NMAC IN NIGHT OP. SEE AND AVOID CONCEPT MISUSED.

Date: 1993-08 · Aircraft: Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Anomalies: conflict-nmac|deviation-track-heading-all-types|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-clearance|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-far|other-unspecified

Synopsis

NMAC IN NIGHT OP. SEE AND AVOID CONCEPT MISUSED.

Narrative

WE DEPARTED RWY 9R AT MIA FOR THE SORT; VFR FLT BACK TO FXE. IT WAS THE END OF A LONG DAY AND WE WERE LOOKING FORWARD TO GETTING HOME. WE HAD MADE THIS REPOSITION NUMEROUS TIMES AS WE ARE BASED AT FXE BUT A MAJORITY OF OUR FLTS GO IN AND OUT OF MIA. WE DEPARTED AND WERE INITIALLY CLRED TO CLB TO 5000 FT ON THE RWY HDG. UPON CONTACTING THE MIA DEP/APCH CTL; WE WERE PASSING THROUGH 3000 FT AND WERE INSTRUCTED TO STOP OUR CLB AT 3500 FT AND PROCEED WITH A L TURN; NBOUND ON COURSE TO FXE. AFTER WE MADE THE TURN; TRACON ISSUED A TFC TO AN ACR FLT REGARDING US. I DON'T RECALL THE ACR FLT NUMBER. ATC 'ACR Y?; YOU'LL SEE TFC AT YOUR 2 O'CLOCK AND 5 MI; NBOUND; AN LTT AT 3500.' ACR: 'WE HAVE HIM ON TCASII AND WE THINK WE SEE SOMETHING DOWN THERE. AT THIS POINT; BOTH MYSELF AND THE PF; WHO WAS ALSO THE PIC SINCE WE ARE BOTH PIC QUALIFIED; AGREED THAT WE HAD THE TFC IN SIGHT. 'AT THIS POINT; MIA APCH STATED; 'LTT X; TFC FOR YOU IS 11 O'CLOCK AND 4 MI; AN LGT ON THE DOWNWIND FOR 27L AT MIA.' WE RESPONDED; 'WE HAVE THE TFC IN SIGHT AND CAN MAINTAIN VISUAL.' MIA TRACON RESPONDED; LTT X; REF THAT TFC; YOU ARE CLR TO CLB AND MAINTAIN 5000 AND PROCEED DIRECT FXE WHEN YOU ARE ABLE.' AT THIS POINT; THE PF PROCEEDED TO TURN TO THE NW; I ASSUMED; TO PASS BEHIND THE LGT. HOWEVER; HE ROLLED OUT OF HIS TURN RIGHT AT THE OTHER ACFT AND PROCEEDED TO CLB. WE WERE INDICATING 250 KTS AND I AM SURE THE LGT WAS DOING CLOSE TO THAT AS WELL. WITH THE CLOSURE RATE THAT FOLLOWED; THERE WAS NO TIME FOR ME TO REACT AND WE PASSED APPROX 400 FT ABOVE AND SLIGHTLY BEHIND THE TAIL OF THE LGT. I COULD NOT BELIEVE WHAT I HAD JUST WITNESSED AND AT THIS POINT; THE LGT FLT COMMENTED; 'THAT WAS REAL EXCITING!' I AM CERTAIN THAT; GIVEN THE CONFLICTING FLT PATHS; HE WAS SURE TO HAVE BEEN GIVEN AN RA BY HIS TCASII. WHEN I ASKED THE PF IF HE REALIZED HOW CLOSE THAT WAS; HE STATED THAT IT WASN'T THAT CLOSE AND THAT WE WERE VFR AND COULD DO AS WE PLEASED. HE ALSO STATED THAT HE DID NOT WANT TO PASS 500 FT BELOW A HVY ACFT AS OUR ORIGINAL FLT PATH WOULD HAVE TAKEN US. WHEN I ASKED HIM WHY HE DIDN'T KEEP THE TURN IN UNTIL WE WERE CLR AND THEN CLB; HE SAID HE DIDN'T KNOW. I STILL THINK THAT A COMBINATION OF FATIGUE AND THE CITY LIGHTS WERE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IN THAT THEY OBSCURED OUR PERCEPTION OF DISTANCE AND CLOSURE RATE. ALSO; THE PF PIC WAS A NEW PIC; HAVING JUST RECENTLY UPGRADED. THIS COULD HAVE CAUSED SOME COMPLACENCY ON MY PART BECAUSE HE WAS A VERY CAPABLE SIC AND FO. HOWEVER; THE BIGGEST FACTOR WAS POOR COCKPIT RESOURCE MGMNT ON OUR PART. IF I WOULD HAVE VOICED MY THOUGHTS ABOUT WHAT I WOULD DO IF I WERE FLYING (I.E.; TURN FULLY UNTIL CLR AND THEN CLBED) AND LIKEWISE; IF MY PARTNER HAD BEEN MORE VOCAL WITH ME REGARDING HIS INTENTIONS; WE WOULD HAVE BEEN BETTER PREPARED. I; ULTIMATELY; COULD HAVE ENCOURAGED THIS BY BEING MORE VOCAL WITH MY OWN THOUGHTS AND PERCEPTIONS. AND; SINCE I WAS THE MORE EXPERIENCED PLT; I SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE ASSERTIVE. THIS; HOWEVER; COULD HAVE ALSO BEEN A FACTOR AS I HAD RECENTLY OFFENDED THIS NEW PIC BY BEING TOO ASSERTIVE. MORE COCKPIT RESOURCE MGMNT TRAINING IS NEEDED! SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 250102: I BELIEVE THE SIT COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED IF ATC WOULD HAVE CLRED US TO TURN WBOUND INSTEAD OF NBOUND AND TO CONTINUE OUR CLB TO 5000 FT.

Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.