ONE SMA PLT COMPLAINS OF OTHER SMA PLT BEHAVIOR UNPROFESSIONAL ATTITUDE IN NMAC INCIDENT.

Date: 1993-05 · Aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Anomalies: conflict-nmac|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-other-unknown|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-far

Synopsis

ONE SMA PLT COMPLAINS OF OTHER SMA PLT BEHAVIOR UNPROFESSIONAL ATTITUDE IN NMAC INCIDENT.

Narrative

AFTER CLRING THE WX IN THE PASCO AREA; WE ASKED FOR AND RECEIVED CLRNC TO OPERATE EBOUND AT 10000 FT; AS THAT WOULD PLACE US ABOVE A LOWER BUILDING CLOUD DECK; AND STILL ALLOW US TO FLY WITHOUT USING OUR OXYGEN. IT WAS APPROX DURING THIS TIME FRAME THAT ZSE STARTED GIVING US UNKNOWN TFC AT OUR 7 O'CLOCK POS GAINING ON US SLOWLY. WE BOTH KEPT SEARCHING FOR THE TFC; BUT DID NOT SEE IT. THE TFC KEPT CLBING; AND THE CTLR SUGGESTED A CLB FOR US TO 10500 FT; WHICH WE DID. AS WE WERE CLBING THROUGH 10200 FT WE FIRST SAW THE TFC. THE TFC'S RPTED MODE C ALT WAS 9800 FT. I ESTIMATE THE SMA Y PASSED DIRECTLY UNDERNEATH US WITH APPROX 400 FT SEPARATION WITH A HDG ABOUT 60 DEGS S OF OURS. IT WAS AT APPROX THIS TIME FRAME THAT WE BOTH OBSERVED THE SMA Y FLY NEXT TO THE CLOUD BANKS OFF TO OUR S. IT IS MY PROFESSIONAL OPINION THAT THERE IS NO POSSIBLE WAY FOR THAT SMA TO REMAIN IN VFR CONDITIONS REF THE DISTANCE FROM CLOUD CRITERIA IN FAR 91.155(A). AFTER ARR AT TWIN FALLS; WE ASKED GND CTL WHERE THE OTHER SMA HAD PARKED. AS WE CLBED OUT OF OUR PLANE; I ASKED THE LINE BOY IF HE KNEW WHERE THE CREW OF SUBJECT SMA WAS; AND HE POINTED TO A COUPLE WALKING ACROSS THE RAMP TOWARDS THE TERMINAL. I THEN JOGGED OVER TO THEM; AND ASKED IF THEY HAD JUST FLOWN IN FROM THE SEATTLE AREA. THEIR RESPONSE WAS 'YES.' I THEN SAID WE NEEDED TO TALK ABOUT OUR NEAR MISS AND POSSIBLE FAA VIOLATIONS. THE GENTLEMAN TOLD ME TO GO TALK TO THE FAA; AND TURNED AROUND TO CONTINUE HIS WALK TO THE TERMINAL. I RETURNED TO OUR ACFT TO GATHER MY PAPERWORK; AND WENT INTO THE FBO TO CALL THE FAA. FAR 91.113(A): THIS ACFT DID NOT APPEAR TO 'PASS OVER; UNDER; OR AHEAD OF IT UNLESS WELL CLR.' I DO NOT CONSIDER A MODE C READOUT BTWN ACFT OF 400 FT TO BE 'WELL CLR.' FAR 91.113(F): THIS ACFT CONVERGED TWICE FROM OUR L SIDE. THE FIRST TIME WAS DURING THE CONFLICT ALERT GIVEN BY ZSE DESCRIBED ABOVE; THE SECOND WAS AS WE APCHED BAKER VOR. FAR 91.155(A): AFTER OUR NEAR MISS; WE BOTH WATCHED THIS ACFT APCH THE CLOUDS WITHIN 1/2 MI LATERALLY AND 300 FT ABOVE. FAR 91.159(A): I BELIEVE IT IS THE INTENT OF THIS FAR TO FLY AT THE PROPER ALT FOR DIRECTION OF FLT WHILE OVER 3000 FT AGL. FAR 91.113(A): AT LEAST ONCE; BOTH MY PAX AND MYSELF FELT ENDANGERED BY THE FLT PATH OF SMA Y AS THE TA WAS ISSUED. I FURTHER FEEL THAT OTHER UNKNOWN ACFT COULD HAVE BEEN ENDANGERED AS THE SMA PASSED NEXT TO THE CLOUDS; ESPECIALLY WHEN IT WAS ABOVE 10000 FT. HE COULD HAVE FILED IFR; IF HE WAS INST RATED; EQUIPPED; AND QUALIFIED. VFR FLT FOLLOWING SVC; WHILE NOT REQUIRED; WOULD HAVE BEEN SAFER THAN CONTINUING ON WITHOUT TALKING TO ANYONE. A CRUISE ALT OF 11500 FT WOULD HAVE PUT SMA Y ABOVE KNOWN WX AND TFC. IT ALSO WOULD HAVE ALLOWED THE SMA TO FLY AT A PROPER ALT FOR DIRECTION OF FLT.

Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.