FLC OF AN MLG ACR ACFT CONTINUED CLB AND DID NOT RESPOND TO A TCASII RA SINCE THE OTHER ACFT WAS POINTED OUT BY ATC AND WAS VISUALLY SIGHTED.
Synopsis
FLC OF AN MLG ACR ACFT CONTINUED CLB AND DID NOT RESPOND TO A TCASII RA SINCE THE OTHER ACFT WAS POINTED OUT BY ATC AND WAS VISUALLY SIGHTED.
Narrative
IT WAS THE COPLT'S LEG THIS TIME FROM A TO B AND THE WX WAS CLR 20 PLUS. ABOUT 25 MI OUT FROM OUR DEP; DEP CTL GAVE US TFC AT 1 TO 0130 O'CLOCK; 8000 FT ABOUT 1 MI. WE WERE AT 7000 FT. HE GAVE US A VFR CLB WITH REF TO THE TFC TO 10000 FT. I ROGERED THAT WE HAD HIM IN SIGHT AND AT THAT TIME THE COPLT BEGAN TO CLB. INSIDE ME; I DIDN'T WANT TO CLB BUT; SINCE THE COPLT STARTED ALREADY; I LET IT GO WITH APPREHENSION ON MY PART (MISTAKE #1). AS WE CLOSED IN ON THE TFC; I REALIZED THAT OUR HDGS WERE NOT PARALLEL BUT ON A CONVERGING COURSE (I WANTED TO ASK THE CTLR BEFORE WHEN WE RECEIVED THE CLRNC WHAT HDG HE WAS ON; BUT DIDN'T -- MISTAKE #2). THIS CAUSED OUR CLOSURE RATE TO BE A LOT FASTER THAN EXPECTED. I DIDN'T LIKE THE SIT; BUT; SINCE I STILL HAD THE TFC IN SIGHT AT 1 O'CLOCK; I DIDN'T MAKE A MOVE TO STOP OUR CLB. THEN; I REALIZED THAT THE TFC'S RELATIVE POS WASN'T CHANGING (I WANTED TO TELL THE COPLT TO MAKE A R TURN AWAY FROM THIS; BUT I DIDN'T -- MISTAKE #3). AT THIS TIME WE RECEIVED A TA; THEN AN RA TO CLB. RIGHT BEFORE THE RA; I LOST SIGHT OF THE TFC DUE TO THE NOSE HIGH POS OF THE ACFT. THE COPLT RAISED THE NOSE TO A HIGHER CLB RATE BECAUSE HE REALIZED IT WAS GOING TO TAKE MORE THAN HE THOUGHT TO GET OVER THE TFC. THE RA TOLD US TO DSND; BUT SINCE WE WERE ALREADY COMMITTED TO A HIGH RATE OF CLB; AND WE HAD EACH OTHER INSIGHT (COPLT AT THIS TIME STILL HAD THE TFC); I DECIDED IT WAS SAFER TO CONTINUE THE CLB THAN NOT TO CLB. RA LASTED ABOUT 3 SECONDS; THEN ALL CLR WITH 1200 FT SEPARATION. THE CLOSEST RA WAS ABOUT 400 FT. THE OTHER TFC HAD AN RA ALSO AND HAD US IN SIGHT. THE CTLR WAS INFORMED OF THE RA BUT SAID NO RPT WILL BE MADE SINCE IT WAS VFR CLB WITH BOTH OF US IN SIGHT OF EACH OTHER. AFTER IT WAS ALL OVER AND HAD TIME TO THINK WHAT AND COULD HAVE HAPPENED; I WAS ANGRY AT MYSELF. FROM THE BEGINNING I HAD A GUT FEELING NOT TO BUT I DID. THOSE MISTAKES TOLD YOU WHY I SHOULDN'T HAVE STARTED THE CLB.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.