ACR PIC'S THOUGHTS ON FLC BEHAVIOR FATIGUE AND THEIR RELATIONSHIPS TO FUEL REMAINING REQUIRED WHILE CONSIDERING WX FACTORS AND TERMINAL AREA WX. LANDED WITH INADEQUATE FUEL RESERVES FOR ALTERNATE ARPT.

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ENRTE TO CLE ON START (FIRST NIGHT) OF TRIP FOR NIGHT CARGO OPERATOR. FIRST NIGHT REQUIRED ADJUSTMENT FROM THE NORMAL DAY-TIME TO ALL NIGHT SCHEDULE MAKING IT THE MOST SLEEP DEPRIVED. WE WERE 2 HRS LATE ON DEP; FURTHER EXTENDING OUR DUTY PERIOD AND LEVEL OF FATIGUE. UPON ARR INTO CLE TERMINAL AREA WE WERE INFORMED THE ONLY RWY WE COULD USE (LONG ENOUGH) WAS CLOSED FOR SNOW REMOVAL. WE THEN ENTERED HOLDING FOR 1 HR INCREASING OUR LEVEL OF FATIGUE FURTHER YET. ADDING TO OUR FATIGUE WAS STRESS FROM A GROWING CONCERN OVER FUEL RESERVES VERSUS THE PRESSURE TO 'GET INTO' CLE AND 'MAKE SVC'. WE DISCUSSED THAT REQUIRED TO PROCEED TO OUR ALTERNATIVE AND DETERMINED THE FUEL REMAINING QUANTITY THAT WOULD REQUIRE US TO GO TO THE ALTERNATE. WX WAS NEAR MINIMUMS MAKING THE PROBABILITY OF A MISSED APCH HIGH. THE RWY OPENED JUST AS WE REACHED OUR 'MINIMUM' FUEL TO PROCEED TO THE ALTERNATE AND WE WERE GIVEN VECTORS TO THE APCH. MUCH TO OUR DISMAY WE WERE GIVEN AN EXTENDED DOWNWIND 19 MI FROM THE ARPT. BY THE TIME WE WERE TURNED 'INBOUND' AND CLRED FOR THE APCH OUR FUEL HAD DECREASED TO THE POINT THAT A 'MISSED APCH' WOULD HAVE NECESSITATED OUR DECLARING AN EMER TO MAKE IT TO OUR ALTERNATE SAFELY. AS WE CONTINUED ON THE APCH; THE INCREASING PRESSURE TO SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETE THE APCH TO LNDG BECAME MORE AND MORE APPARENT AS THE SO RELAYED FUEL REMAIN INFO. THE LAST RVR UPDATE I RECALL RECEIVING WAS SHORTLY AFTER LEAVING THE HOLDING PATTERN ON VECTORS FOR THE APCH. THE FO; PNF; RPTED APCH LIGHTS IN SIGHT 200-300 FT ABOVE DECISION HT. I SAW THEM SHORTLY THEREAFTER AND CONTINUED TO A LNDG. CONDITIONS WERE VERY CLOSE TO MINIMUMS. I REALIZED HOW CLOSE WE HAD COME TO A MISSED APCH AND DECLARING AN EMER LNDG TO ENSURE PRIORITY HANDLING AND A SAFE TRIP TO ALTERNATE. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: SLEEP DEPRIVATION; FATIGUE; STRESS; AND VERY VAGUE IDEAS IN TRAINING AND OPS AS TO WHAT CONSTITUTES MINIMUM FUEL FOR OUR TYPE ACFT AT OUR COMPANY. IN THE PAST; AT ANOTHER OPERATOR; OUR FOM; (OPS MANUAL) SPECIFIED A NUMBER OF LBS FUEL REMAINING REQUIRED AT THE COMPLETION OF A FLT. MY CURRENT COMPANY DOES NOT. OUR 'CLUE' IS A CHKLIST REQUIRING ALL XFEEDS TO BE OPENED BELOW 8000 LBS IN THIS INCIDENT; WE BLOCKED-IN WITH 11400 LBS REMAINING. 5000 LBS WAS REQUIRED TO GET TO THE ALTERNATE; WHICH WOULD HAVE PUT US THERE WITH ABOUT 6500 LBS - 1500 BELOW THE 'LOW FUEL' PROC REQUIREMENTS. HAD I BEEN MORE 'AWAKE' I'M SURE I WOULD HAVE ASKED THE CTLR HOW 'FAR' HE PLANNED TO TAKE US ON THE APCH AND WHAT OUR SEQUENCE WAS. HAD I KNOWN; I WOULD HAVE PROCEEDED TO THE ALTERNATE DIRECTLY FROM THE HOLDING PATTERN. I FEEL STRONGLY THAT SLEEP PATTERNS AND 'NIGHT OPS' SHOULD BE CONSIDERED BY THE FAA AND NEW REGS ON FLT/ DUTY TIMES BE ISSUED TO MINIMIZE FATIGUE AND THE RESULTING SAFETY REDUCTIONS/IMPACT.