WRONG RWY TKOF ON CLOSED RWY AT IAG.

Date: 1993-06 · Aircraft: Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Recip Eng

Anomalies: deviation-discrepancy-procedural-clearance|ground-incursion-runway

Synopsis

WRONG RWY TKOF ON CLOSED RWY AT IAG.

Narrative

THE DAY OF THE EVENT; CREWS WERE WORKING AT THE DEP END OF RWY 24 ON TXWY K. RWY 24 WAS NOT 'X-ED OFF;' NOR WAS IT BARRICADED TO DETER TFC. ATIS INFO AT THE TIME OF THE EVENT STATED THAT WIND DIRECTION WAS 240 DEGS AT 7 AND RWYS 28L/10R 24/6 WERE CLOSED. UPON INITIAL CALLUP FOR TAXI FOR TKOF THE GND CTLR INSTRUCTIONS WERE 'TAXI RWY 24.' THIS ESTABLISHED IN OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT WE WERE GOING TO DEPART USING RWY 24 AND NO OTHER DEP RWY INSTRUCTIONS OR CORRECTIONS WERE EVER RECEIVED FROM THE CTLR. DURING INITIAL TAXI OUT; THE CTLR INSTRUCTED US TO TAXI VIA TXWY I; 28L; RWY 24 TO 28R. THIS MADE NO SENSE SINCE 28L/10R WAS CLOSED AND BARRICADED. APPARENTLY; THE WORK CREW WAS BLOCKING OUR NORMAL TAXI RTE TO RWY 24. THE CREW; HOWEVER; WAS FINISHING UP AND WERE MOVING OFF THE RWY WHICH ALLOWED US TO PASS USING THE PERIMETER TXWY. FOLLOWING NORMAL PRE-TKOF CHKS; WE CALLED TWR AND INFORMED THEM WE WERE HOLDING AND READY FOR DEP RWY 24. THE TWR CLRED US TO DEPART RWY 28R AND DID NOT OFFER ANY CORRECTION TO OUR ORIGINALLY ASSIGNED DEP RWY. WE APPARENTLY HAD A MINDSET TO DEPART RWY 24 ESPECIALLY SINCE WE KNEW THE WORK CREWS HAD MOVED OFF THE RWY TO LET US PASS EARLIER DURING TAXI. WE TAXIED INTO POS ON RWY 24 AND THERE WERE NO VEHICLES OR CREWS ON THE RWY. AFTER DEP THE CTLR INFORMED US THAT WE WERE SUPPOSED TO DEPART RWY 28R. DURING THE TIME OF THE EVENT; THERE WAS CONFUSION AND CONFLICTING INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN BY THE CTLR; SUCH AS: WHY WERE WE ASSIGNED TO TKOF RWY 24 IF IT WAS CLOSED. WHY WERE WE INSTRUCTED TO TAXI ON CLOSED RWYS. OUR CALL 'READY FOR DEP RWY 24' STILL ALLOWED THE CTLR TIME TO REVISE OUR DEP RWY; WHICH HE DID NOT. COM ERRORS APPEAR TO BE CAUSES FOR THE EVENT; HOWEVER; AN OVERWORKED AND STRESSED CTLR WHO WAS WORKING GND AND TWR FREQS AT THE SAME TIME COULD POSSIBLY BE A PRIMARY CAUSE FOR SAFETY SHORTCOMINGS. THE USE OF 2 SEPARATE CTLRS; 1 FOR GND/CLRNC DELIVERY AND 1 FOR TWR WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY IMPROVE SAFETY AT IAG.

Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.