TWR CTLR IS CRITICAL OF APCH CTLR HANDLING OF A HVY INBOUND ACFT AND ANOTHER ACR. CTLR CLAIMS THAT LTSS OCCURRED.
Synopsis
TWR CTLR IS CRITICAL OF APCH CTLR HANDLING OF A HVY INBOUND ACFT AND ANOTHER ACR. CTLR CLAIMS THAT LTSS OCCURRED.
Narrative
THE WX IN DENVER WAS MARGINAL VFR TO COMPLETE IFR CONDITIONS. THE BASE OF THE CLOUDS WERE HOVERING IN THE 900-1000 FT RANGE (6000-6200 MSL). THE TOPS WERE AROUND 7300 MSL. WE WERE RUNNING SIMULTANEOUS ILS APCHS TO RWYS 35R AND 36. THESE RWYS ARE SEPARATED BY 1 MI. THIS OP REQUIRES THE USE OF A FINAL MONITOR POS IN THE TRACON TO ENSURE THAT ACFT REMAIN ON THE LOC DUE TO THE CLOSE PROX OF OTHER ACFT CONDUCTING APCHS ON THE OTHER RWY. FOR REASONS UNKNOWN TO ME THE TRACON SAID THEY WERE GOING TO USE VISUAL SEPARATION AS WELL WHEN CONDUCTING THESE APCHS. THIS WAS OKAY ABOVE THE CLOUDS; BUT WHAT ABOUT WHEN THEY WENT INTO THEM. THIS OP ALSO REQUIRES THAT ACFT BE ON THE LCL CTL FREQ 18 MI OUT ON FINAL. THE TWR COMPLAINED AGAIN BECAUSE THEY WEREN'T GETTING THEM UNTIL THE OM (5 MI). WHEN THE COMPLAINTS WERE ISSUED WE WERE TOLD THEY NEEDED TO KEEP THE ACFT IN ORDER TO APPLY THE VISUAL SEPARATION. THERE ARE NO PROCS FOR THIS. THE END RESULT WAS ABOUT 3 HRS AFTER BEGINNING THIS OP; THE FINAL MONITOR POS NOTICED AN LGT CLOSING THE DISTANCE BEHIND A HVY WDB. REALIZING THAT IF SOMETHING WASN'T DONE THAT SOON HE COULD NOT MAINTAIN THE REQUIRED MINIMUM OF 5 MI SEPARATION. HE ASKED THE LGT PLT IF THE LESS THAN STANDARD WAKE TURB SEPARATION WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE. THE PLT REPLIED 'NO PROB.' HENCE; HE DID NOT PULL THE ACFT OFF OF THE APCH. THE TWR SUPVR IN THE TWR CAB DID NOT LIKE WHAT HE SAW AND CALLED AN OPERROR ON THE FINAL MONITOR CTLR FOR NOT APPLYING PROPER WAKE TURB SEPARATION. THERE ARE SOME SERIOUS QUESTIONS HERE AS TO THE PROPER USE OF WAKE TURB SEPARATION. THE PROB IS THE CTLR WAS APPLYING SEPARATION STANDARDS THAT COULD NOT POSSIBLY BE ASSURED BECAUSE OF THE AWKWARD POS THIS OP PUT HIM IN. THE REAL CULPRIT IN THIS SCENARIO IS TRYING TO PUT TOO MANY AIRPLANES INTO AN ARPT THAT THE WX CONDITIONS DID NOT ALLOW. WE PUSHED THE ENVELOPE TOO FAR. THE RULES WERE WRITTEN AND FLOW RATES ADJUSTED BECAUSE OF THE ARPT LIMITATIONS. THEN THE RULES WERE BENT TO SQUEEZE IN A COUPLE MORE ACFT. THE END RESULT WAS AN OPERROR WHICH COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED IF ONLY THE PROCS FOR SIMULTANEOUS ILS APCHS WERE FOLLOWED AS WRITTEN. UNFORTUNATELY; THIS PRACTICE HAPPENS ALL TOO OFTEN. IF THIS TREND CONTINUES; SOMEDAY MORE THAN AN OPERROR WILL OCCUR.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.