MISFUELING; FUEL IMBAL.

Date: 1993-08 · Aircraft: Widebody; Low Wing; 3 Turbojet Eng

Anomalies: aircraft-equipment-problem-less-severe|other-unspecified

Synopsis

MISFUELING; FUEL IMBAL.

Narrative

#3 FUEL GAUGE INOP. FUEL TANK QUANTITY WAS MEASURED BY MECHS BY STICK METHOD; THEN WAS CONFIRMED BY MAINT CTL IN MSP. STICK READING BY MECH SHOWED TANK #3 WAS 9500 LBS WHILE QUANTITY IN TANKS #1 AND #2 WERE ABOUT 14000 LBS. WITH A 5000 LB DIFFERENCE THAN IN TANK #1; WE SHOULD HAVE FELT IMPROPER WT DISTRIBUTION UPON ARR INTO DTW (SAME INBOUND ACFT); BUT CTLS WERE NORMAL. WE QUESTIONED THIS STICK READING AND QUANTITY 3 TIMES WITH MECHS; AND THEY IN TURN VERIFIED QUANTITY SAYING THIS READING WAS CORRECT. A KNOWN QUANTITY WAS PUMPED INTO TANK #3 TO EQUALIZE ALL FUEL TANKS FOR DEP. IMMEDIATELY AFTER TKOF; I NOTICED A R WING HVY CTL SIT; NOT THREATENING OR DANGEROUS; JUST EXTRA L AILERON WAS REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN STRAIGHT AND LEVEL FLT. WE TRANSFERRED APPROX 2000 LBS OF FUEL FROM TANK #3 TO TANK #1 TO EQUALIZE WT DISTRIBUTION. FLT PROCEEDED NORMALLY TO DEST. WE FEEL WE HAD APPROX 2000-4000 LBS MORE FUEL IN TANK #3 THAN TANKS #1 AND #2; SO AGAIN THAT MUCH ABOVE THE DISPATCHED FUEL. EITHER MECH MISREAD STICK READING; MECH AND MAINT CTL MISINTERPRETED STICK READING; OR ACFT STICK MEASURING SYS WAS INACCURATE. MAYBE FLCS SHOULD BE TRAINED IN PROCS FOR USING STICK MEASURING METHOD IN DETERMINING FUEL QUANTITY IN A TANK WITH AN INOP FUEL GAUGE. WHEN YOU ARE ASSURED BY THE PEOPLE TRAINED TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION; YOU ARE STILL RESPONSIBLE AS PLTS; IF THESE VERY PEOPLE ARE NOT CORRECT. SINCE THE FINAL RESPONSIBILITY LIES ON THE PLT'S SHOULDERS; MAYBE WE SHOULD BE THE ONES PERFORMING THESE DUTIES.

Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.