FO OF AN ACR WDB ACFT RPTED THAT THE ILS WAS OTS DURING A VISUAL APCH WHICH HAD NOT BEEN SPECIFICALLY RPTED TO HIM PRIOR TO THE APCH.

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ON OUR DSCNT FOR LNDG AT JFK THE CURRENT ATIS INFO INDICATED THAT RWY 31R APCHS WERE IN USE FOR LNDG AND THAT THE WX WAS VFR. UPON CHKING IN WITH KENNEDY APCH; WE WERE GIVEN A HDG TO FLY FOR A VECTOR TO A VISUAL APCH FOR RWY 4R AT JFK AND TOLD TO OBTAIN THE NEW ATIS INFO WHICH HAD JUST BEEN CHANGED. THE NEW ATIS INFO INDICATED THAT THE WX WAS VFR; THE WIND WAS APPROX 310 DEGS AT 15 KTS; AND THAT VISUAL APCHS WERE IN USE; LNDG RWY 4R. THERE WERE NO NOTAMS RPTED ON THE ATIS AT THIS TIME. WE BOTH COMMENTED THAT THE WIND DIRECTION FAVORED RWY 31 AND SPECULATED THE RWY CHANGE MIGHT BE A NOISE ABATEMENT PROC DUE TO THE LATE HR. I ASKED THE CAPT TO INSTALL THE NEW APCH AND TUNE THE ILS FOR THE RWY 4R APCH AS A BACKUP SINCE THERE IS NO VISUAL APCH AID FOR RWY 4R AND THE APCH IS AN OVERWATER APCH WITH VIRTUALLY NO VISUAL CUES AVAILABLE FOR THE GS. APPROX 10 MI FROM THE RWY OVER THE WATER ON THE E SIDE OF THE ARPT ON A DOWNWIND LEG WE WERE CLRED TO DSND TO 2000 FT MSL. SUBSEQUENT HDGS WERE GIVEN PLACING US ON A R BASE LEG FOR THE RWY AND WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO RPT THE ARPT IN SIGHT. AT THIS POINT WE WERE APPROX 13 MI FROM THE ARPT AT 2000 FT MSL AND COULD SEE THE APCH LIGHTS CLRLY. WE RPTED THE ARPT IN SIGHT AND WERE CLRED FOR THE VISUAL APCH TO RWY 4R AND INSTRUCTED TO CONTACT KENNEDY TWR. IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT WE WERE INFORMED ONLY THAT A FLT CHK WAS IN PROGRESS AT THE ARPT AND WERE GIVEN SEVERAL SPD REDUCTIONS DUE TO THIS CHK. AT NO TIME WERE WE ADVISED THAT THE ILS FOR RWY 4R WAS OTS. UPON RECEIVING OUR CLRNC I TURNED TO ALIGN THE ACFT WITH THE APCH LIGHTS AND XCHKED MY INSTS. THE CAPT CHKED IN WITH KENNEDY TWR GIVING OUR POS AND WE WERE SUBSEQUENTLY CLRED TO LAND ON RWY 4R. AT THIS TIME OUR POS WAS JUST PAST NARRO; APPROX 8 MI FROM EBBEE; THE FAF; AT 2000 FT MSL. I NOTICED THAT ALTHOUGH I WAS SLIGHTLY R OF COURSE; PERHAPS DUE TO THE STRONG XWIND; THE LOC HAD GONE TO THE EXPANDED MODE AND WAS INDICATING THAT THE ACFT NEEDED TO TURN FURTHER TO THE R AND THE GS RECEIVER INDICATED THAT THE GS WAS WELL BELOW THE ACFT. THERE WERE NO WARNING FLAGS SHOWING. THESE INDICATIONS WERE OBVIOUSLY IN ERROR SO I ASKED THE CAPT TO CHK WITH THE TWR ON THE STATUS OF THE LOC. THE KENNEDY TWR CTLR INDICATED THAT A FLT CHK WAS BEING ACCOMPLISHED TO RWY 22R WHICH IS THE RECIPROCAL RWY FOR RWY 4L AND USES THE SAME LOC FREQ AS RWY 4R; THE RWY WE WERE USING FOR OUR APCH. I BELIEVE THIS INFO SHOULD HAVE BEEN PROVIDED TO US MUCH EARLIER EITHER THROUGH THE ATIS INFO; THROUGH KENNEDY APCH CTL OR KENNEDY TWR. THERE WERE NO DEVS DURING THIS FLT BUT THE POTENTIAL FOR A SERIOUS ACCIDENT WAS IN PLACE. IN RETROSPECT IT IS POSSIBLE THAT DUE TO THE LAST MIN RWY CHANGE; THE HIGH WORKLOAD ASSOCIATED WITH SUCH A RWY CHANGE AND THE PRESENCE OF VFR CONDITIONS; THE LOCS WHICH HAVE SIMILAR AURAL IDENTIFIERS WERE NOT PROPERLY IDENTED. A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 4R AT NIGHT OVER THE WATER WITH NO VISUAL GLIDE PATH AIDES IS NOT A DESIRABLE CONDITION IN THE FIRST PLACE; COUPLE THAT WITH A HIGH WORKLOAD SIT IN A 2 PLT AIRPLANE WITH TOTALLY CONFUSING ILS INDICATIONS AND PERHAPS AN AUTOPLT APCH AND ONE CAN SEE THE POTENTIAL FOR AN ACCIDENT. FORTUNATELY THE ACFT WAS BEING HAND FLOWN AND WE BOTH RECOGNIZED THAT THERE WAS MAJOR PROB WITH THE LOC AND THE GLIDE PATH. I BELIEVE PROPER COMS COULD HAVE COMPLETELY REMOVED ANY POSSIBILITY OF ERROR DURING THIS APCH.