SMT CHARTER FLT DEVIATES TSTMS THINKING HE IS CLRED TO DO SO.

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FLT WAS FILED MSY; V-9 GRW; WITH A 'FORMAT' WX BRIEFING (TELEPHONE) FROM FSS. BEFORE TKOF; I CALLED TWICE MORE; TO CHK CURRENT RADAR FOR THE PROGRESS OF TSTMS THAT EXTENDED FROM HUNDREDS OF MI W OF OUR RTE TO 'MAYBE 50 OR 60 MI' E OF V-9; BTWN MCB AND JAN. MY CALLS PAINTED A PICTURE OF TSTMS CLOSER TO BTR THAN MCB; MOVING SLOWLY NNE AND NOT LIKELY TO CROSS V-9 BEFORE I GOT THERE. IF THEY GOT TOO CLOSE; I WOULD DEVIATE E. MY LAST CALL WAS IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE PAX ARRIVED AND SHORTLY BEFORE OUR TKOF. THAT'S WHEN I WAS TOLD 'MAYBE 50-60 MI.' I WOULD DEVIATE FARTHER E. IN RETROSPECT; I SHOULD HAVE REFILED V-455 MEI; THENCE NW TO A SUITABLE ARPT IN THE MEM AREA. I FILED FOR 4000 FT TO STAY BELOW THE TSTM BASES; WHERE POSSIBLE. ACFT HAS AN EARLY STORMSCOPE -- THE MODEL THAT LIGHTS UP LIKE A CHRISTMAS TREE; WHENEVER THERE IS A STRONG LIGHTNING STRIKE ANYWHERE WITHIN 200 NM; AND A POST-KOREAN WAR MONOCHROME RADAR WITH MULTIPLE RADOME PATCHES. FIRST VECTOR FROM MSY WAS NW; STRAIGHT TOWARD THE DEATH ANGEL; SO I ASKED FOR THE FIRST OF A LONG SERIES OF VECTORS TO THE NNE; THEN NE; THEN ENE. ROUGHLY 35 SE OF MCB AND 35 SW OF LBY; ZHU'S FREQ WAS FAR TOO BUSY; AND THE CTLR WAS IMPATIENT TO KNOW WHEN I WOULD GO NW TOWARD MCB OR V-9. I SAID SOMETHING TO THE EFFECT THAT I NEEDED TO GO FARTHER NE AROUND THE LINE OF CELLS; BUT HE KEPT PRESSURING ME TO GIVE HIM AN EXACT RTE. AT THAT POINT; I SHOULD'VE SAID SOMETHING LIKE: 'LOOK; I NEED INFINITE L AND R DEVS; AS MY RADAR PICTURE IS CONSTANTLY CHANGING; AND; AS SOON AS I CAN GIVE YOU A FOR SURE RTE; I'LL TELL YOU ABOUT IT.' BEING FAR TOO INTIMIDATED BY THE GOD OF THE FED'S; I GAVE IN TO THE PRESSURE AND ASKED FOR DIRECT MEI; AS I NEEDED TO GO IN A GENERALLY NE DIRECTION; AND I SAID SOMETHING TO THE EFFECT THAT I'D FIGURE OUT A NEW FURTHER RTE AND DEST IN A MIN OR TWO. THEN; HE CLRED ME DIRECT LBY; MEI. ONCE LBY LOCKED ON; I FOUND THAT I HAD TO GO SOMEWHAT W OF THERE; AS A CELL WAS STRADDLING V-455 AT LBY. EACH DEV REQUIRED THAT I FIRST GET A WORD THROUGH ALL THE VOICES ON THE FREQ; AND I MADE A COUPLE OF THOSE TURNS BEFORE BEING CLRED TO DO SO; TO STAY OUT OF SOME ANGRY-LOOKING AIR. WNW OF LBY; I PASSED SE OF A LARGE CELL AND BEGAN PAINTING MORE OF THE SAME TOWARD MEI. JUST AS IT OCCURRED TO ME THAT I MIGHT HAVE TO HARASS ZHU AGAIN; TURN S TO A POINT ABOUT 20 NM S OF LBY; GO E TO THE ATLANTIC OCEAN; THEN GO N; I SAW A BIG GAP IN THE LINE THAT HAD BEEN ATTENUATED BY THE CELL I HAD JUST PASSED. I TURNED TO POINT THE RADAR AT WHAT I SAW: RADAR; STORMSCOPE AND EYEBALLS ALL SAID I HAD A 30 MI WIDE GAP BTWN ME AND JAN. I TOLD ZHU I NEEDED TO GO DIRECT JAN; GRW; AND I THOUGHT HE CLRED THAT. HE LATER SAID HE HAD SAID THAT HE'D GET BACK TO ME ON THAT. WE GOT TO GWO WITH A VERY SMOOTH RIDE. THROUGHOUT THE WHOLE DEAL; MY PAX NEVER GOT SO MUCH AS LIGHT CHOP. SOMEWHERE NW OF PCU; I CALLED FLT WATCH FOR YET ANOTHER LOOK AHEAD AT THEIR COMPOSITE RADAR PICTURE. IT WOULD BE GREAT IF ALL FSS'S HAD AN OVERLAY SUPERIMPOSED ON THAT RADAR PICTURE; ENABLING THEM TO SAY; WITH AT LEAST SEMI- ACCURACY; WHERE THE EDGES OF RADAR RETURNS LIE; RELATIVE TO VORS. IF THE RADAR SITE IS NOWHERE NEAR A VOR; SAYING THAT THE E EDGE OF A CLUSTER OR LINE OF CELLS LIES 'OH; MAYBE 100 MI NE OF THE RADAR SITE' GIVES ME INFO THAT IS HARD TO USE IN THE COCKPIT.