AN ACR OPERATED SEVERAL SMT ACFT OVER THE ACFT STRUCTURAL TIME LIMITS.

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DURING AN AUDIT PROCESS OF PAST FILES AT ACR; A PAPER WORK PROB WAS DISCOVERED INVOLVING THE ACR'S OPS SPECS AND THE LIMITS PUBLISHED FOR THE FUSELAGE AND WING STRUCTURAL LIFE LIMITS. AT MANUFACTURE OF THE ACFT; A STRUCTURAL LIFE LIMIT WAS SET AT 22500 CYCLES FOR THE WING AND FUSELAGE. WHEN A NEW LIMIT OF 37000 CYCLES WAS SET BY THE MANUFACTURER A LETTER WAS SENT TO THE ACR FAA PRINCIPLE MAINT INSPECTOR REQUESTING AN OPS SPEC CHANGE REFLECTING THE REVISED FIGURES. AT THIS POINT THE PRINCIPLE MAINT INSPECTOR REQUESTED MORE INFO TO SUPPORT THE CHANGE. DUE TO LACK OF FOLLOW-UP THE OP SPECS WERE NEVER UPDATED. AS A RESULT; 6 SMT ACFT SERIES ACFT HAVE OVERFLOWN THE FUSELAGE AND WING STRUCTURAL LIMITS AS PUBLISHED IN THE ACR'S OPS SPECS. WE BELIEVE THIS PROB TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE PROB AND NOT AN AIRWORTHINESS SAFETY PROB AS WE HAVE FACTUAL DOCUMENTATION FROM THE MANUFACTURER OF THE ACFT AUTHORIZING THE HIGHER CYCLE LIMITS WHICH ALL 6 ACFT FALL UNDER AT THIS TIME. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THAT HE WAS A NEWLY APPOINTED CHIEF INSPECTOR FOR THE OPERATOR AND THEREFORE HAD TAKEN OVER THIS MATTER WHEN HE CAME 'ABOARD.' HE STATED THAT THE FAA HAD NOT BEEN GIVEN SUFFICIENT INFO ON WHICH TO BASE AN APPROVAL UPON THE ORIGINAL OPS SPEC APPLICATION REQUESTED AMENDMENT; THEREFORE; THE PREVIOUS CHIEF OF MAINT HAD DELAYED IN OBTAINING THE NECESSARY DOCUMENTATION FROM THE MANUFACTURER FOR THE FAA. HOWEVER; THIS MATTER HAS BEEN CLRED UP BY THE FAA CLOSING OUT THIS MATTER WITH NO FURTHER ACTION.