 seconds we were given a takeoff clearance and advised that there was landing traffic for Runway 32 that was on a 5-mile final. As pilot not flying; I read back the takeoff clearance and acknowledged the traffic on the 5-mile final for 32. Our aircraft started moving to take Runway 28R and crossed the hold short line as both pilots looked to visually clear the final. I noticed Aircraft Y on short final (estimated 1 mile) and told the pilot flying to stop the aircraft as the pilot flying also noticed traffic on final. This was all happening as the Tower Controller was fumbling with our tail number over the radio but once he got it out he told us to hold our position. We stopped [our] aircraft before it reached the runway. The aircraft on final stated over the radio that they were cleared to land on 28R but were going around. He also asked What was the deal with that?"; to which the Tower Controller stated that he had made an error. We held our position until we were given instructions to line up and wait on 28R. The aircraft we were originally warned about landed on Runway 32 and the aircraft that went around on 28R was handed off to Approach Control. We were then issued a takeoff clearance on Runway 28R and the rest of the flight was uneventful.I believe the Tower Controller issuing a takeoff clearance with airplanes landing on intersecting runways led to this runway incursion. The offset RNAV approaches for Runway 28R also make it difficult to plainly and efficiently see aircraft on final."
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.