IAP ILS APCH FROM A DESTABILIZED APCH WITH MINIMUM DECISION HT.

Narrative

CAPT ATTEMPTED TO NAV TO ARSOT INTXN USING INERTIAL NAV. WHEN TRANSITION TO VOR AND ILS NAV WAS MADE A RTE OF FLT WAS FOLLOWED THAT RESULTED IN AN INTERCEPT THAT APPARENTLY WOULD BE INSIDE THE OM (OC 330KC). LOC CAPTURE WAS ACCOMPLISHED AT APPROX 300 FT AGL WITH AN INTERCEPT ANGLE IN EXCESS OF 30 DEGS. WHEN THE ACFT BROKE OUT AT 200 FT IT HAD DEVIATED R OF CTRLINE; CORRECTIONS WERE MADE BY THE CAPT AND THE ACFT CROSSED THE RWY THRESHOLD OVER THE L EDGE OF THE RWY. FLARE WAS MADE WITH THE ACFT ON THE L SIDE OF THE RWY AND THE COPLT PROMPTING THE CAPT TO GAR. THE ACFT TOUCHED DOWN JUST WITHIN THE RWY BOUNDARIES. THIS APCH WAS MADE WITH THE ACFT NEVER ESTABLISHED ON THE ILS LOC -- THE LOC SHOWED FULL SCALE DEV TO THE R UNTIL APPROX 350 FT AGL. THE CAPT RELIED ON PROMPTINGS FROM THE COPLT AND SO REGARDING HIS FLT PATH SIT; CONTINUED AN UNSTABILIZED APCH THAT LUCKILY ESTABLISHED THE ACFT ON THE LOC 1 MI FROM THE ARPT. THE CAPT'S SENSE OF SITUATIONAL AWARENESS; CREW COORD AND COMMAND WERE GROSSLY INADEQUATE. I BELIEVE THE CAPT WAS MOTIVATED TO GET THE AIRPLANE ON THE GND BECAUSE OF MARGINAL WX; AND A DISTANT ALTERNATE (MENDOZA). ALTHOUGH THE APCH WAS STARTED WITH 65000 LBS OF FUEL; THE CAPT HAD BURNED UP HIS 10000 LB HOLDING FUEL ENRTE DUE TO POOR FUEL CONSERVATION PRACTICES. HOWEVER; MONTEVIDEO WAS AVAILABLE AS A SUITABLE ARPT WITH WX WELL ABOVE MINIMUMS AND ON THE UPTREND. THE CAPT ATTEMPTED TO NAV TO ARSOT USING INS; A PROC CONTRARY TO THE AIRLINE'S POLICY. LACKING A GOOD TRANSITION RTING TO ARSOT; THE CAPT SHOULD HAVE REQUESTED CLRNC DIRECT TO THE TVOR AT EZE AND THE PUBLISHED #2 VOR DME ILS LOCALIZER ILS APCH TO RWY 11. INSTEAD THE CAPT ACCEPTED THE #1 DME ILS LOCALIZER APCH TO RWY 11 -- WITH A CLRNC OVER ARSOT INTXN. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE CAPT INITIALLY MADE A PERFUNCTORY BRIEFING FOR THE #2 APCH (OVER EZE TVOR); HOWEVER; WHILE NAVING TO ARSOT THE COPLT TOLD HIM THAT THE #1 APCH PLATE WAS THE APPROPRIATE CHART AND PROC. IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE APCH DSCNT CHKLIST AND SOP; INS NAV WAS DISCONTINUED AND THE RADIO NAV RESUMED PRIOR TO REACHING ARSOT INTXN. AT THIS POINT A NAV ERROR WAS MADE IN SELECTING AN INTERCEPT HDG FOR THE ILS. BY WAY OF A SUGGESTION I WOULD RECOMMEND ARSOT INTXN BE RELOCATED ON THE 289 DEG RADIAL OF EZE VOR AND A DME ARC TRANSITION RTING PUBLISHED FOR THE PROC WITH A LEAD IN RADIAL FOR THE TURN AT ARSOT. ADDITIONALLY; I SUGGEST THAT THE AIRLINES BE REQUIRED TO FURNISH AREA CHARTS AND STARS AND SIDS TO SECOND OFFICERS.