CPR X ON GAR HAD NMAC WITH ACR Y ON GAR. MULTIPLE RWY OP INTERSECTING RWYS.

Narrative

CPR X ON SHORT FINAL TO RWY 18L. HAVING BEEN CLRED TO LAND; I HEARD ACR Y CALL L BASE TO RWY 23. ASSUMING THIS ACFT MUST BE FAIRLY CLOSE-IN; I LOOKED TO MY L AND OBSERVED MLG IN AN EXTREMELY STEEP NOSE DOWN ATTITUDE IN AN APPARENT 'DIVE' TO RWY 23. I ADVISED COPLT. AT THIS POINT; WE WERE OVER THE NUMBERS OF RWY 18L AND MLG WAS NEARLY AS CLOSE IN. REALIZING THIS WAS GOING TO GET EXTREMELY CLOSE; I ADVISED FO OF MY INTENTION TO KEEP IT HIGH AND LAND BEYOND THE INTXN. A FEW SECONDS LATER I COULD SEE EVEN THAT WAS GOING TO BE TOO CLOSE; AND AS I WAS MAKING MY DECISION TO GAR; TWR ORDERED US TO GAR. AIRSPD WAS SLOW AND ALT ABOUT 200 FT AGL. WE PASSED DIRECTLY OVER THE MLG AT INTXN OF RWYS WITH CLRNC ESTIMATED BY FO OF LESS THAN 100 FT. AS WE WERE ON THE GO; WE ALSO HEARD THE MLG INITIATE A GAR. APPARENTLY; HIS RADICAL APCH LEFT HIM WITH TOO MUCH AIRSPD TO STOP ON REMAINING RWY. HAD I NOT LOOKED OUT OF THE WINDOW AND NOTICED THIS ACFT; A COLLISION; IN MY OPINION; WOULD HAVE BEEN UNAVOIDABLE. MY DECISION TO STOP MY DSCNT TO THE RWY; IN MY MIND; HELPED TO AVOID A CATASTROPHE. I CONTACTED CTLING FACILITY AND THEY LEANED TOWARD BLAMING ACR Y FOR NOT SLOWING DOWN ON APCH. THIS WAS PROBABLY A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR; BUT WITHOUT TALKING TO THE OTHER PLT ONE CAN ONLY MAKE ASSUMPTIONS.