FREQ CHANGE MISSED LATE.

Date: 1993-08 · Aircraft: Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Anomalies: deviation-discrepancy-procedural-clearance|other-unspecified

Synopsis

FREQ CHANGE MISSED LATE.

Narrative

WE WERE ENRTE FROM ANC TO SEA; LEVEL AT 37000 FT. THE FO NOTICED THAT WE HAD STARTED TO PICK UP 'SEA CLRNC DELIVERY' ON 128.0; THE SAME FREQ WE HAD BEEN ON FOR VANCOUVER CTR. WE HAD OBVIOUSLY GOTTEN OUT OF RANGE OF VANCOUVER CTR. WE ASSUMED WE EITHER MISSED THE HDOF TO SEA OR THAT THE CTLR FORGOT TO HAND US OFF. IN ANY CASE; NEITHER ONE OF US NOTICED UNTIL IT WAS TIME FOR OUR DSCNT AND WE BEGAN TO WONDER WHY WE HADN'T GOTTEN LOWER ALT. WE CALLED ZSE IMMEDIATELY AND WERE GIVEN A DSCNT CLRNC. I DON'T BELIEVE THERE WAS ANY CONFLICT AND I DON'T THINK WE WERE OUT OF RANGE VERY LONG -- PERHAPS 5-10 MINS; IF THAT. THE INTERESTING PART OF THIS STORY IS WHY IT HAPPENED; WHY WE DIDN'T NOTICE. WE WERE DISTRACTED. ABOUT 1 HR INTO THE FLT OUR MD CHIEF PLT ANNOUNCED THAT HE WAS ONBOARD AND WANTED TO ENTER THE COCKPIT. HE THEN PROCEEDED TO CRITICIZE MY PERFORMANCE ON THE PA SYS -- NOT THAT I HAD NOT MADE REQUIRED PA'S. I HAD MADE THEM AND SEVERAL MORE; BUT THAT MY TRAVELOGUE WAS INADEQUATE. I HAD MADE 2 BOARDING ANNOUNCEMENTS; THE SEAT BELT SIGN; RTE OF FLT; TIME; WX; ETC ANNOUNCEMENTS AND 2-3 'SIGHTS OF INTEREST' ANNOUNCEMENTS. APPARENTLY; HE FELT THEY WEREN'T ENOUGH AND FELT STRONGLY ENOUGH ABOUT IT TO ENTER THE COCKPIT AND DISTURB US AND UPSET US (THIS IS THE CHIEF PLT). WE SPENT THE REMAINDER OF THE FLT LOOKING OUT THE WINDOW; POURING OVER ROAD MAPS; READING TRAVEL INFO; MAKING PA'S AND WORRYING ABOUT; AND VERY ANGRY ABOUT; HIS ACTIONS. IT'S A WONDER WE DIDN'T MAKE MORE MISTAKES; MAYBE WE DID -- I HOPE NOT. I THINK HIS ENRTE CRITIQUE WAS INAPPROPRIATE AND FOSTERED AN UNSAFE ENVIRONMENT IN THE COCKPIT. THIS WAS NOT A CHKRIDE (HE WAS DEADHEADING); HIS ATTITUDE WAS CLRLY HOSTILE (HE WAS TIRED) AN HIS COMMENTS HAD ABSOLUTELY NOTHING TO DO WITH SAFETY OF FLT ISSUES. THIS IS A LINE PLT WHO SHOULD KNOW SOMETHING ABOUT CRM AND WHAT EFFECT HIS ACTIONS WERE MOST LIKELY TO HAVE ON THE CREW. IT WAS IRRESPONSIBLE; DANGEROUS; AND WITHOUT A DOUBT; IF IN FACT WE DID MISS OUR HDOF; THE CAUSE. THIS IS A SIT FOR US WHERE THERE IS NO RECOURSE WITHIN THE COMPANY. AGAIN; THIS IS THE CHIEF PLT. BUT FAA OR SOMEONE SHOULD REMIND THESE PEOPLE THAT EVERYONE'S FIRST RESPONSIBILITY IS TO SAFETY AND TO KEEP THAT IN MIND.

Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.