AN ACR'S MAINT PROC BROKE DOWN ALLOWING AN ACFT TO FLY WITHOUT AN INSPECTION AND FLT TEST.
Synopsis
AN ACR'S MAINT PROC BROKE DOWN ALLOWING AN ACFT TO FLY WITHOUT AN INSPECTION AND FLT TEST.
Narrative
THIS IS IN REF TO WDB UPPER L LATERAL CENTERING CTL ACTUATOR CHANGE ON MAR/SUN/93 AT ACR MAINT FACILITY IN SFO. THIS ACFT WAS RELEASED FROM MAINT WITHOUT THE NOTIFICATION OF INSPECTION FOR WHICH I FEEL IS DUE TO INSUFFICIENT MAINT MANUALS DEPICTING INSPECTION REQUIREMENT. THIS ACFT ALSO DID NOT HAVE A FLT TEST; WHICH IS MAINT SUPERVISION'S RESPONSIBILITY. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH REPORTER REVEALED THE FOLLOWING: THE RPTING MECH FOR A MAJOR ACR CHANGED THE LATERAL CENTERING CTL ACTUATOR (LCCA) ON A WDB PER THE PROCS LISTED IN THE MAINT MANUAL. FOR THIS PARTICULAR ITEM IN ITS MANUAL; THERE IS NO MENTION OF A HIGHER INSPECTION REQUIRED OR A FLT TEST; ALTHOUGH BOTH ARE GENERALLY AGREED TO BE REQUIRED WHEN THERE IS A CHANGE TO A FLT CTL ITEM. 4 EMPLOYEES; INCLUDING THE RPTR'S PARTNER AND SUPVR; MISSED THE FACT THAT THIS CHANGE REQUIRED AN INSPECTION BY THE QUALITY CTL DEPT. THE ACFT FLEW 2 TRANS CONTINENTAL TRIPS BEFORE SOMEONE WOKE UP TO THE FACT THAT AN INSPECTION WAS REQUIRED. AN INSPECTION WAS MADE AT LAX WHERE A COMPANY INSPECTOR FOUND 6 DISCREPANCIES IN THE WHEEL WELL; MOST OF WHICH HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THE LATERAL CENTERING CTL ACTUATOR. THE RPTR STATES THAT THE FAA IS ON HIS EMPLOYER ABOUT THIS INCIDENT; AND HIS EMPLOYER IS PASSING ALL OF THE BLAME DOWN TO HIM. THE RPTR BELIEVES THAT THE MAINT MANUALS; AND ESPECIALLY THE 'REQUIRED INSPECTION ITEM' LIST SHOULD BE CHANGED TO PREVENT THIS HAPPENING AGAIN.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.