AIRWORTHINESS STANDARDS COMPROMISED IN DEV FROM THE MEL REQUIREMENTS.

Date: 1993-06 · Aircraft: Widebody; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng · Phase: ground

Anomalies: aircraft-equipment-problem-critical|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-far|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-published-material-policy|other-unspecified

Synopsis

AIRWORTHINESS STANDARDS COMPROMISED IN DEV FROM THE MEL REQUIREMENTS.

Narrative

DURING RECEIVING ACFT CHKS; I DISCOVERED THAT THE NUMBER 6 BRAKE ANTI-SKID DID NOT TEST. MAINT DID NOT HAVE PARTS/EQUIP TO MAKE A REPAIR; SO THE DECISION WAS MADE (BY MAINT CTL) TO PLACARD THE #6 BRAKE ANTI-SKID INOP. THE PROB IS THAT THE #1 THRUST REVERSER WAS ALREADY ON PLACARD. ACCORDING TO OUR MEL; WE CANNOT DISPATCH WITH THIS CONDITION. WELL; WHY DO YOU ASK? BOTTOM LINE: WE JUST MISSED IT. HOWEVER; I WILL NOW ADD SOME HUMAN FACTORS THAT MAY SHED SOME LIGHT ON HOW THIS HAPPENED. FIRST; AS THE CAPT; I KNOW THAT I AM ULTIMATELY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SAFE OP OF THE ACFT. THE BRAKE PROB WAS DISCOVERED 10 MINS PRIOR TO DEP. THIS IS A VERY BUSY TIME COMPOUNDED WITH A MAINT PROB. THE BRAKE/THRUST REVERSER RELATIONSHIP IS A GO; NO-GO CONDITION IS A BRAND NEW CHANGE TO OUR MEL. THERE IS A TENDENCY TO RELY ON THE MAINT EXPERTS AT THE MAINT CTL HEADQUARTERS WHO HAVE THE MASTER MEL THAT OFTEN DIFFERS FROM THE MEL THAT THE PLTS CARRY. IN ADDITION; OUR COMPUTERIZED PERFORMANCE SYS (ACCU-LOAD) IS SUPPOSED TO HAVE THE MEL ITEMS AND PENALTIES LOADED IN. I DID NOT (PERSONALLY) LOOK AT/READ THE MEL. I LISTENED AS MY FE READ THE MEL (A MISTAKE I WILL NEVER MAKE AGAIN). I DO NOT MEAN TO TAKE AWAY FROM MY SO. HE IS AN EXCELLENT AIRMAN. MY SO IS A RETIRED SENIOR MIL OFFICER; HAS A MASTERS DEGREE AND IS A COMPANY SO INSTRUCTOR. WHAT CAN I SAY. WE JUST MISREAD THE MEL AND IT GOT BY THE COMPUTER; LCL MAINT (SFO) AND THE EXPERT IN MAINT CTL.

Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.