SMA HAS LOSS OF ACFT CTL ON TKOF. POSSIBLE WIND SHEAR.

Date: 1993-06 · Aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear · Phase: takeoff

Anomalies: deviation-discrepancy-procedural-other-unknown|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-published-material-policy|inflight-event-encounter-loss-of-aircraft-control|inflight-event-encounter-other-unknown

Synopsis

SMA HAS LOSS OF ACFT CTL ON TKOF. POSSIBLE WIND SHEAR.

Narrative

THE FLT INTO 06A (TUSKGEE ARPT) WAS OF A PRACTICE TRAINING MEASURE. BOTH MYSELF AND A FRIEND ARE CURRENTLY UNDERGOING CFI TRAINING. WE WERE PRACTICING VARIOUS TKOF AND LNDG TYPES. DURING ONE OF THE TKOFS WE BELIEVED WE ENCOUNTERED A WIND SHEAR. THE ACFT BEING FLOWN WAS AN SMA. WHILE PERFORMING A SHORT FIELD TKOF; I EXPERIENCED A SUDDEN DECREASE IN ALT IMMEDIATELY AFTER RETRACTING THE GEAR ON CLBOUT. I AM AWARE OF THE DRAG CHARACTERISTICS OF THIS ACFT WHILE THE GEAR ARE IN TRANSIT. THE GEAR DROP ABOUT 2 FT IN TRANSIT. WE HAD A POSITIVE RATE OF CLB AND AT A HT OF ABOUT 30 FT THE GEAR WERE RETRACTED. AS SOON AS THE GEAR STARTED IN TRANSIT THE ACFT LOST ABOUT 20-25 FT EVEN WHILE MAINTAINING A VX CLB ATTITUDE. ONCE THE ACFT DSCNT WAS ARRESTED; THE ACFT WAS ACCELERATED IN GND EFFECT UNTIL AN AIRSPD OF 80-85 KIAS WAS REACHED. ONCE REACHING THIS AIRSPD; A HIGH PERFORMANCE CLBING TURN TO XWIND WAS ESTABLISHED. 2 PEOPLE ON THE GND SAID TKOF WAS SAID TO LOOK LIKE AEROBATIC FLT. UNDER NO INSTANCE WAS THE ACFT IN AN ABNORMAL CONDITION CONSIDERING THE FLT SIT AND NONE OF THE BANK/PITCH ANGLES WERE EXCEEDED. DURING THE TKOF; THE ALT LOSS BECAME A MAJOR CONCERN. BOTH MYSELF AND THE OTHER PLT GOT THAT 'SICK SINKING FEELING' ABOUT THE SIT AT HAND. ONCE RECOVERY WAS MAINTAINED; THE ONLY THING THAT I COULD THINK ABOUT WAS GAINING AIRSPD AND ALT. THE PEOPLE ON THE GND TOLD ME THAT THEY PERCEIVED IT TO BE MUCH WORSE. COCKPIT CONVERSATION ABOUT THE SIT DISTRACTED ME DURING TKOF AND CLBOUT. THERE ARE A FEW KEY ELEMENTS THAT AFFECTED THE SIT: 1) ENCOUNTER WITH A FRIGHTENING SIT THAT AFFECTED JUDGEMENT AND PERCEPTION; 2) COCKPIT CONVERSATION THAT DISTRACTED ME FROM THE RECOVERY/CLBOUT PROC. I BELIEVE THAT THE SIT COULD HAVE BEEN HANDLED BETTER IF TOTAL ATTN WERE GIVEN TO THE PROB AT HAND. FEAR SHOULD BE CTLED AND MINIMIZED AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE. STRICT ADHERENCE TO THE MANUFACTURERS OPERATING PROCS WILL ALSO PROVIDE THE BEST POSSIBLE PERFORMANCE ON THE MOST PART AND FURTHER REDUCE ANY PROBS LIKE THE SIT JUST DESCRIBED. SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FROM ACN 245570: I NOTICED THAT THE PLT RETRACTED THE LNDG GEAR AT AN ALT OF ABOUT 30 FT AGL. THE RETRACTION SEEMED A LITTLE EARLY ALTHOUGH WE DID HAVE A POSITIVE RATE OF CLB. THE WIND HAD PICKED UP SOME AS THE GUSTS AND TURB SEEMED STRONGER THAN THEY HAD BEEN ON THE PREVIOUS TKOF WHICH I HAD PERFORMED. NEXT; THE ACFT BEGAN TO SETTLE BACK TOWARDS THE RWY WITH THE STALL WARNING HORN INDICATING AN IMMINENT STALL. THE PLT LOWERED THE NOSE OF THE ACFT SLIGHTLY AND THEN PROCEEDED TO STOP THE ACFT'S DSCNT BTWN 5 AND 10 FT ABOVE THE RWY. BY RE- ENTERING GND EFFECT AND ACCELERATING UNTIL WE HAD ENOUGH AIRSPD TO ATTAIN A POSITIVE RATE OF CLB; THE PLT WAS ABLE TO PREVENT CONTACT WITH THE RWY IN A GEAR UP CONFIGN.

Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.